United States District Court, E.D. California
BRETT PETERSON, D.D.S.; B.O.L.T., an unincorporated association of motorcycle riders and enthusiasts; JOHN DALKE, an individual; MARK TEMPLE, an individual, Plaintiffs,
JOSEPH A. FARROW, Commissioner California Highway Patrol; MICHAEL GOOLD, in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the City of Rancho Cordova; SCOTT R. JONES, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of County of Sacramento; ROBERT DIMICELI a.k.a. ROBERT DI MICELI, Officer of the California Highway Patrol; STEPHEN CARROZZO, Rancho Cordova police officer and Deputy Sheriff; KAMALA HARRIS, in her official capacity as California Attorney General, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS
MICHAEL GOOLD, SCOTT R. JONES, AND STEPHEN CARROZZO'S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS'
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
A. MENDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUEGE
Brett Peterson, B.O.L.T. (short for, "Bikers of Lesser
Tolerance"), John Dalke, and Mark Temple sued the
following Defendants-Sheriff of the County of Sacramento
Scott R. Jones in his official capacity, Chief of Police of
the City of Rancho Cordova Michael Goold in his official
capacity, and Rancho Cordova Police Officer Stephen Carrozzo
in his individual capacity (collectively, "Municipal
Defendants"); California Highway Patrol Officer Robert
Dimiceli in his individual capacity, and California Highway
Patrol Commissioner Joseph A. Farrow in his official capacity
(collectively, "State Defendants"); and California
Attorney General Kamala Harris in her official capacity-under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the First,
Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
Defendants move to dismiss and/or strike claims in
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (SAC) (Doc. #44)
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules")
12(b)(6), 12(f), and 21, (Doc. #50). For the reasons stated
below, Municipal Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Peterson, Dalke, and Temple . . . are individuals with a
class M1 motorcycle license who, at all times relevant
herein, resided in the State of California." SAC ¶
10. "Plaintiff B.O.L.T. is an unincorporated association
of motorcycle riders and enthusiasts[, ]" "focusing
on the unconstitutional enforcement [and constitutionality]
of helmet laws . . . ." Id. ¶¶ 11,
allege that "Defendants have an unwritten policy,
custom[, ] and practice of allowing officers to stop
motorcyclists and issue citations for substandard helmets
based on visual criteria, and the officer's subjective
opinion of whether the helmet would, if tested, conform to
federal safety standards[, ]" Id. ¶ 44,
"regardless of whether the officer has tangible and
documentary evidence to believe that (i.) there has been a
determination of non-compliance with [Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard (FMVSS)] 218[, 49 C.F.R. § 571.218
(2011), the federal standard establishing minimum performance
requirements for motorcycle helmets], or (ii.) that the
motorcyclist has knowledge that the helmet has been
determined not to comply with FMVSS 218[, ]"
Id. ¶ 46. Plaintiffs allege they "have
been cited for wearing helmets that [D]efendants'
officers considered to be in violation of the helmet law,
" as a result of this unwritten policy, custom, and
practice. Id. ¶ 47.
also allege that because Temple received a motorcycle helmet
citation, Jones revoked Temple's concealed carry weapons
(CCW) permit. Id. ¶ 191. As a result,
Plaintiffs assert "a constitutional challenge to the
complex statutory scheme set forth in Cal[ifornia] Penal Code
[sections] 25450-25475, 26150-26225, 26300-26325, 32000-32030
as honorably retired California peace officers are granted
mandatory rights, privileges and immunities which are not
bestowed to Temple." Id. ¶ 6.
April 10, 2015, Plaintiffs brought this action against
Defendants (Doc. #1) and on July 1, 2015, Plaintiffs filed
their First Amended Complaint ("FAC, " Doc. #5). In
response, Defendants filed motions to dismiss (Doc. ##13, 18)
and the Court granted the motions under Rule 8, giving
Plaintiffs leave to amend (Doc. #42). On March 3, 2016,
Plaintiffs filed their SAC (Doc. #44). The SAC states nine
causes of action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
including the following specific claims against one or more
of the Municipal Defendants: the second claim for damages
against Carrozzo for Fourth Amendment violations; the third
claim for damages against Carrozzo for First Amendment
violations; the fourth claim for damages against Municipal
Defendants Goold and Jones in their official capacities for
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations; the fifth
claim for damages and injunctive relief by Temple against
Jones in his official capacity for Second Amendment
violations; the sixth claim for damages and injunctive relief
by Temple against Jones in his official capacity for
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violations; and the seventh
claim for damages and injunctive relief by Temple against
Jones in his official capacity for Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection violations. The Court now addresses the merits of
Municipal Defendants' motion to dismiss or strike all of
the above causes of action except the second claim for relief
against Carrozzo (Doc. #50).
Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice (Doc.
#50-2) of the following documents: Exhibit 1-the complaint in
related case, B.O.L.T. et al. v. City of Rancho
Cordova, et al., E.D. Case No. 2:14-cv-01588 (the
"related case"); Exhibit 2-the operative pleading
in the related case; and Exhibit 3-the Court's Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part an earlier dismissal
motion in the related case. Plaintiffs do not oppose
Municipal Defendants' request. Because these documents
are a part of the public record the Court may consider these
documents, and Municipal Defendants' request for judicial
notice is GRANTED. See U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria
Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th
Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
(explaining district courts "may take notice of [other]
proceedings[, ] . . . both within and without the federal
judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation
to matters at issue"); Peviani v. Hostess Brands,
Inc., 750 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (taking
judicial notice of two district court decisions).
Motion to Strike Under Rule 12(f)
12(f) provides that "[t]he court may strike from a
pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). "‘[T]he function of a 12(f)
motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and
money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by
dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . .
.'" Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d
1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (alterations in original) (quoting
Sidney- Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880,
885 (9th Cir. 1983)), rev'd on other grounds,
510 U.S. 517 (1994).
Municipal Defendants contend:
Several of the Plaintiffs in the instant case have already
made claims against the same Defendants in the [the related
case] requesting injunctive and declaratory relief for
violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically,
the Monell claim in [the related case]
(¶[¶] 146-168, SAC, Docket Entry No. 31 in Case No.
14-1588) is essentially the same as the fourth claim in this
case (¶[¶] 164-184, SAC) asserting
Monell-type liability for the same allegations. In
other words, the claims by these Plaintiffs in the instant
action requesting injunctive relief for violations of their
Fourth Amendment rights based on allegations that they were
improperly stopped pursuant to an unconstitutional policy,
should be stricken because those claims are redundant to
those raised in [the related case]. On that basis, Defendants
respectfully request those claims, specifically the fourth
claim for relief, be stricken from the instant SAC.
Municipal Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Mot.")
3:15-25, ECF No. 50. Municipal Defendants also contend that
Plaintiffs' class allegations should be stricken as
identical to the class allegations in the related case.
Id. at 4:3-13.
counter that the allegations in their fourth claim should not
be stricken because they now seek monetary damages in
addition to injunctive relief, and allegations in this action
include new Fourth Amendment violations in the form of
targeted enforcement actions and failed investigations.
Opp'n to Mot. ("Opp'n") 2:12-19, ECF No.
60. Plaintiffs also contend that the class allegations should
not be stricken because the class claims seek ...