United States District Court, N.D. California
KENYON M. NORBERT, JR., Plaintiff,
SAN FRANCISCO SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT STAFF, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
M. Ryu United States Magistrate Judge
who is currently in custody at the San Francisco County Jail
#5 on 1 Moreland Drive, San Bruno, California ("SFCJ
#5"), has filed a pro se civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that jail
officials violated his constitutional rights by being
deliberately indifferent to his safety needs and by denying
him "3 hrs. a week [of] recreation." Dkt. 1 at
has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Id.
at 5. Therefore, this matter has been assigned to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge.
complaint, Plaintiff does not name any individual Defendants.
Dkt. 1 at 2-3. Instead, he names the "San Francisco
Sheriff's Department staff" because he claims he
"cannot name all classification dep./deputies
responsible for placing [him] with inmates that were prone to
attack." Id. at 3. Plaintiff adds that
"every day their [sic] is a different deputy at each
post." Id. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief
and monetary damages. Id.
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will
be granted in a separate written Order.
is proper because certain events giving rise to the claims
are alleged to have occurred at SFJC #5 and SFCJ #4 (850
Bryant Street in San Francisco, California), which are both
located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C.
Standard of Review
federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any
case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must
identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that
are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. §
1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally
construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't,
901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." To comport with Rule 8,
"[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need
only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
Although in order to state a claim a complaint "does not
need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A
complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at
570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the
"plausible on its face" standard of
Twombly: "While legal conclusions can provide
the complaint's framework, they must be supported by
factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,
and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of
personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a
sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's
wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman
v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.
1991) (en banc) (citation omitted). A supervisor therefore
generally "is only liable for constitutional violations
of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or
directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed
to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). This includes evidence that
a supervisor implemented "a policy so deficient that the
policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and
is the moving force of the constitutional violation."
Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446; see Jeffers v.
Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 917 (9th Cir. 2001).
Deliberate Indifference to Safety Needs
alleges that on an unspecified date prior to November 27,
2015, the date he signed his complaint, certain unnamed
deputies transferred him from SFCJ #5 to SFCJ #4 for a court
appearance. Dkt. 1 at 6. Plaintiff, who is an African
American and claims to be a "documented gang member,
" alleges that on the seventh floor of SFCJ #4, deputies
"no longer separate African American gangs as they still
separate Mexican gangs." Id. Plaintiff claims
that SFCJ #4 and SFCJ #5 deputies "were allowed to p[i]t
African American ...