United States District Court, C.D. California
Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
DEFENDANT REGINALD BAILEY’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S JUNE 8, 2016 ORDER
DENYING DISMISSAL OF THE 924(c) COUNTS (Dkt. 201)
Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER J.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
3, 2014, a federal grand jury indicted defendants Reginald
Bailey (“Bailey”) and Dominic Dorsey
(“Dorsey”) with one count of conspiracy to
interfere with interstate commerce by robbery (count one), in
violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); five
substantive Hobbs Act robbery counts (counts two through
six); and five counts of possessing, using, carrying, and
brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence
(counts seven through 11), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii). See Dkt. 1. On January 14, 2016,
defendants’ first trial ended with a hung jury.
See Dkt. 178. Accordingly, all pending motions were
mooted, with the exception of a memorandum of law filed by
defendant Reginald Bailey on December 26, 2015. Dkt. 141
memorandum, Bailey argued that counts seven through eleven of
the indictment should be dismissed in light of recent
authority that purportedly calls into question whether Hobbs
Act robbery constitutes a “crime of violence, ”
as is necessary for the government to sustain its charges
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) for possessing,
using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of
a “crime of violence.” Id. On December
31, 2015, the government filed a response to
defendant’s memorandum of law, arguing, among other
things, that defendant’s memorandum should be ignored
or otherwise denied as an untimely dispositive motion to
dismiss nearly half of the counts in this case. Dkt. 143.
3, 2016, the government filed the operative Second
Superceding Indictment, which again charges defendants with
one Hobbs Act conspiracy count, five substantive Hobbs Act
robbery counts, and five counts of possessing, using,
carrying, and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime
of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
order dated June 8, 2016, the Court construed defendant
Bailey’s memorandum of law as a motion to dismiss
counts seven through eleven of the Indictment. Dkt. 200
(Order). In its order, the Court denied Bailey’s motion
and, in so doing, “join[ed] a growing list of district
courts to have found, in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in [Johnson v. United States,
135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) (“Johnson II”)],
that under the categorical approach, Hobbs Act robbery
constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(3)(A).” Id. (collecting cases).
23, 2016, defendant Bailey filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Court’s June 8, 2016 order. Dkt. 201
(“Mot. Recon.”). On June 29, 2016, the government
filed an opposition to the instant motion. Dkt. 203
(“Opp’n”). On June 30, 2016, the Court held
oral argument on the instant motion, during which defendant
Dorsey joined defendant Bailey in moving for reconsideration
of the Court’s prior order.
carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court
finds and concludes as follows.
not expressly authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, motions for reconsideration are allowed in
criminal cases.” United States v. Jones, 916
F.Supp.2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2013); see also United States v.
Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting
“district courts generally have ‘inherent
authority’ to decide motions for reconsideration and
rehearing of orders in criminal proceedings”) (citation
omitted). Because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do
not address motions for reconsideration, the Court here
“applies the rationale of Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the
rules of civil procedure . . . .” United States v.
Aguilar, 886 F.Supp. 740, 741-42 (E.D. Wash. 1994);
see also United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282,
286 (3d Cir. 2003) (motion for reconsideration permitted in a
criminal case and governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or
motions for reconsideration are justified where new evidence
has come to light, or where there is a need to correct clear
error or to prevent manifest injustice. See Page v.
Something Weird Video, 960 F.Supp. 1438, 1440 (C.D. Cal.
1996). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
“the court may relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment . . . [or] order” based upon, inter
alia, (1) “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect”; (2) “newly discovered
evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b)”; (3) “fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by
an opposing party”; or (4) “any other reason that
under Central District Local Civil Rule 7-18, “[a]
motion for reconsideration of the decision on any motion may
be made only on the grounds of (a) a material difference in
fact or law from that presented to the Court before such
decision that in the exercise of reasonable diligence could
not have been known to the party moving for reconsideration
at the time of such decision, or (b) the emergence of new
material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of
such decision, or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to
consider material facts presented to the Court before such
decision. No motion for reconsideration shall in any manner
repeat any oral or written argument made in support of or in
opposition to the original motion.” See C.D.
Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-18.