United States District Court, E.D. California
JAMES S. QUILICI, Plaintiff,
v.
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
ALLISON CLAIRE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was
accordingly referred to the undersigned by E.D. Cal. R.
(“Local Rule”) 302(c)(21). Plaintiff has also
requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915. ECF No. 2. The request will be denied
because (1) plaintiff failed to sign the affidavit he
submitted to establish IFP status, and (2) the complaint, in
its current form, is frivolous.
I.
INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION IN THE IFP APPLICATION
Plaintiff’s
in forma pauperis application leaves the signature line
blank, and therefore does not qualify as the
“affidavit” required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1).
II.
SCREENING
Where
“plaintiff’s claim appears to be frivolous on the
face of the complaint, ” the district court may
“deny[] plaintiff leave to file in forma
pauperis.” O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920
F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990). A claim is legally frivolous
when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In
reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court will (1)
accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful,
(2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the
plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
327; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007);
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena,
592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010); Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the court need
not accept as true, legal conclusions cast in the form of
factual allegations, or allegations that contradict matters
properly subject to judicial notice. See Western Mining
Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981);
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988
(9th Cir.), as amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (2001).
Pro se
pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). Pro se complaints are construed liberally and may
only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief. Nordstrom v.
Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014). A pro se
litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the
complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the
complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by
amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448
(9th Cir. 1987).
A.
The Complaint
The
complaint alleges civil rights violations, and is brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The allegations of the complaint
are taken as true only for the purposes of this screening.
The
complaint alleges that plaintiff was stopped twice by law
enforcement officers. In the first incident, on March 27,
2014, at 2:30 a.m., officer Richard Anglesey of the
California Highway Patrol “engaged in a traffic
stop” on plaintiff’s car. Complaint at 2. Officer
Anglesey stated that plaintiff was being stopped “for
tinted windows and a dimmed drivers side headlight.”
Id. After giving plaintiff a field sobriety test,
the officer arrested plaintiff for “Driving under the
//// //// influence 8.0 or more VC 23152(A) 23152(B).”
Complaint at 2.[1] The complaint then alleges that “the
arresting officer had no grounds nor evidence to suspend the
plaintiff Drivers License for DUI (VC 13353.2).”
Id.[2]
In the
second incident, on July 3, 2014 at 4:00 a.m.,
plaintiff’s car was again stopped by officer Anglesey.
Id. This time, the officer stated that plaintiff was
“all over the road.” Id. Plaintiff was
given a field sobriety test, and was then arrested “for
driving on a suspended license for (23152(e) Drugs, VC
13353.2.” Id. at 2-3.[3] Plaintiff’s car was
then impounded for 30 days. Id. at 3.[4] Plaintiff alleges
that the impoundment occurred because this was his
“second arrest for DUI.” Id. at 3.
It is
not entirely clear who is a named defendant in this action.
The caption of plaintiff’s complaint lists only
“California Highway Patrol, ” “Office of
Protective Intelligence, ” and “Department of
Motor Vehicles.” Complaint at 1. However, the body of
the complaint states that “Defendant falsely arrested
the Plaintiff, ” and identifies the “Arresting
Officer” as “Richard Anglesey (019574).”
The undersigned therefore interprets the complaint as naming
officer Anglesey as a defendant.
The
only relief sought is listed as ...