United States District Court, C.D. California
Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
IN CHAMBERS - PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (DKT. 58, FILED JUNE 17, 2016)
Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
On
October 30, 2014, plaintiff initiated the instant action
against the International Academy of Film and Television
(“IAFT”), Michael Gleissner
(“Gleissner”), and Does 1 through 10
(collectively, “defendants”) in Los Angeles
County Superior Court. Dkt. 1-1, “Compl.”
Plaintiff asserted several state law claims against
defendants and one federal claim pursuant to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).
Id. On December 8, 2014, defendants removed this
action to this Court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction. Dkt. 1. Thereafter, on May 6, 2016, plaintiff
moved to voluntarily dismiss his ADEA claim and asked the
Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
his remaining state law claims and remand this action to
state court. Dkt. 46. While the Court granted
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss his ADEA claim, the Court
determined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over his state
law claims and denied plaintiff’s motion to remand.
Dkt. 57. The Court reasoned as follows:
[T]he Court determines that it is appropriate for the Court
to retain jurisdiction over the instant action . . . In
particular, the Court finds that remanding this action may
result in significant delay for the parties. This action has
been pending for over a year and a half, the parties have
nearly completed discovery, and a trial is currently
scheduled to begin in less than five months. Were the Court
to decline jurisdiction and remand this action, the parties
would need to request a new trial date from the state court,
which could delay this action by over a year. Particularly
given that this case has already been pending for some time,
the Court finds that such a delay would be unduly prejudicial
to defendants.
Id., at 3.
In
addition, at the hearing on plaintiff’s motion, counsel
for plaintiff informed the Court that defendant Gleissner had
recently filed suit against plaintiff in Florida state court.
The Court expressed concern that if this Florida suit were in
the nature of a compulsory counterclaim it might result in
further delay of this action regardless of whether the action
was remanded to state court. Plaintiff’s counsel
offered to lodge the complaint in the Florida suit with the
Court and, upon the Court’s review of the complaint, it
determined that the Florida suit was “not in the nature
of a compulsory counterclaim.” Dkt. 57, at 4 n.2.
Plaintiff now contends that the Court committed an error in
that the Florida suit is, in fact, in the nature of
a compulsory counterclaim. On this grounds plaintiff asks the
Court to reconsider its prior ruling denying his motion to
remand. The Court declines to do so.
First
and foremost, the Court’s prior ruling was not based
merely on its conclusion that the Florida suit did not appear
to be in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim. Rather, the
Court’s ruling was principally based on the fact that,
by the time plaintiff filed his motion to remand, this action
had already been pending for over a year and a half,
discovery had been completed, and trial was less than five
months away. The Court determined that, given the advanced
stage of this litigation, it would be unfair to defendants to
remand this action to state court thus requiring the parties
to apply for a new trial date in state court. In his motion,
plaintiff does not contend that any of these facts have
changed or even address them.
Second,
even assuming arguendo, that the Florida suit is in
the nature of a compulsory counterclaim, there is no
indication in plaintiff’s papers that any of the
parties to that action have filed-or are even considering
filing-a motion to dismiss that action or to transfer it to
this Court. Indeed, plaintiff provides almost no information
regarding the progress of the Florida suit. Accordingly,
plaintiff’s contention that the Florida suit will cause
delays in this action is, at best, speculative.[1]
Moreover,
the Court finds that the existence of the Florida suit is not
the proper subject of a motion for reconsideration. Pursuant
to the local rules of the Central District of California, a
party moving for reconsideration must show: “(a) a
material difference in fact or law from that presented to the
Court before such decision that in the exercise of reasonable
diligence could not have been known to the party moving for
reconsideration at the time of such decision, or (b) the
emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring
after the time of such decision, or (c) a manifest showing of
a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court
before such decision.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-18. Here,
plaintiff was served with the complaint in the Florida suit
on April 26, 2016 before he filed his motion to
remand on May 6, 2016. Thus all of the arguments plaintiff
raises in the instant motion could have been raised “in
the exercise of reasonable diligence” before the Court
ruled on plaintiff’s motion to remand. Furthermore, the
parties discussed the Florida suit at the hearing on
plaintiff’s motion and the Court referred to the
Florida suit in its ruling. Thus, plaintiff cannot
demonstrate a “manifest showing of a failure to
consider material facts presented to the Court.”
See also Id. (“No motion for reconsideration
shall in any manner repeat any oral or written argument made
in support of or in opposition to the original
motion.”)
For all
of these reasons, the Court finds no basis to reconsider its
prior ruling and plaintiff’s motion is
DENIED.[2]
IT IS
SO ORDERED.
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Notes:
[1] Plaintiff also argues that, in light
of the Florida suit, he will suffer prejudice by having
“to prosecute and defend actions in two venues 3, 000
miles apart.” Mot., at 4. But remanding
plaintiff’s action to state court would not cure this
purported prejudice. Even if the Court were to remand this
action to California state court, plaintiff would still
...