California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division
JOHN C. TORJESEN, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
HARRY MANSDORF, Individually and as Trustee, etc., et al., Defendants JAIME DEJESUS GONZALEZ, Third Party Claimant and Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the Superior Court for Los Angeles County,
No. BC425880 Elizabeth White, Judge.
Long
Beach Legal, John C. Feely; Jaime DeJesus Gonzalez, in pro.
per., for Third Party Claimant and Appellant.
John
C. Torjesen, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WILLHITE, J.
The
Enforcement of Judgments Law (Code Civ. Proc., §§
680.010 et seq.) (the EJL) provides that "[a]fter the
death of the judgment debtor, enforcement of a judgment
against property in the judgment debtor's estate is
governed by the Probate Code, and not by this title."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 686.020.) The Probate Code provides
that money judgments against a decedent, or claims against a
deceased settlor or trustee of a trust, are payable in the
course of administration, and are not enforceable under the
EJL against property in the estate of the decedent or the
trust estate unless the property had been levied upon before
the decedent died. (Prob. Code, §§ 9300, 9303,
19300, 19303.)
In the
case before us, a judgment creditor obtained a judgment
against a judgment debtor (individually and as trustee of the
debtor's trust), but did not levy on the debtor's
property until after the debtor died. A third party claimant
to the property filed a third party claim, and the judgment
creditor filed a petition under the EJL to invalidate the
third party claim. The trial court granted the judgment
creditor's petition. The third party claimant did not
appeal from that ruling. Two years later, the third party
claimant filed a motion to vacate the order granting the
petition, on the ground that it is void because the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to proceed under the EJL. The
trial court denied the motion, and the third party claimant
appealed.
We
conclude that the underlying order invalidating the third
party claim was voidable, not void, and became final once the
time to appeal that order ran. Therefore, we hold the trial
court properly denied the third party claimant's belated
motion to vacate that order.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
John C. Torjesen obtained a $2 million judgment against
defendants Harry Mansdorf, individually and as trustee of the
Mansdorf Family Revocable Trust (the Trust) on January 31,
2012. On September 17, 2012, he obtained a writ of
execution[1] and on October 11, 2012, the Ventura
County Sheriff's Department, at the direction of
Torjesen, levied on property (the Malibu property) owned by
Mansdorf as trustee of the Trust. Mansdorf, however, had died
on August 27, 2012.
On
March 6, 2013, the Ventura County Sheriff's Department
mailed to the Trust a notice that the Malibu property was
scheduled to be sold at a Sheriff's auction on April 18,
2013. Eight days later, third party claimant Jaime DeJesus
Gonzalez filed a third party claim to ownership and
possession of the Malibu property pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 720.130 (part of the EJL). Gonzalez
asserted that in 2008, Mansdorf, in his capacity as trustee
of the Trust, had transferred the Malibu property to himself
(in his individual capacity) and Gonzalez as joint tenants.
Gonzalez contended that at the time Torjesen levied on the
property, neither Mansdorf nor the Trust owned it because it
had passed to Gonzalez by right of survivorship, free and
clear of Torjesen's liens, at the time of Mansdorf's
death.
In
response, on March 25, 2013, Torjesen sought and obtained a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the Ventura County
Sheriff's Department from releasing the Malibu property
from the execution levy until the trial court could hear and
determine a petition on the validity of the third party
claim. Two days later, Torjesen filed a petition under the
ELJ to invalidate Gonzalez's third party claim. The
petition alleged that (1) Gonzalez was not a valid third
party claimant under Code of Civil Procedure section 720.110;
(2) the grant deed under which Gonzalez claimed ownership was
recorded after Torjesen's judgment, and therefore did not
supersede Torjesen's interest; (3) the grant deed was
inconsistent with the terms of the joint venture agreement
pursuant to which the transfer allegedly occurred; (4) the
grant deed Gonzalez filed was altered, which rendered it
void; (5) there was no effective delivery of the grant deed
from Mansdorf to Gonzalez; and (6) Gonzalez's claim of
ownership under joint tenancy was contrary to representations
he made in federal court that the Malibu property passed to
Mansdorf's estate upon his death.
Gonzalez's
opposition to the petition was due a week later, on April 3,
2013. The day before the opposition was due, Gonzalez's
attorney sought an extension of time to file the opposition,
citing a medical issue, but the trial court denied the
request. The next day, Gonzalez filed a declaration by
Mansdorf's widow in support of his third party claim; he
filed no points and authorities in opposition to
Torjesen's petition.
On
April 8, 2013, the day before the scheduled hearing,
Gonzalez's attorney substituted out of the case, and
Gonzalez, in propria persona, filed a request for dismissal
without prejudice of his claim. The court entered the
dismissal that same day. A week later, Torjesen filed an ex
parte application asking the trial court to reconsider its
ruling dismissing Gonzalez's claim, arguing that under
the EJL, proceedings to determine the validity of a third
party claim cannot be dismissed without the consent of the
judgment creditor. On April 15, 2013, the trial court granted
Torjesen's request for reconsideration, retracted its
order dismissing the third party claim, and granted
Torjesen's petition to invalidate Gonzalez's third
party claim. Gonzalez did not appeal the trial court's
order.
Two
years later, Gonzalez, represented by new counsel, filed an
ex parte application to vacate the trial court's order
invalidating his third party claim. Gonzalez argued that the
third party claim process used in the case was unlawful
because the judgment debtor had died before the execution
lien was perfected (citing Code Civ. Proc., § 686.020
and Prob. Code, §§ 19300, 19303), and therefore the
order was void. The trial court denied the application on
March 18, 2015, stating that the matter was resolved when the
court granted ...