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Ervin v. Davis

United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division

July 8, 2016

CURTIS LEE ERVIN, Petitioner,
v.
RON DAVIS, Warden, California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent.

          ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 32 AND 33 RE: DKT. NO. 213

          LUCY H. KOH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         In 1991, Petitioner Curtis Lee Ervin ("Petitioner") was convicted of the murder of Carlene McDonald and sentenced to death. On September 7, 2007, Petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus before this Court, which included 37 claims in total. ECF No. 97 ("Pet."). Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment as to all 37 claims in Petitioner's amended habeas petition. ECF No. 213 ("Mot."). Petitioner opposed Respondent's motion and requested an evidentiary hearing on 15 of Petitioner's 37 claims. This Court has ruled on 23 of the 37 claims.

         This Order addresses claims 32 and 33 in Petitioner's amended habeas petition, which pertain to the alleged ineffective assistance of Petitioner's appellate counsel. Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing on both claims 32 and 33. For the reasons discussed below, Respondent's motion for summary judgment as to claims 32 and 33 is GRANTED, and Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing as to claims 32 and 33 is DENIED.

         I.BACKGROUND

         A. Factual Background[1]

         On February 21, 1991, a jury convicted Petitioner of first degree murder with the special circumstance finding of murder for financial gain. Evidence presented at Petitioner's trial established that Robert McDonald ("McDonald"), the former spouse of Carlene McDonald ("Carlene"), had hired Petitioner and Arestes Robinson ("Robinson"), to kill Carlene for $2, 500.

         At trial, Armond Jack ("Jack") testified that he had driven with Petitioner to meet McDonald to negotiate the price for killing Carlene. Jack also testified that he had driven Petitioner and Robinson to Carlene's apartment on November 7, 1986, the night of the murder. While Petitioner, Robinson, and Jack were driving to Carlene's apartment, Petitioner asked for and received a knife from Robinson. With the assistance of a BB gun, Petitioner and Robinson kidnapped Carlene and used Carlene's vehicle to take Carlene to Tilden Park, where Petitioner stabbed Carlene to death with Robinson's assistance. A patrol officer found Carlene's body the following afternoon.

         Petitioner and Robinson met with McDonald the day after Carlene's murder and presented McDonald with Carlene's driver's license as proof of the murder. McDonald paid Petitioner $2, 500, which Petitioner shared with Robinson and others to purchase cocaine. A few weeks after Carlene's murder, McDonald paid Petitioner an additional $1, 700. Sharon Williams ("Williams"), Petitioner's girlfriend, testified that Petitioner gave her a watch and ring later identified as belonging to Carlene.

         In addition to the physical evidence linking Petitioner to Carlene's murder, Petitioner also admitted various incriminating aspects of the crime to David Willis ("Willis"), Zane Sinnott ("Sinnott"), and the investigating police officer, Sergeant Dana Weaver ("Weaver"). According to these witnesses, Petitioner admitted that he and Robinson had confronted Carlene, had pointed the BB gun at her, had forced her into her car, and had driven her to Tilden Park. Petitioner further admitted to stabbing Carlene to death at Tilden Park while Robinson held her. The prosecution also introduced testimony from Robinson's girlfriend, Gail Johnson ("Johnson"), who stated that Robinson had admitted to participating in Carlene's murder.

         Robinson, McDonald, and Petitioner were tried together. Petitioner made no claims of innocence, but sought to impeach the testimony of prosecution witnesses Jack, Sinnott, and Willis. In addition, Dr. Fred Rosenthal ("Rosenthal"), a psychiatrist, testified that Petitioner's cocaine consumption might have impaired Petitioner's thought process and that Petitioner thus did not appreciate the seriousness and finality of killing someone for money. The jury found Petitioner's defenses unavailing and convicted Petitioner of first degree murder.

         During the penalty phase of Petitioner's trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of a prior bank robbery conviction and some jail disciplinary problems. Petitioner introduced mitigating evidence regarding his character, employment, family, drug use, religious involvement, and musical skills. McDonald and Robinson also introduced mitigating evidence. The jury returned death verdicts for Petitioner and McDonald, but chose life imprisonment without parole for Robinson.

