United States District Court, S.D. California
ASA A. ALPHONSO, Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, et al., Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
HON.
M. JAMES LORENZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Asa A.
Alphonso (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner, filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 22 U.S.C. §
2254 challenging his conviction and sentence for nine felony
offenses against Michelle C. These offenses include two
counts of corporal injury on a cohabitant, two counts of
false imprisonment by violence, and one count each of assault
by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury,
assault with a deadly weapon, rape, attempting to dissuade a
witness from reporting a crime, and making a criminal threat.
(Lod. 2 [Doc. 17-7], 179-81.) On August 12, 2015, Magistrate
Judge Jan M. Adler issued a report and recommendation
recommending the prejudicial dismissal of Petitioner’s
22 U.S.C. § 2254 claims. (See R&R [Doc. 17].)
Petitioner timely objected to the report and recommendation
(See Objection [Doc. 18].) In reviewing a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation, the district court
“shall make a de novo determination of those portions
of the report . . . to which objection is made, ” and
“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the reasons
stated below, the Court overrules Petitioner’s
objections and adopts the report and recommendation.
I.
Factual Background
After
reviewing the report and recommendation, the Court finds its
factual background section to be a comprehensive and accurate
reflection of the underlying record. Accordingly, the Court
adopts it as its own. (See R&R 2:7-7:22.)
II.
Legal Standard
This
Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").
See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under
AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to
any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless
that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state
court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v.
Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). In deciding a state
prisoner's habeas petition, a federal court is not called
upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court's
determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily
deferential review, inquiring only whether the state
court's decision was objectively unreasonable. See
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina
v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004).
III.
Objections
Petitioner
advances four objections. He contends that the report and
recommendation is erroneous inasmuch as it found that (1) the
state court’s alleged abuse of discretion in denying
his motion for a new trial is not cognizable on federal
habeas review; (2) the exclusion of Michelle C’s
estranged husband’s testimony did not violate
Petitioner’s right to present a complete defense; (3)
the harmless error standard articulated in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) does not govern here; and
(4) Petitioner’s Batson / Wheeler
challenge based on the allegedly racially discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges lacked merit. (See Objection.) The
Court will address these objections in turn.[1]
A.
Claim 1
Petitioner
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for a new trial based on the allegedly
wrongful exclusion of Michelle C’s estranged
husband’s testimony. (Petition [Doc. 1] 12:2-15:2;
Objection 2:12-3:23.) Habeas relief under § 2254 is
available only for violations of federal law. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (a). Petitioner concedes the fact that, in
his first claim, he cites only to California state case law
to support his abuse of discretion claim. (Objection
2:21-22.) Nevertheless, Petitioner contends that his first
claim presents an issue of federal law because its heading
includes a reference to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The
Court disagrees. While the heading suggests that his first
claim will allege federal constitutional violations, the fact
remains that the substance of this section focuses
exclusively on the alleged violation of his state statutory
right to a new trial. The mere reference to an Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, unaccompanied by any analysis or
citation to authority, does not suffice to convert an issue
of state law into a federal issue cognizable on federal
habeas review. See Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988,
993-94 (9th Cir. 1985).
B.
Claim 2
Petitioner
contends that the state violated his right to present a
defense by not allowing him to call Michelle C’s
estranged husband as an impeachment witness. (Petition
15:3-19:26; Objection 4:1-5:8.) The Compulsory Process Clause
of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment establish that criminal defendants have
“the right to put before a jury evidence that might
influence the determination of guilt.” Pennsylvania
v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987).
After
the prosecution rested, and outside of the presence of the
jury, the trial court heard the testimony of Michelle
C’s estranged husband Kip Cowell
(“Cowell”). Cowell testified that he married
Michelle C in 1991, and the two were together for about 16
years before separating. (Lod. 1 Vol. 2 [Doc. 16-3],
387:23-388:4.) Cowell testified that Michelle C made various
allegations of abuse against him during this time.
Specifically, Cowell was in the Navy, and he claims that
Michelle C approached the Navy with accusations that he
mentally abused her, physically abused her, financially
abused her, and sexually abused her. Michelle C also
contacted child protective services alleging sexual abuse of
their daughter. These accusations were based on
Cowell’s actions of engaging Michelle C in arguments
that caused her stress (mental abuse); prying his work laptop
computer from her hands when she refused to let go of it
voluntarily (physical abuse); taking over the finances and,
after separation, creating a bank account she could not
access (financial ...