Order
Filed Date 7/19/16
Monterey
County Superior Court No.: SSC120180A The Honorable Carrie M.
Panetta, Judge.
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant Juaquin Gacia Soto:
Stephen B. Bedrick under appointment by the Court of Appeal
for Appellant
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent The People: Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General of California Gerald A Engler, Chief
Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior
Assistant Attorney General Seth K. Schalit, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General Kevin Kiley, Deputy Attorney General
Amit Kurlekar, Deputy Attorney General
ORDER
MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING
THE
COURT:
It is
ordered that the opinion filed herein on June 30, 2016, be
modified as follows:
1. The
text of Footnote 8 on page 19 is replaced with the following
text:
In a
petition for rehearing, the Attorney General belatedly argues
that the instruction should not have been given because
defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense was
purely delusional. (See Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at
p. 960.) The record, however, contains substantial evidence
from which reasonable jurors could have found that
defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense was not
entirely delusional. For example, defendant’s expert
testified that sleep deprivation caused by methamphetamine
use negatively affects users’ ability to process
information, form judgments, and make good decisions. That
the trial court admitted this evidence and allowed defendant
to raise a claim of imperfect self-defense constituted an
implicit finding that substantial evidence supported the
instruction notwithstanding the holding of Elmore.
2. On
page 22, the following footnote, numbered footnote 10, is
appended to the last sentence of Section II.A., immediately
preceding the heading for Section II.B.:
In her
petition for rehearing, the Attorney General contends we sua
sponte raised the issue of voluntary intoxication as it
pertains to express malice. She argues that defendant limited
his claim to voluntary intoxication as it applies to
implied malice only. Defendant did not state his
claim in so limited a fashion. Much of defendant’s
argument concerned malice generally without specifying
implied or express malice, and he relied on case law
pertaining to imperfect self-defense as it applies to express
malice. (See appellant’s opening brief at page 17,
citing Elmore, supra, and In re
Christian S., supra.) Indeed, the Attorney
General’s brief in response acknowledged that
defendant’s claim included express malice. (See
respondent’s brief at page 3, stating “Appellant
argues that a jury instruction explaining that evidence of
his voluntary intoxication could be considered for purposes
of (1) negating express malice....”)
The
Attorney General’s petition for rehearing also contends
our holding produces an “incongruous” result
because a defendant charged with implied malice murder cannot
present evidence of voluntary intoxication, while a defendant
charged with express malice-an arguably more culpable state
of mind-is allowed to present such evidence. To the extent
this result may be incongruous, it is a consequence of
Section 29.4, which explicitly makes voluntary intoxication
relevant to express malice while omitting implied malice.
Respondent’s
petition for rehearing is denied.
There
is no change in the judgment.
Márquez, J.
Defendant
Juaquin Garcia Soto, armed with a knife, kicked in the front
door of Israel Ramirez’s apartment. Upon entering the
apartment, defendant found Ramirez and his partner, Patricia
Saavedra, sitting in the living room watching television. The
couple’s young son was also in the living room. Shortly
thereafter, defendant and Ramirez engaged in a knife fight in
which both parties stabbed each other multiple times.
Defendant then fled the scene and Ramirez died from his
wounds.
At
trial, Saavedra testified that defendant started the knife
fight by stabbing Ramirez first. Defendant, however, claimed
that Ramirez started the knife fight, forcing defendant to
protect himself with his knife. Defendant also testified that
he had been using alcohol and methamphetamine in the days
before the offense. Based on defendant’s version of
events, defendant asserted a theory of imperfect
self-defense.
The
jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder and first
degree burglary. The jury also found that defendant had used
a deadly or dangerous weapon with respect to both counts. The
trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 16 years
to life in prison.
Defendant
raises two claims on appeal. First, he contends the trial
court erred by limiting the jury’s consideration of
evidence of voluntary intoxication. Based on a modified
version of CALCRIM No. 625, the trial court precluded the
jury from considering evidence of defendant’s voluntary
intoxication with respect to his claim of imperfect
self-defense. But Penal Code section 29.4 expressly allows
for consideration of voluntary intoxication with respect to
express malice. Because an actual but unreasonable belief in
the need for self-defense negates express malice, Penal Code
section 29.4 makes evidence of voluntary intoxication
relevant to the state of mind required for imperfect
self-defense. We therefore hold the trial court erred by
precluding the jury from considering evidence of
defendant’s voluntary intoxication with respect to his
claim of imperfect self-defense. We conclude, however, that
this error was not prejudicial.
Second,
defendant contends the trial court erred by excluding certain
pretrial statements he made to police. He also contends his
trial counsel was ineffective by failing to introduce the
statements as prior consistent statements. We hold
defendant’s pretrial statements were not admissible as
prior consistent statements. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err when it excluded the statements, and defense counsel
was not ineffective for failing to seek their admission.
Finding
no prejudicial error, we will affirm the judgment.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
A.
Facts of the Offense
1.
