United States District Court, N.D. California
GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Re:
Dkt. Nos. 10, 11
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending
before the Court are two motions to dismiss Plaintiffs'
complaint brought by (1) Contra Costa County and Director
William Walker, M.D. (the "County MTD") and (2) the
City of Antioch, the Antioch Police Department, Antioch
Police Chief Allan Cantando, Officer Huleman, and Officer
Smith (the "City MTD"). Dkt. Nos. 10, 11. For the
reasons articulated below, the motions are GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
For
purposes of deciding the motions, the Court accepts the
following as true: On April 4, 2015, Defendant Antioch Police
Department received a call from Afroza Chowdhury, who was
living at her ex-husband's home. Dkt. No. 1
("Compl.") ¶¶ 1, 24. Defendants Officer
Huleman and Officer Smith responded to the call, but when
they arrived they found it difficult to understand Ms.
Chowdhury. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. The officers
spoke with Ms. Chowdhury's son, Plaintiff Yassar Ahmed,
who gave them his number and asked them to call him if they
took his mother anywhere so that he could come to assist her.
Id. ¶¶ 26-27. Ms. Chowdhury was mentally
unstable and expressing suicidal ideations. Id.
¶ 23.
Officers
Huleman and Smith decided to put Ms. Chowdhury in an
involuntary psychiatric hold under California Welfare &
Institutions Code § 5150, and simultaneously took her
ex-husband into custody for suspicion of domestic violence.
Id. ¶¶ 28-29. Ms. Chowdhury was taken to
the Contra Costa Regional Medical Center ("CCMC")
by ambulance, but Officers Huleman and Smith did not inform
Mr. Ahmed. Id. ¶¶ 30-31.
Once at
CCMC, Ms. Chowdhury was seen by Defendant Victor
Torres-Collazo, M.D., a psychiatrist. Id. ¶ 32.
Dr. Torres-Collazo released Ms. Chowdhury from the
involuntary psychiatric hold in the early hours of April 5,
2015. Id. ¶ 32. Despite CCMC's policy of
notifying next of kin prior to releasing mental health
patients, no one attempted to notify Ms. Chowdhury's
family before she was released. Id. ¶¶
33-34.
Upon
her release, Ms. Chowdhury was placed in a taxi cab owned by
Defendant Concord Cab Company and driven by Defendant Kyle
Gourley. Id. ¶ 35. CCMC gave Mr. Gourley a
payment slip and directed him to drive Ms. Chowdhury back to
her ex-husband's home. Id. ¶ 36. Ms.
Chowdhury repeatedly questioned Mr. Gourley about their
destination during the drive. Id. ¶ 37. While
the taxi was still moving on the freeway, Ms. Chowdhury
opened the passenger door and jumped out. Id. at
¶¶ 38-39. She was struck and killed on the freeway.
Id. ¶ 39.
Plaintiffs
Maria Ahmed and Yassar Ahmed, successors-in-interest to Ms.
Chowdhury's estate, bring five claims for relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and California statutes: (1) deliberate
indifference to Ms. Chowdhury's medical needs in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) supervisory
liability in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) a
Monell claim; (4) a "survival action"; and
(5) wrongful death. See generally id.
II.
DISCUSSION
On
April 28, 2016, Defendants Contra Costa County and Dr.
Walker[1] (together, the "County
Defendants") moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims as
to the County Defendants. County MTD. On April 29, 2016,
Defendants City of Antioch, Chief Cantando, [2] the Antioch
Police Department, Officer Huleman, and Officer Smith
(together, the "City Defendants") moved to dismiss
Plaintiffs' complaint as to the City Defendants. Both the
County Defendants and the City Defendants contend that
Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim for which
relief can be granted.
A.
Legal Standard
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" A
defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). "Dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a
cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a
cognizable legal theory." Mendiondo v. Centinela
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible when a plaintiff pleads "factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In
reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts
"accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and
construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
Nonetheless, Courts do not "accept as true allegations
that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact,
or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Scis.
Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). And
even where facts are accepted as true, "a plaintiff may
plead [him]self out of court" if he "plead[s] facts
which establish that he cannot prevail on his . . .
claim." Weisbuch v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 119
F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
If
dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6), a court
"should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend
the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading
could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other
facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130
(9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
B.
Section 1983 Claims (Claims One, Two, Three, and
Four)
Plaintiffs
assert four claims under § 1983: (1) deliberate
indifference to Ms. Chowdhury's medical needs in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) supervisory
liability in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) a
Monell claim; and (4) a "survival action."
See Compl.
"To
state a section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege that
(1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person
acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived
the plaintiff of a constitutional right." L.W. v.
Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1992).
"In
order for a person acting under color of state law to be
liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal
participation in the alleged rights deprivation: there is no
respondeat superior liability under section 1983."
Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978)). Likewise, a government entity "cannot be
held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. A government
entity can only be liable under § 1983 if "a
policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be
a moving force behind a violation of constitutional
rights." Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d
892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
658)).
With
these principles in mind, the Court will address the
sufficiency of each of ...