United States District Court, C.D. California
DEFENDANT NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC ’S MOTION TO DISMISS
(Dkt. 7, filed June 16, 2016)
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Martin Pearson, Pro Se
Attorneys Present for Defendants: Robert Im
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
CHRISTINA A. SNYDER J.
24, 2016, plaintiff Martin Pearson, proceeding pro
se, filed the instant action against defendants
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”) and
Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Inc (“Greenpoint”).
Dkt. 1. The complaint asserts claims against defendants for:
(1) declaratory relief; (2) violation of 15 U.S.C. §
1601, et seq.; (3) violation of 15 U.S.C. §
1641(g); (4) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et
seq.; (5) violation of 12 U.S.C. § 2605; (6) quasi
contract; (7) accounting; and (8) quiet title relating to
violations of the Federal Truth in Lending Act
16, 2016, defendant Nationstar filed the instant motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as well as a request for
judicial notice. Dkt. 7-8. Plaintiff filed an opposition to
the instant motion on June 28, 2016, Dkt. 12, and defendant
Nationstar filed a reply on July 1, 2016, Dkt. 14. Having
carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court
finds and concludes as follows.
December 21, 2006, plaintiff obtained a loan from defendant
Greenpoint in the amount of $601, 600, secured by a Deed of
Trust which was recorded against the real property located at
1168 Deborah Street, Upland CA 91784 (the “Subject
Property”). Compl. at 3, 35-36; Id. Ex. A,
Deed of Trust. In March 2013, the beneficial interest under
the Deed of Trust was transferred to defendant Nationstar.
See id. Ex. G, Assignment of Deed of Trust. After
plaintiff failed to make payments on his loan, a Notice of
Default was recorded against the Subject Property. RJN, Ex.
1, Notice of Default. When plaintiff failed to cure this
default, a Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded
against the Subject Property on August 19, 2013.
Id., Ex. 2, Notice of Trustee’s Sale.
April 25, 2014, plaintiff filed an action in San Bernadino
Superior Court against defendant Nationstar (“the State
Court Action”). RJN, Ex. 5, State Court Complaint. In
his state court complaint, plaintiff asserted two causes of
action for: (1) quiet title pursuant to California Civil Code
§ 760.020; and (2) violation of California
Homeowner’s Bill of Rights (“HBOR”).
Id. Each of these causes of action, at base,
challenged Nationstar’s right to foreclose on the
subject property. See id. On August 15, 2014,
plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
in the State Court Action alleging the same causes of action
as his original complaint. RJN, EX. 6, State Court FAC. On
September 12, 2014, Nationstar filed a demurrer to
plaintiff’s FAC, and on April 23, 2015, the demurrer
was heard and sustained without leave to amend. RJN, Ex. 7,
Notice of Ruling re: Nationstar’s Demurrer to
plaintiff’s FAC. On May 1, 2015, judgment was entered
against plaintiff and in favor of Nationstar. RJN, Ex. 8,
Judgment of Dismissal. On June 11, 2015, the State Court
Action was dismissed with prejudice. RJN, Ex. 9, Minute Order
Dismissing State Court Action with Prejudice. Defendants
represent that plaintiff did not timely appeal the dismissal
of the State Court Action. Mot., at 3. Plaintiff does not
dispute this fact in his opposition or complaint.
24, 2016, plaintiff filed the instant action again
challenging Nationstar’s right to foreclose on the
Subject Property. Dkt. 1.
motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in a
complaint. Under this Rule, a district court properly
dismisses a claim if “there is a ‘lack of a
cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts
alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’ ”
Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242
(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balisteri v. Pacifica Polic
Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[F]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must
accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as
well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.
Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
The complaint must be read in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,
266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “a court
considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009); see Moss v. United States Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]or
a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the
non-conclusory ‘factual content, ’ and reasonable
inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of
a claim entitling the ...