United States District Court, E.D. California
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Theresa Niesen brought this civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants violated her
Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully seizing her dogs and
arresting her following a probation search of her home. The
matter is now before the court, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, on (1) defendants Yolo County
Sheriff’s Deputies Lech Garcia, Juan Ceja, and Jerry
Lazaro’s (“Deputies”) motion for summary
judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims, (Docket No. 20),
and (2) defendants Yolo County Animal Control Officers
Michael Nevis and Vanus Bigelow’s
(“Officers”) motion for summary judgment on all
of plaintiff’s claims, (Docket No. 21).
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
On June
26, 2012, Shane Edington was sentenced in the Superior Court
of California, County of Yolo, to three years’ summary
probation for various misdemeanor convictions. (Req. for
Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Ex. A (Docket No.
20-3).)[1] The terms of Edgington’s probation
required him to submit to any search of his person, vehicle,
or residence for stolen property “at any time of day or
night[, ] with or without [a] warrant, upon the request of
any peace officer.” (Id.)
In
December 2012, Yolo County Sheriff’s Deputy Lazaro
planned to conduct a probation search of Edgington. (Dehoff
Decl. Ex. H (“Lazaro Dep.”) at 6:25-22:6 (Docket
No. 20-4).) To obtain Edgington’s most recent address,
Deputy Lazaro spoke with a confidential informant that he had
used on five previous occasions and believed to be reliable.
(Id.) The informant told Deputy Lazaro that
Edgington resided with plaintiff, his girlfriend, at 138
Antelope Street in Woodland, California (the
“House”). (Id.) Deputy Lazaro then
followed up with Yolo County Superior Court’s Criminal
Division to inquire about Edgington’s most recent
listed address. (Id.) The court informed Deputy
Lazaro that its master court file listed Edgington’s
current address as 138 Antelope Street in Woodland,
California. (Id.; see Dehoff Decl. Ex. G.)
Based
on this information and believing that Edgington resided in
the House, Deputies Lazaro, Ceja, and Garcia arrived at the
House on December 17, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. to conduct the
probation search. (Lazaro Dep. at 22:16-24:10.) Plaintiff,
who resided in the House, was not home at the time of the
probation search. (Dehoff Decl. Ex. L (“Van Asperen
Dep.”) at 9:14-15:19; Dehoff Decl. Ex. N (“Niesen
Dep.”) at 12:9-13:11.) The Deputies knocked on the
front door and announced themselves as sheriffs. (Lazaro Dep.
at 23:1-23.) After receiving no response, the Deputies
entered the House through the front door. (Id.;
Dehoff Decl. Ex. J (“Garcia Dep.”) at
12:16-15:19.) The Deputies encountered one male, Vincent Van
Asperen, and one female, Carol Vitalie, on the sofa in the
living room. (Lazaro Dep. at 23:24-24:10.) Van Asperen and
Vitalie consented to a search of their persons, which
revealed a methamphetamine glass pipe in each of their
possessions. (Id. at 61:1-21; Garcia Dep. at
15:20-18:18.)
Deputy
Lazaro performed a protective sweep of the House and found a
bedroom with a closed door in the back of the House. (Lazaro
Dep. at 27:16-30:10.) Upon partially opening the bedroom
door, Deputy Lazaro observed three pit bull terriers barking
and growling, video monitoring equipment that showed the
front of the House, and an open sliding glass door on the
other side of the room leading out to the backyard.
(Id.) Suspecting that Edgington was in the bedroom
and had taken off, Deputy Lazaro called Animal Control to
secure the three pit bulls so the Deputies could search the
bedroom.[2] (Id. at 58:21-59:2; Dehoff Decl.
Ex. I (“Ceja Dep.”) at 52:11-53:14.)
Animal
Control Officer Nevis arrived a short time later with a snare
pole used for catching, holding, and releasing animals.
(Lazaro Dep. at 30:11-32:14; Dehoff Decl. Ex. K (“Nevis
Dep.”) at 12:5-13:25.) Officer Nevis and Deputy Lazaro,
who had his Taser out, partially opened the bedroom door and
observed the three pit bulls barking and growling inside.
