Pearson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC

         Proceedings: DEFENDANT NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC ’S MOTION TO DISMISS (Dkt. 7, filed June 16, 2016)

          Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Martin Pearson, Pro Se

          Attorneys Present for Defendants: Robert Im

          CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

          CHRISTINA A. SNYDER J.

         I. INTRODUCTION

         On May 24, 2016, plaintiff Martin Pearson, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action against defendants Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”) and Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Inc (“Greenpoint”). Dkt. 1. The complaint asserts claims against defendants for: (1) declaratory relief; (2) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.; (3) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g); (4) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.; (5) violation of 12 U.S.C. § 2605; (6) quasi contract; (7) accounting; and (8) quiet title relating to violations of the Federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). Id.

         On June 16, 2016, defendant Nationstar filed the instant motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as well as a request for judicial notice.^[1] Dkt. 7-8. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the instant motion on June 28, 2016, Dkt. 12, and defendant Nationstar filed a reply on July 1, 2016, Dkt. 14. Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court finds and concludes as follows.

         II. BACKGROUND

         On December 21, 2006, plaintiff obtained a loan from defendant Greenpoint in the amount of $601, 600, secured by a Deed of Trust which was recorded against the real property located at 1168 Deborah Street, Upland CA 91784 (the “Subject Property”). Compl. at 3, 35-36; Id. Ex. A, Deed of Trust. In March 2013, the beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust was transferred to defendant Nationstar. See id. Ex. G, Assignment of Deed of Trust. After plaintiff failed to make payments on his loan, a Notice of Default was recorded against the Subject Property. RJN, Ex. 1, Notice of Default. When plaintiff failed to cure this default, a Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded against the Subject Property on August 19, 2013. Id., Ex. 2, Notice of Trustee’s Sale.

         On April 25, 2014, plaintiff filed an action in San Bernadino Superior Court against defendant Nationstar (“the State Court Action”). RJN, Ex. 5, State Court Complaint. In his state court complaint, plaintiff asserted two causes of action for: (1) quiet title pursuant to California Civil Code § 760.020; and (2) violation of California Homeowner’s Bill of Rights (“HBOR”). Id. Each of these causes of action, at base, challenged Nationstar’s right to foreclose on the subject property. See id. On August 15, 2014, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in the State Court Action alleging the same causes of action as his original complaint. RJN, EX. 6, State Court FAC. On September 12, 2014, Nationstar filed a demurrer to plaintiff’s FAC, and on April 23, 2015, the demurrer was heard and sustained without leave to amend. RJN, Ex. 7, Notice of Ruling re: Nationstar’s Demurrer to plaintiff’s FAC. On May 1, 2015, judgment was entered against plaintiff and in favor of Nationstar. RJN, Ex. 8, Judgment of Dismissal. On June 11, 2015, the State Court Action was dismissed with prejudice. RJN, Ex. 9, Minute Order Dismissing State Court Action with Prejudice. Defendants represent that plaintiff did not timely appeal the dismissal of the State Court Action. Mot., at 3. Plaintiff does not dispute this fact in his opposition or complaint.

         On May 24, 2016, plaintiff filed the instant action again challenging Nationstar’s right to foreclose on the Subject Property. Dkt. 1.

         III. LEGAL STANDARD

         A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. Under this Rule, a district court properly dismisses a claim if “there is a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’ ” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balisteri v. Pacifica Polic Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

         In considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The complaint must be read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content, ’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the ...