United States District Court, E.D. California
CHRIS PYARA on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiffs,
SYSCO CORPORATION; SYSCO SACRAMENTO, INC., A California Corporation; and DOES 1-100, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
A. MENDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a wage and hour case brought by plaintiff Chris Pyara
(“Pyara”) on behalf of similarly situated
employees of defendants Sysco Corporation and Sysco
Sacramento, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”).
Pyara alleges ten causes of action for violations of various
provisions of the California Labor Code (“CLC”),
associated regulations, and common law. Defendants now move
for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c) for each of the
ten causes of action raised by Pyara (Doc. #9). For the
reasons stated below, the Court denies in part and grants in
part the motion.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt industrial truck
driver from October 31, 2011 to November 27, 2013. Compl.
¶ 18; Tzintun Decl. (Doc. #1-5) ¶¶ 2-3. During
this period, there was a collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) in place between Sysco Sacramento and the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 137, which
represented Sysco Sacramento employees. Tzintun Decl. ¶
8; Defendants’ First Request for Judicial Notice
(“D RJN 1”) (Doc. #10), Exh. A.
April 13, 2015, Pyara, on behalf of himself and “all
non-exempt employees, including . . . hourly industrial truck
workers, truck drivers, drivers, or similar job designations
and titles who are presently or formerly employed” by
Defendants, filed a complaint against Defendants in
Sacramento Superior Court alleging that Defendants violated
the common law and various provisions of the CLC and
associated regulations. Pyara’s first cause of action
for “wage theft / time shaving” is based on
Defendants’ alleged practice of clocking out Pyara for
meal and rest periods even when he remained working.
Pyara’s second cause of action for failure to pay
overtime is based on Defendants’ alleged failure to
provide meal and rest periods and therefore not correctly
classifying certain hours as overtime work. Pyara’s
third cause of action for failure to provide meal periods is
based on Defendants’ alleged policy of requiring Pyara
to work through meal periods and to work at least five hours
without a meal period and failing to provide a second meal
period when Pyara worked shifts of ten hours or more.
Pyara’s fourth cause of action for failure to permit
rest periods is similarly based on Defendants’ alleged
policy of requiring Pyara to work through rest periods and
work four hours without a rest period. Based on these alleged
practices (wage theft, failure to pay overtime, and failure
to provide meal and rest breaks), Pyara alleges that
Defendants failed to provide accurate itemized wage
statements (fifth cause of action); failed to pay all wages
due upon termination (sixth cause of action); were unjustly
enriched (seventh cause of action); converted Pyara’s
wages (eighth cause of action); defrauded Pyara (ninth cause
of action); and violated the California Unfair Competition
Law (“UCL”) (tenth cause of action). Defendants
removed the case to this Court based on federal question
jurisdiction and pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act
(“CAFA”) (Doc. #1). Pyara did not oppose removal.
Jurisdiction is indeed proper based on CAFA because the
parties are minimally diverse, there are over 100 potential
class members, and the aggregate amount in controversy is
greater than $5 million. Removal at 6-13.
moved for judgment on the pleadings of all ten of the causes
of action (Doc. #9). Defendants allege that the first four
causes of action are either statutorily barred or preempted
by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Pyara opposed
the motion (Doc. #14).
bring their motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Rule 12(c), which states that “[a]fter the pleadings
are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may
move for judgment on the pleadings.” For the purposes
of Rule 12(c), the pleadings are closed once an answer has
been filed. Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058,
1061 (9th Cir. 2005). Since Defendants filed their answer
(Doc. #1-2) and the motion will not delay trial, a Rule 12(c)
motion is appropriate at this time.
12(c) motions are “functionally identical” to
Rule 12(b) motions. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine
Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989).
“Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving
party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that
no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal
Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896
F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). Just as in Rule 12(b)
motions to dismiss, courts must accept as true the
allegations of the non-moving party. Id.
support of its motion, Defendants ask this court to take
judicial notice of the CBA between Sysco Sacramento and the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 137 (Doc. #10).
D RJN 1, Exh. A. Pyara asks this Court to take judicial
notice of (1) the California Legislative Counsel’s
Digest for Assembly Bill 569 dated February 25, 2009; (2) the
California Assembly Committee on Labor and Employment file
for Assembly Bill 569; and (3) the California Assembly
Committee on Appropriations file for Assembly Bill 569 (Doc.
#14-1). Plaintiff’s RJN, Exhs. 1-3. In support of its
reply, Defendants request that this Court take judicial
notice of the order denying the motion to remand in the case
Gerardo Ayala v. Destination Shuttle Services LLC, et
al., CV 1306141 GAF (PJWx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2013) and
the Bill Analysis of Senate Bill 1255 by the California
Assembly Committee on Labor and Employment from the hearing
held on June 20, 2012 (Doc. #16). Defendants’ Second
RJN, Exhs. A, B. Neither party objects to the opposing
party’s requests for judicial notice.
may take judicial notice of a fact that is not reasonably
disputed if it “can be accurately and readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2). CBAs are properly
considered materials that are not subject to reasonable
dispute and are therefore proper for judicial notice.
Densmore v. Mission Linen Supply, 2016 WL 696503, at
*4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2016). The Court grants
Defendants’ first RJN (Doc. #10).
may also judicially notice legislative facts such as
“facts of which courts take particular notice when
interpreting a statute.” Korematsu v. United
States, 584 F.Supp. 1406, 1414 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
Moreover, if the legislature’s intent is not clear from
its language, a court may take judicial notice of legislative
history, including committee reports. Ass’n des
Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris,
729 F.3d 937, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s
exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and Defendants’ Exhibit B from
Defendants’ second RJN are all legislative history and
are therefore proper for judicial notice.
courts are allowed to consider “matters of public
record.” Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab
Investments, 779 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015).
Defendants’ Exhibit A from Defendants’ second RJN
is a matter of public record and proper for judicial notice.
For these reasons, the Court will take judicial notice of
Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and Defendants’
Exhibit A from Defendants’ first RJN and Exhibits A and
B from Defendants’ second RJN.
motion argues that the first four causes of action are
preempted by the LMRA and that the second and third causes of
action are statutorily exempted. If either the second or
third cause of action is statutorily exempted, the preemption
analysis for that claim is moot. For that reason, the Court
will first address the issue of ...