(Lazaro Dep. at 30:11-32:14.) Officer Nevis snared the first
pit bull and began to lead it out of the bedroom.
(Id.) As Nevis was leading the snared dog out of the
door, the second pit bull jumped over the snared dog and
advanced toward Officer Nevis. (Id.) Deputy Lazaro
tased the second pit bull and momentarily subdued it.
(Id.) The third pit bull then ran out of the bedroom
and, in doing so, dislodged the Taser wires attached to the
second dog, which stopped the shocking process and freed it.
(Id.) The two free pit bulls then ran down the
hallway toward the living room, and Deputy Lazaro yelled a
warning to the other Deputies. (Id.; Nevis Dep. at
12:5-13:25.)
One pit
bull ran toward Deputy Ceja, who initially shot it three
times and then four additional times when it “continued
to come at [him].” (Ceja Dep. at 19:15-23:12, 28:2-23,
54:7-55:3.) The other pit bull ran toward the sofa where Van
Asperen, Vitalie, and Deputy Garcia were. Deputy Garcia shot
the pit bull twice from six to eight feet away as it ran
toward them. (Garcia Dep. at 24:24-26:1; Van Asperen Dep. at
40:24-41:9.) Animal Control Officer Bigelow subsequently
arrived at the House and took possession of the snared dog
from the bedroom, as Officer Nevis and Deputy Ceja placed the
two wounded pit bulls in Nevis’ vehicle and Nevis drove
them to an animal clinic at the University of California at
Davis, School of Veterinary Medicine. (Ceja Dep. at 27:12-17,
29:4-12; Dehoff Decl. Ex. O-1 (“Bigelow Dep.”) at
15:17-17:12 (Docket No. 21-3).) By the time Officer Nevis
reached the clinic, however, the dogs had died from their
wounds. (Nevis Dep. at 14:7-9, 20:16-21:24.)
The
Deputies then searched the remainder of the House. In the
bedroom they found (1) .35 grams of methamphetamine; (2) a
glass smoking pipe; (3) a letter from Yolo County Superior
Court addressed to Edgington at the House’s address;
and (4) Edgington’s name written on boxes containing
clothes and other belongings. (Lazaro Dep. at 37:1-52:7, Ex.
5.) The Deputies and Officers also found three more pit bulls
in a kennel in the backyard and another pit bull in the
garage of the House. (Id.; Ceja Dep. at 31:13-35:25;
Niesen Decl. ¶¶ 8-9 (Docket No. 26-1).)
Officer
Nevis returned to the House and, together with Officer
Bigelow, snared and removed the remaining dogs and
transported them to the Yolo County Animal Services shelter
pending reclamation by their owner. (Ceja Dep. at 31:13-16;
Nevis Dep. at 22:7-254:7; Bigelow Dep. at 17:18-18:23; Niesen
Decl. ¶ 12.) Van Asperen and Vitalie were placed under
arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia and transported
to Yolo County Jail. (Lazaro Dep. at 61:1-63:13; Garcia Dep.
at 30:2-17; Van Asperen Dep. at 31:7-33:15.) At approximately
11:40 a.m., the Deputies declared the House secure and left
the premises. (Ceja Dep. at 36:16-17.)
Upon
returning from the search, Deputy Lazaro filled out and
signed a declaration for probable cause to arrest plaintiff
for possession of a controlled substance and drug
paraphernalia based on the .35 grams of methamphetamine and
glass smoking pipe found in her bedroom. (Lazaro Dep. at
45:19-46:14.) On December 19, 2012, pursuant to the probable
cause declaration, Deputy Ceja returned to the House with
three other deputies and arrested plaintiff. (Ceja Dep. at
37:19-40:23, 59:20-65:3.) Plaintiff spent two days in Yolo
County Jail because she was unable to post bail. (Niesen
Decl. ¶¶ 18-20.) On December 21, 2012, she was
released and informed that the District Attorney declined to
prosecute her for the drugs and paraphernalia found during
the December 17, 2012 search. (Id. ¶ 20; Niesen
Dep. at 175:19-176:21.)[3] Following the incident, plaintiff could
afford to retrieve only three of her five dogs from Animal
Services. (Niesen Decl. ¶¶ 14-16.)
