United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER
KENDALL J. NEWMAN MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her
application for Disability Income Benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act
(“Act”).[1] In her motion for summary judgment,
plaintiff principally contends that the Commissioner erred by
finding that plaintiff was not disabled from February 7,
2011, through the date of the final administrative decision.
(ECF No. 16.) The Commissioner filed an opposition to
plaintiff’s motion and a cross-motion for summary
judgment, to which plaintiff replied. (ECF Nos. 20, 21.)
For the
reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED IN PART, the Commissioner’s
cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and this matter
is remanded for further administrative proceedings under
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
was born on May 8, 1963, completed the eleventh grade, and
speaks English. (Administrative Transcript (“AT”)
230, 252, 254.)[2] She has worked as a customer service
associate and as a department manager at Lowes hardware
store. (AT 254.) On May 21, 2012, plaintiff applied for DIB
alleging that her disability began on February 7, 2011, at
the age of 47. (AT 64, 80, 177-85.) Plaintiff alleged that
she was disabled primarily due to pain and damage to the
tendons in her shoulders, wrists, hands, middle finger,
knees, and ankles, as well as depression, anxiety and high
cholesterol. (AT 64, 253.) After plaintiff’s
applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration,
plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law
judge (“ALJ”), which took place on February 25,
2014, and at which plaintiff, represented by an attorney, and
a vocational expert testified. (AT 37-63.) The ALJ issued a
decision dated April II, 2014, determining that plaintiff had
not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, between
February 7, 2011, and the date of that decision. (AT 10-30.)
The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied
plaintiff’s request for review on April 2, 2015. (AT
1-7.) Plaintiff then filed this action in federal district
court on June 3, 2015, to obtain judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1.)
II.
ISSUES PRESENTED
On
appeal, plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) whether
the ALJ improperly failed to consider the opinions of
treating physician Dr. Hu when determining plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”); (2) whether
the ALJ improperly considered and weighed critical parts of
the opinions of treating physician Dr. Aquino and examining
physician Dr. Bathgate when determining plaintiff’s
RFC; (3) whether the ALJ improperly discounted the testimony
of plaintiff as to her own symptoms and functional
limitations; and (4) whether the Appeals Council erred in
considering the additional MRI evidence plaintiff submitted
in connection with her administrative appeal of the
ALJ’s decision.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
The
court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine
whether (1) it is based on proper legal standards pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the
record as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180
F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.
Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir.
2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d
625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart,
400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is
responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts
in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.”
Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.
2001) (citation omitted). “The court will uphold the
ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to
more than one rational interpretation.” Tommasetti
v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). However,
the court may only consider the reasons given by the ALJ for
his decision and “may not affirm the ALJ on a ground
upon which he did not rely.” Orn, 495 F.3d at
630.
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Summary of the ALJ’s Findings
The ALJ
evaluated plaintiff’s entitlement to DIB pursuant to
the Commissioner’s standard five-step analytical
framework.[3] As an initial matter, the ALJ found that
plaintiff remained insured for purposes of DIB through
December 31, 2016. (AT 15.) At the first step, the ALJ
concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since February 7, 2011, the alleged onset
date. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ found that
plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
[H]istory of degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder
with surgical repair, chronic right shoulder pain/strain,
degenerative joint disease of the left knee, right
patellofemoral syndrome, cervical degenerative disc disease
status post fusion, mild degenerative disc disease of the
lumbar spine, adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and
chronic depression, (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
(Id.) However, at step three, the ALJ determined
that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an
impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. (AT 16-18.)
Before
proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as follows:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform simple, routine, and
repetitive tasks at the light exertional level as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she can never climb ladders, ropes,
or scaffolding and she cannot work with or near heights,
hazards, or moving machinery. The claimant can occasionally
reach overhead with both arms and she can tolerate no more
than occasional contact with the public.
(AT 15.)
At step
four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not capable of
performing any past relevant work. (AT 24.) At step five, the
ALJ found that in light of plaintiff’s age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity, that there
were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that plaintiff could perform. (Id.) Thus,
the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not been under a
disability, as defined in the Act, from February 7, 2011,
through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT 25.)
B.
Plaintiff’s Substantive Challenges to the
Commissioner’s Determinations
1.
The ALJ Committed Prejudicial Error in Failing to Properly
Consider and Weigh the Treating Opinions of Dr. Hu.
First,
plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed prejudicial error
by not properly considering and weighing Dr. Hu’s
treating opinions when determining plaintiff’s RFC. The
court agrees.
Title
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) mandates that the
Commissioner consider every medical source opinion by
promising claimants that the administration “will
evaluate every medical opinion we receive.”
Id. This regulation defines medical opinions as
“statements from physicians and psychologists or other
acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the
nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s),
including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and
prognosis, what ...