United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY THE COURT OF INTENT TO PROCEED ON CLAIM
FOUND TO BE COGNIZABLE [ECF No. 22]
Plaintiff
Percy Lee Rhodes is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in
this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Plaintiff consented to
the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on
November 23, 2015. Local Rule 302.
Currently
before the Court is Plaintiff's first amended complaint,
filed on June 20, 2016, in response to the Court's
February 2, 2016, screening order dismissing the original
complaint with leave to amend.
I.
SCREENING
REQUIREMENT
The
Court is required to screen complaints brought by persons
proceeding in pro per. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject
to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of his rights.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo
County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010).
While
persons proceeding pro se are still entitled to have their
pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved
in their favor, the pleading standard is now higher,
Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir.
2012) (citations omitted), and to survive screening,
Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which
requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to
reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79;
Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th
Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts
that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's
liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility
standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572
F.3d at 969.
II.
COMPLAINT
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff
names nurse practitioner Vivian, nurse practitioner Pat,
senior official L. Her, registered nurse D. Lang, and
lieutenant K. Nunez, as Defendants.
On July
21, 2014, at approximately 5:15 p.m., Plaintiff was taken to
the infirmary to see nurse practitioner Pat. Pat told
Plaintiff they were not going to do anything, not going to
change or take out the catheter until Plaintiff could see
another physician. Defendant Pat knew Plaintiff was injured,
knew he was bleeding, knew nurse Vivian injured him, and did
nothing to stop the bleeding.
On July
28, 2014, nurse Vivian punched a hole internally causing
bleeding. Nurse Vivian deprived Plaintiff of his
constitutional rights when she injured Plaintiff and did
nothing to stop the bleedings which led to difficulty passing
urine, infection, fevers, sweats, burning in penis,
suprapubic abdominal pain, nausea and vomiting for weeks.
After
returning from Community Medical Center to the Fresno County
Jail, medical staff did not follow Doctor Shu's
recommendations.
On July
29, 2014, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Plaintiff was called
for follow-up and was advised by officer Her it would be a
long time because the office was busy. Plaintiff had been
bleeding now for almost forty-eight hours and was forced ...