Plaintiff
filed a Complaint for damages on September 12, 2016, alleging
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deputies Lazaro,
Ceja, and Garcia and Officers Bigelow and Nevis. (Compl.
¶¶ 1-14 (Docket No. 1).)[4] Plaintiff alleges that (1)
the killing of her two dogs and seizure of her five other
dogs on December 17, 2012 constituted an unreasonable search
and seizure in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, and
(2) plaintiff’s arrest on December 19, 2012 and ensuing
detention violated her Fourth Amendment rights because
“there was no evidence that Plaintiff had committed any
crime.” (Id. ¶¶
17-25.)[5]
Plaintiff
seeks emotional distress and punitive damages and
compensatory damages for the loss of the value of her two
dogs that were killed, the amount she paid to retrieve three
of her other dogs from Animal Services, and the loss of the
value of the two remaining dogs she could not afford to
retrieve. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 20.) The Deputies and
Officers now move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment claims. (Docket Nos. 20-21.)
II.
Legal Standard
A party
may move for summary judgment on a “claim or
defense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is
proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id.; Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc.,
127 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997). A material fact is one
that could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine
issue exists if the evidence produced would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to reach a verdict in favor of the
non-moving party. Id.
The
moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that no
genuine issue of material fact exists as to the particular
claim or defense. Id. at 256. Where the moving party
seeks summary judgment on a claim or defense for which it
bears the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively
demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find for
the non-moving party on that claim or defense. Soremekun
v. Thrifty Payless Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 994 (9th Cir.
2007). If summary judgment is sought on a claim or defense
for which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at
trial, the moving party must either (1) produce evidence
negating an essential element of the non-moving party’s
claim or defense, or (2) show that the non-moving party
cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of
its claim or defense. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Once
the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to produce concrete, specific
evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact.
Id. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. To
carry this burden, the non-moving may not rely “solely
on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.”
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).
Rather, it must produce sufficient evidence beyond the
pleadings that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find
in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. If it does
so, then “there is a genuine issue of fact that
requires a trial.” Id. at 257.
In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court may not
weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or
determine the truth of the matters asserted, and it must view
all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 249,
255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Thus, although
the court should review the record as a whole, it must
disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party”
unless that evidence is “uncontradicted and
unimpeached” and “comes from disinterested
witnesses.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (citation omitted).
III.
Discussion
Title
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person
who, under color of any [state law] subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983
does not create substantive rights; it merely serves as the
procedural device for enforcing substantive provisions of the
Constitution and federal statutes.” Crumpton v.
Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S.
600, 617 (1979)).
To
establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both
(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation
was caused by a person acting under color of state law.
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,
49-50 (1999); Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S.
Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011). Section 1983
“contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of
that necessary to state a violation of the underlying
constitutional right.” Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986). There is no dispute here that
the various defendants acted under color of state law.
A.
Shooting of the Two Dogs
The
Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the right “to be
secure in their . . . effects[ ] against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
“The killing of a dog is a destruction recognized as a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and can constitute a
cognizable claim under § 1983.” San Jose
Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San
Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 975 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Hells Angels”) (quotation marks and
alterations omitted). Plaintiff’s first § 1983
claim alleges that the Deputies’ shooting of her two
dogs constituted unlawful seizures in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.[6]
1.
Deputies’ Liability for Shooting the Dogs
The
Deputies argue that summary judgment is warranted because (1)
they acted in self-defense in shooting plaintiff’s two
dogs and thus did not violate plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment right; and (2) even if the court finds a Fourth
Amendment violation, the Deputies are entitled to qualified
immunity because a reasonable deputy under the same
circumstances would have believed that the probation search
could not occur without removing the dogs from the bedroom,
Animal Control was the best way ...