United States District Court, C.D. California
Proceedings:
(IN CHAMBERS) - PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE MAY 31,
2016 ORDER OF JUDGE ANDREW GUILFORD DENYING DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGE STATON; AND FOR OTHER RELIEF (Dkt. 97)
HONORABLE CHRISTINA A. SNYDER JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
On May
22, 2015, the instant action was filed by plaintiff Nazie
Azam and assigned to Judge Dale S. Fischer in the Western
Division of the Central District of California. Dkts 1, 4.
This case arises from plaintiff’s 2005 purchase of
property in Laguna Niguel, California. Complaint at
¶¶ 2, 8. Plaintiff refinanced her loan on the
property in 2006 with Washington Mutual F.A.
(“Washington Mutual”), which later failed.
Id. at ¶ 12. After the FDIC became the receiver
of Washington Mutual, the FDIC transferred Azam’s loan
to JPMorgan Chase pursuant to a 2008 Purchase and Assumption
Agreement. Id. at ¶ 17. Through the instant
action, plaintiff seeks, among other things, a declaration
that the original deed of trust is void, damages against the
FDIC, and cancellation of the original promissory note and
deed of trust.
On
October 16, 2015, defendant FDIC filed a notice of related
case, dkt 15, and the case was transferred to Judge Josephine
L. Staton in the Southern Division of the Central District of
California. Dkt. 16. On November 1, 2015, plaintiff filed a
motion for disqualification of Judge Staton, intercircuit
assignment, and other relief. Dkt 22. The motion argued,
among other things, that Judge Staton “has a direct
financial interest in the matters at issue and the outcome of
this case and [another case in the Eastern District
of California entitled, Law Offices of Nina Ringgold and
All Current Clients Thereof v. Jerry Brown, et al., Case
No. 12-cv-00717 (E.D. Cal.)], ” in which plaintiff Azam
is a member of a putative class. Id. at 12-13. As a
former judge of the Orange County Superior Court, Judge
Staton allegedly has an interest in the outcome of the
ongoing putative class action in the Eastern District, which
involves, at least in part, compensation packages received by
judges of the Los Angeles and Orange County Superior Courts.
Plaintiff’s motion for disqualification was assigned to
Judge James V. Selna, who denied the motion on November 16,
2015. Dkt 32. Months later, in an order dated April 20, 2016,
Judge Staton dismissed plaintiff’s claims in this
action with prejudice. Dkt. 79.
On May
18, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion again seeking, among other
things, disqualification of Judge Staton and requesting
intercircuit assignment. Dkt. 83. According to the motion,
Judge Staton has “direct general and financial
interests in the case and related cases” and should
therefore be disqualified. Dkt. 83. The motion further
asserted that with the exception of Judge Andrew J. Guilford,
“[a]ll of the [federal] judges in the Santa Ana
courthouse [of the Central District of California] have
general and financial interests requiring
disqualification” by virtue of having previously been
Superior Court judges. Id. at 5. Plaintiff’s
motion for disqualification was referred to Judge Selna, who
recused himself from ruling on the motion shortly thereafter.
Dkts. 91-92. The motion was then referred to Judge Guilford,
who denied the motion on May 31, 2016. Dkt. 94.
On June
28, 2016, plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking, among
other things, to vacate Judge Guilford’s May 31, 2016
motion denying plaintiff’s motion to disqualify Judge
Staton. Dkt. 97. On June 29, 2016, pursuant to General Order
14-03 and Local Rule 72-5, the instant motion was referred to
the undersigned.[1] Dkt. 98.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
28
U.S.C. § 144 (“Section 144”) provides for
disqualification of a judge whenever “a party to any
proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him
or in favor of any adverse party.” The affidavit must
set forth “the facts and the reasons for the belief
that bias or prejudice exists.” 28 U.S.C. § 144.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455 (“Section 455”),
judges must disqualify themselves “in any proceeding in
which [their] impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” Id. § 455(a).
The
substantive standard for disqualification is the same under
both Sections 144 and 455: “whether a reasonable person
with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” United States v. Studley, 783
F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Moreover,
the alleged bias cannot result from mere disagreement,
however vehement, with a judge’s rulings; instead,
“the alleged bias must stem from an
‘extrajudicial source.’” United States
v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548
(1994)). “[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis
of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the
current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not
constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless
they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that
would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky,
510 U.S. at 555.
III.
DISCUSSION
In the
instant motion, plaintiff contends that
[t]he judges in the southern division [of the Central
District of California] have disqualifying interests because
they have a direct financial interest in the case and the
pending class action case because they are former judges of
the Superior Court of the County of Orange. The only judge
that does not have a direct financial interest is Judge
Guilford. However, it is plainly apparent that he is openly
bias [sic] and has used the disqualification
question of Judge Staton as a basis to argue about his own
disqualification in a different case. The May 31, 2016 orders
should be vacated and the case reassigned under 28 U.S.C. Sec
292 (d) as requested by all members of the pending class
action.
Motion at 3. Specifically, plaintiff contends that Judge
Guilford’s May 31, 2016 order “undertook to
determine disqualification (1) when he should have
disqualified himself, and (2) when he was using extra
judicial sources and extraneous information, and (3) when he
had already demonstrated bias and prejudice against the
plaintiff and counsel.” Motion at 2. According to
plaintiff, Judge Guilford “clearly demonstrated
unreasonable bias and use of matters extrajudicial to both
the case and the present motion.” Id. at 6.
The
Court finds plaintiff’s motion to be without merit.
Although, in plaintiff’s view, Judge Guilford’s
order “intentionally misrepresents plaintiff’s
claims” and “is an advocacy document and is not a
neutral or even handed discussion of the applicable legal and
evidentiary issues, ” id. at 2,
plaintiff’s disagreement with the particulars of Judge
Guilford’s reasoning or his conclusions does not
provide grounds for disqualification or a finding of bias.
Cf. United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 739 (9th
Cir. 1978) (“Adverse rulings do not constitute the
requisite bias or prejudice of [28 U.S.C. §
144].”) (citing Ber ...