United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
KENDALL J. NEWMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff
is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff
claims that defendant Parciasepe was deliberately indifferent
to plaintiff’s safety in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights.[1] Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is before the court. As set forth more fully below,
the undersigned finds that defendant’s motion for
summary judgment should be denied.
II.
Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff
alleges that on January 10, 2013, defendant Parciasepe
brought new inmate Villiers to plaintiff’s cell, and
when Villiers and plaintiff recognized each other as enemies
from past encounters on the streets and prisons, they
informed defendant, but defendant ignored their pleas, shut
the cell door, stated “handle your business, ”
and walked away. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that
Villiers started banging on the cell door, yelling “let
me out because we [are] not compatible, ” but their
pleas went unanswered by defendant and the altercation
continued. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Plaintiff contends that
defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s
safety, and failed to protect plaintiff, and claims that his
failure to address their incompatibility was cruel and
unusual punishment.
III.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant
moves for summary judgment on the grounds that there is
evidence that plaintiff staged the fight with Villiers so
that plaintiff could get his old cellmate back, and there are
no facts demonstrating that defendant knew of an excessive
risk to plaintiff or that defendant disregarded any such
risk. In addition, defendant argues that he is entitled to
qualified immunity because it was reasonable for defendant to
believe that his actions were lawful, based on his review of
the central files reflecting that plaintiff and Villiers were
eligible to be cellmates, neither inmate advised the officers
they were enemies when Villiers was placed in cell 240, and
that Villiers’ statement that he and plaintiff were
“incompatible, ” but both he and plaintiff were
calm, and showed no sign of aggression or fear, led defendant
to believe that Villiers’ request was a convenience
cell move request. Defendant contends that his actions were
objectively reasonable in light of the information known to
him at the time.
In
opposition, plaintiff contends that his evidence demonstrates
that defendant was warned that Villiers and plaintiff viewed
one another as enemies as soon as Villiers entered the cell.
Plaintiff argues that their yelling and kicking the door for
help informed defendant that a fight was going to ensue if
defendant did not separate them. Plaintiff contends that
defendant ignored these warnings, resulting in the
altercation and subsequent injuries sustained by plaintiff
and Villiers.
In
reply, defendant argues that Villiers’ statement that
he and plaintiff were “incompatible” did not
alert defendant to a substantial risk of harm or suggest that
plaintiff and Villiers were enemies. Defendant contends that
Villiers was placed in cell 240 without incident, and it was
not until shortly after they were celled together that
Villiers informed defendant that plaintiff and Villiers were
“incompatible.” (ECF No. 81 at 2.) Defendant
argues that plaintiff failed to adduce competent evidence
that defendant was both aware of facts from which an
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm
existed, or that defendant drew the inference. (ECF No. 81 at
3.) Defendant denies that plaintiff or Villiers told
defendant any reason they could not be housed together other
than Villiers’ statement that they were
“incompatible.” Defendant states that he advised
Villiers of the procedure for convenience moves and assured
him it would be addressed in the morning. Defendant contends
that based on his observations of the behavior of plaintiff
and Villiers, Villiers’ statements to defendant, and
defendant’s experience and training as a correctional
officer, defendant did not believe that placing Villiers in
cell 240 with plaintiff would lead to an altercation.
Moreover,
defendant contends that plaintiff’s statement in his
opposition that he and Villiers fought because plaintiff had
“stabbed a person who plaintiff has always understood
to be Villiers’ cousin” (ECF No. 80 at 4), is
unsupported by plaintiff’s own declaration or any other
competent evidence. (ECF No. 81 at 4.) Defendant points out
that Villiers testified at his deposition that plaintiff
fabricated the story about the cousin to create a reason for
the fight that plaintiff planned in order to get Villiers out
of the cell that night. (Id.) Defendant notes that
plaintiff did not deny that he orchestrated the fight.
Defendant
argues that he adduced evidence that plaintiff and Villiers
had no problems previously, and after the fight, they signed
a “peaceful Co-existence Agreement” chrono which
conceded that there was no animosity between them and they
could co-exist peacefully on the same prison yard. Moreover,
months after the incident they continued to be housed in the
same building, “and communicated with each other with
no signs of hostility, no verbal or physical altercations
between them.” (ECF No. 81 at 5.)
Finally,
defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity
because he believed in good faith that his actions were
reasonable based on the circumstances as he knew them at the
time. (ECF No. 81 at 6.)
IV.
Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary
judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the
standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56 is
met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[T]the
moving party always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, ’ which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)). “Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there
is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party’s case.” Nursing Home Pension Fund,
Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec.
Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 advisory committee’s notes to 2010
amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not have
the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a
party who does have the trial burden cannot produce
admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the
fact”). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “[A]
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of
the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.
Consequently,
if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the
burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a
genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to
establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the
opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials
of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of
specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible
discovery material in support of its contention that such a
dispute exists. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party
must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material,
i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv.,
Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d
626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine,
i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v.
Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.
1987), overruled in part on other grounds,
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564,
1575 (9th Cir. 1990).
In the
endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630.
Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to
‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order
to see whether there is a genuine need for
trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note
on 1963 amendments).
In
resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to
be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed
before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing
party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it
is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual
predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See
Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224,
1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898,
902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue,
the opposing party “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. .
. . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there
is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).
By
contemporaneous notice provided on November 10, 2015 (ECF No.
75-1), plaintiff was advised of the requirements for opposing
a motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952,
957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v.
Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).
V.
Evidentiary Objections
Defendants
filed objections to plaintiff’s exhibits. Generally,
this court does not rule on evidentiary matters raised on
summary judgment, unless otherwise noted. See Capitol
Records, LLC v. BlueBeat, Inc., 765 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1200
n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that it is often unnecessary
and impractical for a court to methodically scrutinize and
give a full analysis of each evidentiary objection on a
motion for summary judgment); Burch v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1118-22 (E.D. Cal.
2006) (same).
“At
summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to
produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at
trial.” Nevada Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene,
648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Block v. City
of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001))
(internal quotations omitted). The focus is on the
admissibility of the evidence’s contents, not its form.
Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Arizona, Inc., 374
F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2004); Fraser v. Goodale,
342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003); Burch, 433
F.Supp.2d at 1122. Therefore, unless otherwise specifically
addressed herein, defendants’ authentication and
hearsay objections are overruled. See, e.g.,
Fonseca, 374 F.3d at 846; Burch, 433
F.Supp.2d at 1122. Documents submitted as exhibits are
considered to the extent that they are relevant, and despite
the fact that they are not authenticated because such
documents could be admissible at trial if authenticated. This
court offers no opinion on the admissibility of these
documents at trial.
VI.
Facts[2]
On
January 10, 2013, plaintiff Marcelino Clemente was housed in
A-5 facility of Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”)
and did not have a cellmate at that time. Defendant
Correctional Officer Parciasepe and his partner, Correctional
Officer S. Hpoo (“Hpoo”), worked the third watch
shift from 1400 to 2200 hours. That night, MCSP received
prisoners at the facility who had just transferred in from
another prison, including inmate Eric Villiers, CDCR #
D-96687 (“Villiers”). Control Sergeant Butcher
assigned defendant the task of locating housing for new
arrival Villiers.
An
appropriate housing assignment for an inmate is determined
through a screening process pursuant to California Code of
Regulations Title 15 § 3269(a). A number of factors are
considered when determining an appropriate housing
assignment, including the inmate’s CDCR Form 812, also
known as an “Enemy List” which is reviewed to
confirm that inmates are not listed as enemies before housing
them together. If an inmate has another inmate on his
...