United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION RE: DKT. NO.
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge
a California prisoner currently incarcerated at Mule Creek
State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 31,
2016, the Court dismissed as untimely Plaintiff’s
claims against District Attorneys Lowe, Wiley, and Ford;
Deputy Turner; the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department;
the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office; and
Alameda County. Docket No. 41 at 9-13. The Court dismissed
the remaining defendant Judith Browne because she had not
been served. Id. Final judgment was entered that
same day, and Plaintiff did not appeal. Pending before the
Court is Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration filed
on April 14, 2016. For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
denial of a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is
construed as a denial of relief under Rule 60(b). See
McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.3 (9th Cir.
1999). Motions for reconsideration should not be frequently
made or freely granted. See generally Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341
(9th Cir. 1981). “‘[T]he major grounds that
justify reconsideration involve an intervening change of
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the
need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.’” Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of
Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989)
(quoting United States v. Desert Gold Mining Co.,
433 F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir. 1970)). Courts construing Rule
59(e) have noted that a motion to reconsider is not a vehicle
permitting the unsuccessful party to “rehash”
arguments previously presented, or to present
“contentions which might have been raised prior to the
challenged judgment.” Costello v. United
States, 765 F.Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (citing
cases). These holdings “reflect[ ] district
courts’ concerns for preserving dwindling resources and
promoting judicial efficiency.” Id.
asking the Court to reconsider the judgment, Plaintiff raises
the new argument that his claims accrued in December 2012
because he was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994), and by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) from filing this action until the
constitutional violations caused him to suffer a physical
injury in December 2012. Docket No. 44 at 2-3. A motion for
reconsideration under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) is an
improper vehicle for bringing new claims not previously
raised. See Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d
734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A district court does not
abuse its discretion when it disregards legal arguments made
for the first time on a [Rule 59(e)] motion to
amend.”); see also Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (motion for
reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or
present evidence for the first time when they could
reasonably have been raised earlier in the
litigation”); 389 Orange St. Partners v.
Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ninth Circuit
held that its “abuse of discretion review preclude[d]
reversing the district court for declining to address an
issue raised for the first time in a motion for
reconsideration”). The Court therefore DENIES
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration (Docket No. 44) is DENIED. This case remains
IS SO ORDERED.
 Because the Court found that
Plaintiff’s claims were untimely, the Court declined to
address Defendants’ alternative arguments that District
Attorneys Lowe, Wiley and Ford were entitled to absolute or
qualified immunity for their actions. Docket No. 41 at
 Plaintiff has also moved for
reconsideration pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which is inapplicable here. Rule 52(b)
applies to “action[s] tried on the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, ” i.e. a bench trial, and
requests that a court amend its findings of fact.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(1), ...