United States District Court, C.D. California
JEANNIE B. HOBERT
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY FSB, ET AL.
Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
IN CHAMBERS RESPONSE OF PLAINTIFF JEANNIE B HOBERT TO
JUNE 28, 2016 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (Dkt. 12, filed July 11,
2016), PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION (Dkt. 13, filed July 13, 2016)
Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER JUDGE
January 29, 2016, plaintiff filed an action, Jeanie
Hobert v. Wilmington Saving Fund FSB, et al., Case No:
2:16-cv-00657-CAS-PLA (“Hobert I”), before this
court. In Hobert I, plaintiff named Wilmington
Saving Fund Society, FSB (“Wilmington”) and
Statebridge Company, LLC (“Statebridge”) as
defendants and asserted claims for (1) Violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681i of the Fair Credit Reporting Act; (2) Invasion
of Privacy; (3) Negligent, Wanton, and/or Intentional Hiring
and Supervision of Incompetent Employees or Agents; and (4)
Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692 of the Fair Debt
Collections Practices Act. Hobert I, Dkt. 1. On
March 17, 2016, the defendants in Hobert I filed a
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, Dkt. 11, and,
on May 24, 2016, the Court granted defendants’ motion,
Dkt. 23. The Court granted defendants’ motion without
prejudice and provided plaintiff with twenty days in which to
file an amended complaint. Dkt. 23, at 20. In granting
plaintiff leave to amend, the Court expressly stated:
Plaintiff may not plead additional claims or add allegations
that are not intended to cure the specific defects the Court
has noted. Should any amended complaint exceed the scope of
leave to amend granted by this order, the Court will strike
the offending portions under Rule 12(f).
Id. at 20. Plaintiff failed to file an amended
complaint within the twenty days provided for in the
Court’s order. Accordingly, on June 24, 2016, the Court
dismissed Hobert I with prejudice. Dkt. 24.
13, 2016, plaintiff initiated this action, Hobert
II, against defendants Wilmington and Statebridge and
naming, as new defendants, Fay Servicing and Does 1 through
10. Hobert II, Dkt. 1. In her complaint in
Hobert II, plaintiff asserts thirteen new claims for
relief which were not raised in her complaint in Hobert
I. As stated above, when the Court granted plaintiff
leave to amend her complaint in Hobert I it did not
grant plaintiff leave to add additional parties and claims.
28, 2016, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause
(“OSC”) instructing plaintiff to explain in
writing why her complaint in Hobert II should not be
stricken for failure to seek leave to add additional claims.
Dkt. 10. On July 11, 2016, plaintiff filed a response to the
Court’s OSC. Dkt. 12. Thereafter, on July 18, 2016,
plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
in Hobert II. Dkt. 17. Like her original complaint
in Hobert II, plaintiff’s FAC asserts claims
that were not raised in her complaint in Hobert I.
response to the Court’s OSC, plaintiff states, in
Plaintiff was unaware that the order to amend was an actual
dismissal without prejudice, curable only be amendment, and
that filing a new complaint was procedurally prohibited.
Plaintiff seeks leave to prosecute the within claim upon
which relief can be granted, with due allowance for Plaintiff
to procedurally comply with the requirements of the Court and
Dkt. 12, at 3. It appears that plaintiff is contending that
she was unaware that, per the Court’s order dismissing
her complaint in Hobert I, she was prohibited from
filing an amended complaint asserting additional claims for
relief. Nonetheless, the Court’s order was explicit:
“Plaintiff may not plead additional claims or
add allegations that are not intended to cure the specific
defects the Court has noted.” Dkt. 23, at 20 (emphasis
added). Accordingly, the Court rejects plaintiff’s
contention that she was unaware that the Court had prohibited
her from filing a new complaint asserting additional claims
addition, to the extent plaintiff wished to file a complaint
asserting additional claims for relief, she was required to
seek leave pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
However, even had plaintiff sought leave pursuant to Rule 15,
the Court would have denied such a request because, upon the
Court’s review of plaintiff’s complaint and FAC,
granting leave to amend would appear to be futile in this
case. See also Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80
F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is
not an abuse of discretion where amendment would be futile).
Accordingly, the Court hereby STRIKES plaintiff’s
complaint and FAC in Hobert II and DISMISSES this
action WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
has also filed an application for a temporary restraining
order. Dkt. 13. In her application, plaintiff requests that
the Court issue a temporary restraining order preventing
defendant Wilmington or the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s department from taking any steps to deprive
Plaintiff of her residence, including by evicting her. This
is now the second time plaintiff has filed an application for
a temporary restraining order requesting that the Court
enjoin defendant Wilmington and the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s department from taking steps to remove her
from her residence. Nonetheless, as the Court has already
explained to plaintiff, because her residence has already
been the subject of an unlawful detainer action in which
judgment was entered in favor of defendants, it would be a
violation of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,
for the Court to issue a temporary restraining order
preventing defendants from enforcing that judgment.
See Dkt. 9, at 1 (citing Halajian v. Deutsche
Bank Nat. Trust Co., 2012 WL 1833941, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
May 18, 2012) (finding that it would violate the
Anti-Injunction Act to issue a temporary restraining order
staying unlawful detainer proceedings by “postponing
enforcement of judgment”); McKinney v. Citi
Residential Lending, Inc., 2016 WL 499346, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 9, 2016) (same)); see also Le v. 1st Nat.
Lending Servs., 2013 WL 2555556, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jul.
7, 2013) (“Numerous district courts ...