United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
RE: DKT. NO. 46
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY United States Magistrate Judge
INTRODUCTION
Now
pending before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Pamela
Snyder (“Plaintiff”) to consolidate actions
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42. (Dkt. No.
46.[1])
Plaintiff has two civil actions pending in this District,
each involving a different property she owns. One action is
against Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC
(“Nationstar”), the other against both Nationstar
and Defendant Bank of America, N.A. (“Bank of
America”). After carefully considering the arguments
and briefing submitted, the Court concludes that oral
argument is unnecessary, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion. Plaintiff has not
established that there are any common questions of fact or
law that justify consolidating her two cases. Additionally,
consolidation would likely cause jury confusion and prejudice
to Nationstar, would not promote judicial economy, and would
result in undue delay to this suit.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s
first action was filed on June 30, 2015 and involves a
residential mortgage loan for Plaintiff’s real property
located at 2548-2550 Sutter Street, San Francisco, California
94115 (Case No. 3:15-cv-03049-JSC) (“Sutter Street
Suit”). The Court discussed the factual background of
this case in a previous order and incorporates that
discussion here. (See Dkt. No. 30 at 1-4.) Plaintiff
filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“Sutter
Street SAC”) on November 29, 2015, alleging violations
of (1) California Civil Code § 2954; (2) the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b); (3) California
Civil Code §§ 1788.11(d) and (e); and (4) the
Unfair Business Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§§ 17200-17210. (Dkt. No. 33 at 1.) The parties
engaged in written discovery and attended mediation in April
2016. (Dkt. No. 39; see also Dkt. No. 47 at 15.)
Trial is scheduled to commence on January 17, 2017. (Dkt. No.
39 at 2.)
The
second action, pending before Magistrate Judge Laporte, was
filed on September 17, 2015 and involves a loan modification
for Plaintiff’s real property located at 811 Page
Street, San Francisco, California 91117 (Case No.
3:15-cv-04228-EDL) (“Page Street Suit”).
Plaintiff asserts claims against two defendants: Nationstar
and Bank of America. Judge Laporte previously discussed the
factual background of that case in a previous order granting
a motion to dismiss; the Court incorporates Judge
Laporte’s discussion here. (See Page Street
Suit, Dkt. No. 46 at 2-4.) Plaintiff filed the operative
Third Amended Complaint (“Page Street TAC”) on
March 15, 2016, alleging causes of action for: (1) fraud
against Bank of America; (2) and (5) negligent
misrepresentation against Bank of America; (3) and (4)
violation of California Civil Code § 2923.7 against Bank
of America; (6) violation of California Civil Code §
2924.11 against Nationstar; and (7) violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692e, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, against
Nationstar. (Page Street Suit, Dkt. No. 47 at 1, 15-29.) In
the Page Street Suit, the parties have not begun discovery,
as the parties had previously engaged in three separate
rounds of briefing to dismiss Plaintiff’s various
complaints. (Page Street Suit, Dkt. Nos. 8, 19, 31.) The
parties are scheduled to have a case management conference
with Judge Laporte on July 6, 2016. (Page Street Suit, Dkt.
No. 50.) There is no trial date.
On May
23, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate her two
pending actions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42. (Dkt. No. 46.) Nationstar filed an opposition to the
motion, while Bank of America did not. (Dkt. Nos. 47, 53.)
LEGAL
STANDARD
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 42 governs consolidation of cases.
Rule 42(a) provides, in relevant part, that if “actions
before the court involve a common question of law or
fact” then “the court may: (1) join for hearing
or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2)
consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to
avoid unnecessary cost or delay.”
Under
Rule 42, “[t]he district court has broad discretion []
to consolidate cases pending in the same district.”
Inv’rs Research Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent.
Dist. of California, 877 F.2d 777, 777 (9th Cir. 1989).
In determining whether consolidation is appropriate, the
court “weighs the saving of time and effort
consolidation would produce against any inconvenience, delay,
or expense that it would cause.” Huene v. United
States, 743 F.2d 703, 704 (9th Cir. 1984). Even if a
common question exists, consolidation is not appropriate
where it results in “inefficiency, inconvenience, or
unfair prejudice to a party.” E.E.O.C. v. HBE
Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b)). The party seeking consolidation bears
the burden of demonstrating that convenience and judicial
economy would result from consolidation. Wright v. United
States, No. C 92-1290 BAC, 1993 WL 313040, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 6, 1993).
DISCUSSION
Consolidation
is not warranted. As discussed below, Plaintiff has not
established that there are any common questions of fact or
law that justify consolidating her two cases; this alone
justifies denying her motion to consolidate. Moreover, each
of the other factors that courts typically consider-jury
confusion and prejudice, judicial economy, and undue
delay-weighs against consolidation as well.
I.
Common Questions of Fact or Law
There
is no dispute that Plaintiff’s two actions do not
contain common questions of law, as both actions allege
different statutory violations requiring different statutory
analyses. (Compare Sutter Street SAC at 1,
with Page Street TAC at 1.) Plaintiff concedes this
point, arguing only that the two ...