Overview
The
victim, Israel Ramirez, lived with his partner Patricia
Saavedra and their two children in an apartment on the second
floor of a two-story building in Greenfield, California. On
July 20, 2012, defendant, an unemployed 32-year-old farm
worker, entered the building and went to the second floor.
First, he knocked on the door of Bernadino Solano’s
apartment. When Solano opened the door, defendant stepped in,
briefly looked around, and left. Shortly thereafter,
defendant kicked in the door of Ramirez’s apartment
down the hall from Solano’s apartment. Ramirez,
Saavedra, and their young son were sitting in the living room
watching television when defendant entered the apartment.
The
parties put forth different versions of the subsequent
events. Saavedra testified that defendant approached them and
stabbed Ramirez in the neck while the couple sat on the
couch. She testified that Ramirez then went into the kitchen
with defendant in pursuit while she retreated to a bedroom
with their child. In his testimony, defendant admitted that
he had kicked in the front door of the apartment, but he
testified he was about to leave when Ramirez approached him
with a knife and stabbed him first. Defendant claimed that
only then did he take out his knife to defend himself.
Police
found Ramirez’s body lying face down in a pool of blood
on the floor of the hallway outside the apartment. Defendant,
who had fled the scene, was later arrested at a
relative’s house.
2.
Testimony of Bernadino Solano
Bernadino
Solano testified as follows. He lived with his wife and
family in their second-floor apartment, neighboring
Ramirez’s apartment. On July 10, 2012, at around 6:00
p.m., Solano heard someone knocking loudly on his door. When
Solano opened the door, he saw defendant standing there
looking upset. Defendant told Solano to come out into the
hallway, but Solano refused and tried to shut the door.
Defendant stuck his foot inside to prevent the door from
closing. He then pushed the door back open. Defendant
appeared angry and was hiding his right hand behind his back.
Defendant then took three steps into Solano’s
apartment, looked around, and walked out. While Solano closed
and locked the door, his daughter called 911. About a half
hour later, Solano heard noises from down the hall that
sounded like a door being kicked in.
On
cross-examination, Solano testified that defendant did not
appear intoxicated. Solano admitted, however, that he had
testified at the preliminary hearing that defendant appeared
intoxicated.
3.
Testimony of Patricia Saavedra
Patricia
Saavedra testified as follows. She and Ramirez lived together
in a second-floor apartment on Oak Avenue in Greenfield. At
the time of the offense, they had been living together for
about three years.
On July
10, 2012, Saavedra and Ramirez were sitting on the couch in
their living room watching television. Their young son was
sitting on the floor about two feet away. A renter was
staying in another room of the apartment. At around 6:40
p.m., defendant kicked in the door and entered the apartment.
Defendant started walking slowly towards Ramirez and Saavedra
while looking from side to side. Defendant had his right hand
in his front pocket. Ramirez asked defendant what he wanted.
Defendant kept asking if Ramirez was alone. Ramirez and
Saavedra remained seated on the couch. When defendant got to
the couch, he stabbed Ramirez in the neck with a knife.
Ramirez got up and went to the kitchen. Saavedra got up and
grabbed her son. Defendant said something to her in English
and held the knife up. Saavedra did not understand what
defendant had said because she did not speak English.
Defendant then followed Ramirez into the kitchen. At the same
time, Saavedra took her son into a nearby room where they
sheltered in place with Saavedra’s young daughter.
From
the other room, Saavedra could hear the sound of the two men
“grabbing each other.”[1] She remained in the room
for about five minutes while she called 911. When she came
out, defendant and Ramirez were gone. She asked the renter if
he had seen Ramirez, but the renter said he had not. Saavedra
then went into the hallway and saw Ramirez’s dead body.
Saavedra
testified that while defendant’s behavior seemed
strange, he did not stumble or slur his words. When asked why
she remained on the couch as defendant approached, she
replied that “we are not trouble makers, ” and
“we hadn’t done anything.” She testified
that when defendant initially broke in, she asked Ramirez,
“Do you know this man? Do you have a problem with
him?” Ramirez responded, “No.”
4.
Testimony of Jae Yi
Jae Yi
testified as follows. Yi was the manager of a grocery store
on the first floor of the building. The entrance to the
upstairs apartments was behind a gated doorway around the
corner on the side of the building. Yi testified that around
6:00 p.m. he heard noises upstairs that sounded like children
running. He asked an employee to go upstairs and tell them to
“keep it down.” The employee went around to the
entrance on the side of the building, came back, and told Yi
there were no children upstairs. Yi then went around to the
side of the building to see what was going on.
Yi
found defendant inside the gated doorway, groaning and
breathing heavily. Yi told him to come out, and defendant
complied. Defendant was bleeding from a wound in his side,
and his hand was bloody. Yi told him to sit down and offered
to call an ambulance, but defendant refused. Instead, he
paced back and forth on the sidewalk in front of the doorway
while Yi called the ambulance. Defendant appeared to be
talking to himself in Spanish. After pacing for about five
minutes, defendant went into an empty parking lot on the side
of ...