Castro v. G.L.R. Construction

          ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE RE: DKT. NOS. 17, 19, 36

          EDWARD J. DAVILA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         I. INTRODUCTION

         Plaintiff Steve D. Castro (“Plaintiff”) filed a three-page “Employment Discrimination Complaint” on November 30, 2015, against Defendants G.L.R. Construction, Silicon Valley Crane, Inc., Joe O. Alexander Builder, Inc. and Andrew Shin Law Firm, through which Plaintiff purportedly asserts claims for employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Dkt. No. 1. Two of the defendants, Silicon Valley Crane and Andrew Shin Law Firm, move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. Nos. 17, 19. Silicon Valley Crane also moves for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), and Andrew Shin Law Firm has filed a motion to strike two proclaimed amended complaints filed by Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 36. For his part, Plaintiff filed a document on February 17, 2016, which the court has construed as his opposition to the dismissal motions. Dkt. No. 30.^[1]

         Federal jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. These matters are suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Accordingly, the hearing scheduled for July 7, 2016, is VACATED. Because Plaintiff’s complaint is inconsistent with the pleading standard that applies to civil cases, the motions to dismiss must be granted. The motion to strike will also be granted because the two amended complaints were not properly filed.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). The factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” such that the claim “is plausible on its face.” Id. at 556-57. A complaint that falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).

         When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must generally accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). The court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

         Also, the court generally does not consider any material beyond the pleadings for a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990). Exceptions to this rule include material submitted as part of the complaint or relied upon in the complaint, and material subject to judicial notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-69 (9th Cir. 2001).

         B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15

         Amendments to pleadings are primarily governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Under Rule 15(a)(1), a party “may amend its pleading once as a matter of course” within 21 days after that pleading is served, or 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or motion under Rule 12. “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).

         “The law is clear that district courts have the inherent power to control their docket, and in the exercise of that power, they may properly strike improper documents.” Zepeda v. Paypal, Inc., No. C 10-2500 SBA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69297, at *12-13, 2013 WL 2147410 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2013).

         III.DISCUSSION

         A. Plaintiff Failed to Satisfy the ...