United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ REVISED MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [103]
OTIS
D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff
Toyrrific, LLC (“Toyriffic”) maintains that
Defendants Edvin Karapetian, Edward Minasyan, Lena
Amerkhanian, and EDO Trading, Inc. (collectively,
“Defendants”) violated the terms of the
parties’ settlement agreement from a predecessor
action. In light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, which
reversed and remanded this Court’s previous Order,
Defendants renew their Motion for Summary Judgment. (Motion
for Sum. J. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 103.) The Ninth
Circuit held that when imposing Rule 37(c)(1) exclusionary
sanctions, the Court must do so under the standard of
R&R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Penn., 673 F.3d
1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2012). (ECF No. 87.) That is, the Court
must find that a plaintiff’s “noncompliance
involved willfulness, fault or bad faith, ” and must
consider “the availability of lesser sanctions”
before imposing a sanction that would amount in the dismissal
of a claim. Id. at 1245, 1247. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to the
standard in R&R Sails.[1]
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Toyrrific
is a leader in the manufacturing, selling, and marketing of
airsoft toy guns and remote-control toys. (Additional
Material Facts (“AMF”) 57, ECF No. 67-2.) It also
operates HobbyTron, which sells toys through its website,
Hobbytron.com. (Id. 58.) Defendant Karapetian is a
former Toyrrific employee who, along with Defendant Minasyan,
allegedly stole Toyrrific’s products, trade dress,
copyrighted materials, trademarks, and trade-secret
information to establish a competing business, HobbyChase.
(Id. 59.)
As a
result of Karapetian and Minasyan’s alleged
infringement, Toyrrific filed an action against both
individuals in August 2010 for copyright infringement and
other claims related to the alleged unlawful interference
with Toyrrific’s company. (Id. 61.);
Toyrrific v. Karapetian (“Toyrrific
I”), No. CV 10-5813-ODW(Ex) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5,
2010). The parties ultimately resolved Toyrrific I
on December 12, 2011, through the execution of a Settlement
Agreement and Mutual General Release
(“Agreement”). (Id. 63.)
Six
months later, on May 23, 2012, Toyrrific filed the present
action alleging that Defendants violated the terms of the
Agreement. (Compl. ¶ 21, ECF No. 1.) Specifically,
Toyrrific alleges that Defendants breached the Agreement by:
1) failing to comply with the terms of the Court’s
preliminary injunction; 2) failing to stop operating a
website similar to hobbychase.com; 3) failing to cease
operating the HobbyChase business; and 4) failing to deliver
assets of HobbyChase, as described in the Bill of Sale
included with the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 49.) On
August 16, 2012, the Court dismissed all claims except for
Toyrrific’s breach of contract claim. (ECF No. 30.)
On
March 25, 2013, Defendants moved for summary judgment on
Toyriffic’s remaining claim. (ECF No. 50.) The Court
entered judgment in favor of Defendants on April 16, 2013
based on Rule 37(c)(1) exclusionary sanctions. Toyriffic
v. Karapetian (“Toyrrific II”),
Case No. 2:12-cv-04499-ODW(Ex) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013, ECF
No. 71.) Toyriffic appealed the Court’s order, and the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to this
Court, holding that the district court erred as a matter of
law by imposing Rule 37(c)(1) exclusionary sanctions without
finding that Toyrrific’s “noncompliance involved
willfulness, fault, or bad faith, ” and without
considering “the availability of lesser
sanctions.” (ECF No. 87.); R&R Sails, 673
F.3d at 1245, 1247. On February 22, 2016, Defendants filed a
renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 103.) On March
02, 2016, Toyriffic filed its Opposition to Defendants’
Revised Motion for Summary Judgment, two days after the Court
imposed deadline. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s
Mot. for Summary Judgment. (“Opp’n.”), ECF
No. 105.) On March 07, 2016, Defendants filed a timely Reply.
(Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n
(“Reply”), ECF No. 107.)
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary
judgment should be granted if there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears
the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Once the moving party has met
its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings
and identify specific facts through admissible evidence that
show a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c). Conclusory or speculative testimony in affidavits and
moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact
and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill’s
Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th
Cir. 1979).
A
genuine issue of material fact must be more than a scintilla
of evidence, or evidence that is merely colorable or not
significantly probative. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, 198
F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). A disputed fact is
“material” where the resolution of that fact
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1968). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is
sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Id. Where the moving and nonmoving
parties’ versions of events differ, courts are required
to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
IV.
DISCUSSION
As a
general rule, a motion for summary judgment is not granted
automatically solely because no response has been filed.
Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 65 (6th Cir. 1979);
Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996).
“Such a motion may properly be granted only if the
facts as to which there is no genuine dispute ‘show
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)). As such, the effect of the nonmovant’s failure
to respond to a motion for summary judgment is that it
constitutes an admission by the nonmovant that there are no
disputed issues of genuine fact warranting trial, but does
not constitute a waiver by the nonmoving party of all the
legal arguments based upon those undisputed facts. Flynn
v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1995).
Central
District of California Local Rule 7-9 requires an opposing
party to file an opposition to any motion at least twenty-one
(21) days prior to the date designated for hearing the
motion. C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-9. Despite the Court imposed
deadline, Toyriffic failed to timely file its Opposition, and
thus the Court takes this Motion as unopposed. ...