         B. Procedural History

         On January 6, 2000, the California Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. People v. Ervin, 990 P.2d 506, 537 (Cal. 2000). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 2, 2000. Ervin v. California, 531 U.S. 842 (2000). On November 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition before this Court. ECF No. 32. On January 22, 2003, Petitioner filed a corrected federal habeas petition. ECF No. 45. That same day, the Court stayed all federal habeas proceedings so that Petitioner could exhaust his claims in state court. Petitioner filed a state habeas petition on October 1, 2003, and on December 14, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's state habeas petition.

         Following the California Supreme Court's decision, Petitioner filed an amended federal habeas petition. ECF No. 97. Respondent filed a response on March 7, 2008, ECF No. 110, and Petitioner filed a traverse on November 13, 2008. ECF No. 133.

         On February 14, 2012, Respondent filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On January 8, 2013, Petitioner filed an opposition and a request for an evidentiary hearing on claims 7-10, 19-20, 25-30, and 32-34. ECF No. 249 ("Opp'n"). Respondent filed a reply on May 10, 2013, which included an opposition to Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing. ECF No. 259 ("Resp. Reply"). On August 16, 2013, Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent's opposition to Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing. ECF No. 266 ("Pet. Reply").

         On January 7, 2015, the instant action was reassigned from U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken to the undersigned judge. ECF No. 268. On March 16, 2015, the Court stayed Petitioner's penalty phase claims pending the Ninth Circuit's decision of an appeal filed in Jones v. Chappell, 31 F.Supp.3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014). ECF No. 269. The Ninth Circuit decided Jones on November 12, 2015, and determined that the district court had erred in finding California's post-conviction system of review in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). In the wake of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Jones, all of Petitioner's claims are now ripe for review.

         On December 11, 2015, this Court issued an order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment as to claims 1-5. ECF No. 271. On March 28, 2016, this Court issued an order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment as to claims 14-15 and 17-18. ECF No. 281. On March 29, 2016, this Court issued an order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment as to claims 7-13. ECF No. 282. On June 14, 2016, this Court issued an order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment as to claims 21, 35, and 36. ECF No. 283. On June 15, 2016, this Court issued an order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment as to claims 6 and 16. ECF No. 284. On June 16, 2016, this Court issued an order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment as to claims 22 and 23. ECF No. 285.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         A. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d))

         Because Petitioner filed his original federal habeas petition in 2002, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") applies to the instant action. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003) (holding that AEDPA applies whenever a federal habeas petition is filed after April 24, 1996). Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas relief on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state court's adjudication "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

         1. Contrary To or Unreasonable Application of Clearly Established Federal Law

         As to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" prongs have separate and distinct meanings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) ("Section 2254(d)(1) defines two categories of cases in which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court."). A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 412-13.

         A state court's decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. "[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit is not unreasonable "so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on [its] correctness." Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

         Holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision are the sole determinant of clearly established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Although a district court may "look to circuit precedent to ascertain whether [the circuit] has already held that the particular point in issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent, " Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (per curiam), "[c]ircuit precedent cannot refine or sharpen a general principle of [U.S.] Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule, " Lopez v. Smith, 135 S.Ct. 1, 4 (2014) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         2. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts

         In order to find that a state court's decision was based on "an unreasonable determination of the facts, " 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a federal court "must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record before the state court, " Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15 (2013). That said, "where the state courts plainly misapprehend or misstate the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension goes to a material factual issue that is central to petitioner's claim, that misapprehension can fatally undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual finding unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

         In examining whether a petitioner is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2), a federal court's review "is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). In the event that a federal court "determine[s], considering only the evidence before the state court, that the adjudication of a claim on the merits resulted in a decision contrary to or involving an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, " the federal court evaluates the petitioner's claim de novo. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 778. If error is found, habeas relief is warranted if that error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). ...


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