United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE
GAIL
J. STANDISH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
In this
Social Security Disability Insurance (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits
case, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
formulated Reed’s Residual Functional Capacity
(“RFC”) based on the opinion of an examining
physician, the testimony of a vocational expert identifying a
gap in the physician’s opinion, and Plaintiff
Reed’s own testimony to fill that gap. Based on
Reed’s RFC, the ALJ determined that Reed could perform
his past relevant work and was, therefore, not disabled.
Dissatisfied with the ALJ’s determination, Reed
contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by relying
on, and speculating as to the meaning of, Reed’s
testimony instead of further developing the record by
contacting the consulting physician. The Court disagrees. The
record before the Court-and before the ALJ below-is
unambiguous and contains sufficient evidence to support the
ALJ’s RFC determination. The Court thus affirms the
Commissioner’s decision denying benefits in this case.
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
Reed
applied for DIB on February 11, 2010, and for SSI on February
17, 2010, alleging disability as of December 31, 2004.
[Administrative Record (“AR”) 422-24.] The
applications were first denied on June 8, 2010, after which
Plaintiff timely requested a hearing. [AR 256, 263, 275.] ALJ
Joel Martinez conducted hearings on January 19, 2011, June 8,
2011, and August 8, 2011. [AR 55, 103, 164.] In a decision
dated August 23, 2011, the ALJ found Reed not disabled. [AR
237-48.] Reed sought review from the Appeals Council on
September 8, 2011; the Appeals Council remanded the case for
further proceedings on January 8, 2013. [AR 382, 250.]
ALJ
Richard Urbin held a new hearing on December 16, 2013. [AR
196.] On March 21, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision, and Reed again appealed to the Appeals Council. [AR
25-27.] The Council denied his request for review on July 27,
2015. [AR 1-6.] Plaintiff appealed to this Court pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The parties
consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate
Judge. [Dkt. 11 & 12.] The parties completed briefing and
the case is ready for decision.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
The
ALJ’s March 21, 2015 decision applied the five-step
sequential evaluation process and found that Reed was not
disabled. [AR 28-44]; see 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(b)-(g)(1).[1] The ALJ determined that Reed had the
following severe impairments: history of fracture of the left
tibia; history of soft tissue injury of the right ankle;
degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine; and
degenerative disease of his left knee. [AR 34.] The ALJ found
that none of Reed’s impairments met or equaled any of
the impairments listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. [AR
38]; see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. The ALJ then concluded that Reed retained the RFC
to:
[L]ift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently. He can sit, stand and walk one hour at a time
for a total of six hours each out of eight hours. After
sitting for one hour, he must stand for about five to ten
minutes. The claimant requires the use of a cane, and it is
medically necessary. Without a cane, the claimant can walk
50 feet, and he can use his free hand to carry small
objects. The claimant can continuously reach, and he can
frequently finger, handle, push and pull. He can use his
feet continuously. He can occasionally climb ramps and
ladders, kneel, crouch, stoop and crawl. He can frequently
balance.
[AR 38-39.] The ALJ based the RFC assessment on the
evaluation of Dr. H. Harlan Bleecker, a consultative
orthopedist, as well as Reed’s testimony. [AR 39.] The
ALJ thus concluded that Reed retained the ability to perform
“a reduced range of light work.” [AR 39]; see
also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
The ALJ
determined that Reed could perform his past relevant work as
a Collections Manager, Credit and Collection, as it is
generally performed throughout the national economy. [AR
43-44.] In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ relied on the
vocational expert’s testimony that the ALJ’s
hypothetical claimant could perform Reed’s past
relevant work if he could stand and remain by his work
station while taking breaks from being seated.
GOVERNING
STANDARD
Under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the
Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the
Administration’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence; and (2) the Administration used correct legal
standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d
1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499
F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(internal citation and quotations omitted); see also
Hoopai, 499 F.3d at ...