United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Hon.
Bernard G. Skomal United States Magistrate Judge.
I.
BACKGROUND
On July
5, 2016, Plaintiff Israel Garcia, a prisoner proceeding
pro se and In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") in
this civil rights action, filed a motion to appoint counsel,
his second such request. (ECF No. 45.) In his Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff claims several correctional and medical
officials at Calipatria State Prison violated his Eighth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights in February 2013,
by failing to ensure his safety, using excessive force
against him, denying him adequate medical treatment, and
refusing to permit him to present evidence at a disciplinary
proceeding which resulted in a year of administrative
segregation. (See ECF No. 16 at 5-17.) On July 18,
2014, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to appoint counsel
because he is indigent, incarcerated, has limited access to
the law library, has made "repeated efforts to obtain a
lawyer, " believes his case will "likely involve
conflicting testimony, " and that counsel would
"better enable [him] to present evidence and cross
examine witnesses." (See ECF No. 12 at
¶¶ 1-4.) On October 31, 2014, the Court issued an
order denying Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel
without prejudice for failure to demonstrate the exceptional
circumstances required for appointment of counsel in a civil
action. (See ECF No. 18 at 3.)
Presently
before the Court is Plaintiff's second ex parte motion
for appointment of counsel filed on July 5, 2016 nunc pro
tunc to June 30, 2016. (ECF No. 45.) Plaintiff's
present motion requests appointment of counsel because of his
"recent diagnosis" and because his "resources
[in jail] are very limited." (Id. at 1.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As
explained in the Court's prior order, "there is no
absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings."
Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In Re Hedges), 32
F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994). Consequently, federal courts
do not have the authority "to make coercive appointments
of counsel" as Plaintiff has asked this Court to do in
his recent motion. Mallard v. United States District
Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United
States v. $292, 888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564,
569 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court also explained in its October
31, 2014 Order that while district courts do have discretion
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to "request"
that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants, such a
request is only made upon an evaluation of the likelihood of
the plaintiff's success on the merits and a showing of
"exceptional circumstances." See Agyeman v.
Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th
Cir. 2004). A finding of the exceptional circumstances
"requires at least an evaluation of the Plaintiff's
ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the
complexity of the legal issues involved.'"
Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v.
Escalderon, 789 F.25 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986));
see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th
Cir. 1991).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
has twice now requested appointment of counsel in this case
based, in part, on his assertion that he is uneducated in the
law and lacks the resources to properly litigate his case.
However, one's lack of education and resources, without
more, does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance
warranting appointed counsel in a civil action. The courts
are aware, as Plaintiff wrote in his ex parte motion, that
most pro se litigants "find it difficult to
articulate [their] claims, " and would be better served
with the assistance of counsel. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at
1331; Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir.
1997). To address this issue, federal courts employ
procedures which are protective of a pro se
litigant's rights. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (holding pro se complaint to less
stringent standard) (per curiam). For example, where a
plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the
court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the
plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los
Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.
1988).
The
Court has once again reviewed the complaint in this action
and finds Plaintiff has been able to clearly articulate his
claims that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated. Nothing has substantially changed in this case
since the Court's last order that would change the
Court's analysis of the exceptional circumstance
requirement. Although Plaintiff argues that his case is
"complex, " the Court does not agree that the
issues are so complex as to warrant appointment of counsel at
this time. As the Ninth Circuit explained in
Wilborn, difficulty alone is not sufficient to meet
the exceptional circumstances requirement. Wilborn,
789 F.2d at 1331.
To
establish exceptional circumstances, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that because of the complexity of his legal
claims he is unable to articulate his positions.
Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. The court in Rand
held exceptional circumstances did not exist where, even
though the motions that were filed with the court "did
not achieve the quality of papers that might have been
prepared by a lawyer, " the papers were "generally
articulate and organized." Id. Here, like the
litigant in Rand, Plaintiff has been able to put
forward his claims in a generally articulate and organized
manner against the relative complexity of a §1983 case
and therefore this action does not warrant the assistance of
counsel at this time.[1] Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion is
DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS
SO ORDERED.
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Notes:
[1] Plaintiff also states that he needs
the assistance of counsel because of his "recent
diagnosis." (ECF No. 45 at 1.) He further states that he
has not enclosed his mental diagnosis "do (sic) to no
copys (sic)." (Id. at 2.) Not only has
Plaintiff failed to provide corroboration of his mental
diagnosis, the Court finds that whatever the diagnosis is,
Plaintiff is nevertheless able to sufficiently articulate his
position with respect to his factual and legal arguments.
This likewise fails to meet ...