United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY
FEES AND EXPENSES PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
(Doc. 32)
SHEILA
K. OBERTO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
After
successfully obtaining reversal of an Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision denying his
application for Social Security disability benefits,
Plaintiff filed an application for an award of attorney fees
and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act
(“EAJA”) in the amount of $10, 619. (See
Doc. 32, pp. 9-10 (representing a contingency fee based on
25% of Plaintiff’s past due benefits as remuneration
for 30.9 hours of attorney time and 5.0 hours of paralegal
time spent representing Plaintiff, and an additional $26.34
in expenses).) On June 17, 2016, the Court ordered
Defendant’s opposition, if any, to be filed by no later
than June 29, 2016. (Doc. 34.) No opposition has been filed;
therefore, the motion is deemed unopposed. For the reasons
set forth below, Plaintiff’s application for EAJA fees
and expenses is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed this action on December 11, 2013, seeking judicial
review of a final administrative decision denying his
application for Social Security disability benefits. On March
9, 2015, the Court issued an order reversing the ALJ’s
decision and remanding the case for award or benefits based
on the ALJ’s failure to articulate specific and
legitimate reasons for rejecting the medical opinion of
Plaintiff’s treating physician. (Doc. 21.) On March 27,
2015, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending the Court erred in considering the ALJ’s
findings and by failing to follow the standard of review and
improperly reweighing evidence. (Doc. 25.) On June 29, 2015,
the Court denied Defendant’s motion for
reconsideration, again finding the ALJ failed to provide
adequate reasons for rejecting the opinion of
Plaintiff’s treating physician and noting that the
opinion must be credited as a matter of law. (Doc. 28, p. 6
(citing Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th
Cir. 2004); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292
(9th Cir. 1996); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834
(9th Cir. 1995).
On June
13, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for EAJA fees and
expenses, seeking (1) an interim EAJA fee award of $10, 916,
representing 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits under
the contingency fee agreement, (2) an order that
Plaintiff’s counsel reimburse Plaintiff in the amount
of $ 6, 900 for EAJA fees previously paid by the
Commissioner, and (3) leave to file a motion pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 406(b) motion upon calculation of benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act for work performed
before the Court. (Doc. 32.) No opposition was filed. It is
Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees and expenses under
the EAJA that is currently pending before the Court.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The
EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing
party . . . fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that
party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the
United States . . . unless the court finds that the position
of the United States was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v.
Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). “It is the
government’s burden to show that its position was
substantially justified or that special circumstances exist
to make an award unjust.” Gutierrez v.
Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001).
A
“party” under the EAJA is defined as including
“an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2, 000,
000 at the time the civil action was filed[.]” 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i). The term “fees and
other expenses” includes “reasonable attorney
fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). “The
statute explicitly permits the court, in its discretion, to
reduce the amount awarded to the prevailing party to the
extent that the party ‘unduly and unreasonably
protracted’ the final resolution of the case.”
Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir.1998)
(citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(C) &
2412(d)(2)(D)).
A party
who obtains a remand in a Social Security case is a
prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA. Shalala v.
Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993) (“No holding
of this Court has ever denied prevailing-party status . . .
to a plaintiff who won a remand order pursuant to sentence
four of § 405(g) . . ., which terminates the litigation
with victory for the plaintiff). “An applicant for
disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the
purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is
reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability
benefits ultimately are awarded.” Gutierrez,
274 F.3d at 1257.
III.
ANALYSIS
There
is no dispute Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this
litigation. The Court finds Plaintiff did not unduly delay
this litigation, and Plaintiffs net worth did not exceed two
million dollars when this action was filed. The Court thus
considers below whether the government’s actions were
substantially justified.
A.
The Government’s Position was Not Substantially
Justified
Substantial
justification means “justified in substance or in the
main -- that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In other words, the government’s position
must have a reasonable basis both in fact and in law.
Id. In considering whether the position of the
government is substantially justified, the position of the
United States includes “both the government’s
litigation position and the underlying agency action giving
rise to the civil action.” Meier v Colvin, 727
F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013).
In the
social security context, it is the ALJ’s decision that
is considered the “action or failure to act” by
the agency. Id. Under the substantial justification
test, the court first considers the ALJ’s decision and
then considers the government’s litigation position in
defending that decision. Id. Where the underlying
ALJ decision is not substantially justified, a court need not
address whether the government’s litigation position
was justified. Id. at 872 (citing Shafer v.
Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) ...