United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE [ECF NO.
135]
Hon.
Ruben B. Brooks, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff
Tyrone Rogers, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis, submitted “Rogers’ Ex Parte
Application for Protective Order Staying Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss the Third [Amended] Complaint Pending a
Ruling on [Motion to] Compel Discovery” (the “Ex
Parte”), which was filed nunc pro tunc to February 22,
2016 [ECF No. 135]. On March 7, 2016, Kuzil-Ruan filed an
“Opposition to Ex Parte Application for Protective
Order Staying Kuzil’s Motion to Dismiss the Third
Amended Complaint” [ECF No. 137]. Plaintiff filed his
reply on May 25, 2016 [ECF No. 141]. For the reasons
discussed below, the Ex Parte [ECF No. 135] is DENIED.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The
allegations that form the basis of Rogers’s lawsuit
arise from events that began in March of 2010 while Plaintiff
was incarcerated at Centinela State Prison
(“Centinela”). (Third Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 128.)
In the Third Amended Complaint, Rogers contends that the
Defendants violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First
Amendment. (Id. at 3-5.) Plaintiff alleges that
Giurbino and Uribe adopted a Staff Redirection Plan that
caused prison lockdowns. (Id. at 3-4.) The lockdowns
caused him “to [miss] attending his scheduled religious
services on any given lockdown day without a compelling
government interest and without the least restrictive means
to further that interest.” (Id. at 4.) Rogers
asserts that Defendants placed a substantial burden on his
right to religious exercise “by not allowing Rogers to
fellowship with other protestant faith inmates in the chapel
for group study, group worship services, and group prayer
service Sunday through Saturday.” (Id.)
Plaintiff maintains that he presently suffers from these
violations because he has still not completed a four-year
seminary program that began in 2010 because of the rolling
lockdowns. (Id.)
In
addition to the rolling lockdowns, Rogers appears to contend
that on three separate occasions he was prevented from
attending group worship, group bible study, and group prayer
service for ten days respectively because scissors,
ammunition, and a dental tool went missing, prompting the
prison to be locked down. (See id. at 5.) He appears
to only blame Kuzil-Ruan for the first of these occurrences,
but he asserts that these incidents were reported to Uribe
and Giurbino, who “chose not to correct their
subordinates.” (Id.) He requests injunctive
relief and damages. (Id. at 7.)
II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This
case has a long procedural history. Plaintiff’s
original Complaint was filed on March 21, 2011 [ECF No. 1].
United States District Court Judge Irma E. Gonzalez issued an
order sua sponte dismissing Rogers’s Complaint for
failure to state a claim [ECF No. 3]. Plaintiff filed his
First Amended Complaint on May 31, 2011 [ECF No. 5], but this
pleading was also sua sponte dismissed by Judge Gonzalez for
the same reason [ECF No. 7]. Rogers filed his Second Amended
Complaint on July 12, 2011 [ECF No. 8]. There, he stated
causes of action against Defendants Giurbino, Uribe,
Kuzil-Ruan, and Narvis under RLUIPA, the First Amendment, the
Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. (Second Am.
Compl. 2-8, ECF No. 8.) Judge Gonzalez issued an order sua
sponte dismissing Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and
access to courts claims and dismissing Defendant Narvis from
the litigation. (Order Dismissing Claims 7, ECF No. 9.)
Defendants
Uribe, Kuzil-Ruan, and Giurbino filed a motion to dismiss
Rogers’s Second Amended Complaint on October 31, 2011
[ECF No. 18]. Judge Gonzalez granted this motion in part and
denied it in part on February 14, 2012 [ECF No. 33]. She
granted the motion as to Plaintiff’s claims under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, dismissed all claims against
Defendants Giurbino and Uribe, and denied the motion to
dismiss Rogers’s RLUIPA claims. (Order re: Mot. Dismiss
Second Am. Compl. 21, ECF No. 33.) Defendant Kuzil-Ruan
answered on February 27, 2012 [ECF No. 34]. Plaintiff filed a
motion to compel discovery on April 5, 2012 [ECF No. 42]. The
Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part
this motion [ECF No. 67]. On November 13, 2012, Defendant
Kuzil-Ruan moved for summary judgment [ECF No. 74]. Judge
Gonzalez granted summary judgment in favor of Kuzil-Ruan on
February 26, 2013 [ECF No. 96].
Rogers
appealed several of the Court’s orders [ECF No. 100],
and on August 31, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued an order
affirming in part, reversing in part, and vacating in part
Judge Gonzalez’s decisions [ECF No. 112]. Of relevance
here, the Ninth Circuit directed the district court to allow
Rogers the benefit of its grant of his motion to compel
discovery. (Rogers v. Giurbino, No. 13-55527, order
at 8-10 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2015), ECF No. 112.) This Court
subsequently issued an order stating that “to the
extent the Defendant has not done so already, Kuzil-Ruan
shall respond to the discovery ordered by December 30,
2015.” (Mins. 1, Nov. 25, 2015, ECF No. 127.) Plaintiff
filed the Third Amended Complaint on January 19, 2016 [ECF
No. 128]. On February 1, 2016, Defendants Giurbino and Uribe
filed a motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint [ECF
No. 129]. Defendant Kuzil-Ruan also filed a motion to dismiss
the Third Amended Complaint the same day [ECF No. 131].
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
It is
well established that a party may obtain discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial to be discoverable. Id.
Relevance is construed broadly to include any matter that
bears on, or reasonably could lead to other matters that
could bear on, any issue that may be in the case. See
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-51
(1978) (footnote omitted) (discussing relevance to a claim or
defense, although decided under 1978 version of Rule 26 that
authorized discovery relevant to the subject matter of the
action (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501
(1947))). Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
enables the propounding party to bring a motion to compel
responses to discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3)(B). The party
opposing discovery bears the burden of resisting disclosure.
Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 299 (C.D. Cal.
1992).
IV.
DISCUSSION
In the
Ex Parte, Rogers appears to request that a ruling on the
motions to dismiss be stayed pending an order from the Court
compelling Defendants to produce discovery as a result of
their alleged failure to comply with orders by the Ninth
Circuit and this Court. (See Ex Parte Appl. 1, ECF
No. 135.) Plaintiff indicates that the Defendants produced
discovery in response to those orders, but he complains that
this production falls short as to his document requests five,
eight, and nine. (Id. at 2.)
As to document No. 5, Defendant[s] claim not to provide the
officer’s names associated with the lost canister,
document No. 8, Defendants claim that no evidence exist[s]
concerning the name of the medical officer who lost the
medical scissor[s] nor, did Defendants provide the name of
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