United States District Court, E.D. California
JODI SCOTT-GEORGE, individually and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
PVH CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Troy
L. Nunley United States District Judge.
This
matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant PVH
Corporation’s (“Defendant and PVH”) motion
for partial summary judgment. (ECF No. 114.) Named Plaintiffs
Jodi Scott-George and Melissa Wiggs’s (collectively
referred to as “Plaintiffs”) oppose
Defendant’s motion. (ECF No. 116.) Defendant has filed
a reply. (ECF No. 118.) The Court has carefully considered
the arguments raised in the parties’ briefing. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is hereby
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I.
Factual Background
PVH is
a publicly traded company, incorporated in the state of
Delaware, which operates various clothing brands and sells
clothes as a wholesaler and a retailer. (Pls’ Response
to Def’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts (“SMF”), ECF No. 116-6, SMFs 5, 8.) PVH
directly operates stores under the brands Van Heusen and IZOD
in California. (ECF No. 116-6, SMF 6.) PVH Retail Stores, LLC
(“Retail Stores”) is a subsidiary corporation of
PVH. (ECF No. 116-6, SMF 9.)
Plaintiffs
are former retail store employees of PVH. (ECF No. 116-6,
SMFs 1, 3.) Ms. Scott-George worked at a G.H. Bass & Co.
store, which was previously owned by PVH, and Ms. Wiggs
worked at a Van Heusen store, a brand still operated by PVH.
(ECF No. 116-6, SMF 3- 4.) Plaintiffs have alleged seven
causes of action against PVH based on violations of
California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 510, 512(a), 1194,
and 1198.
In this
Court’s previous order, the Court granted class
certification and certified the following subclasses:
(1) Overtime I Subclass (non-payment of regular overtime):
All nonexempt employees who worked in excess of 8 hours (but
less than 12 hours) in a workday or in excess 40 hours in a
workweek without receiving the appropriate overtime wage that
is one and a half times the regular rate pay, while working
for Defendant in California from March 20, 2009 to the
present.
(2) Overtime II Subclass (non-payment of double overtime):
All nonexempt employees who worked in excess of 12 hours in a
workday without receiving the appropriate overtime wage that
is twice the regular rate pay, while working for Defendant in
California from March 20, 2009 to the present.
(3) Security Bag Check Subclass: All nonexempt employees who
were subjected to a security bag check while working for
Defendant in California from March 20, 2009 to the present.
(4) Paycard Subclass: All nonexempt employees who received
their earned wages via the Money Network paycard system while
working for Defendant in California from March 20, 2009 to
the present.
(5) Meal Period Subclass: All nonexempt employees who did not
receive a compliant meal period, while working for Defendant
in California from March 20, 2009 to the present.
(6) Rest Period Subclass: All nonexempt employees who did not
receive a compliant rest period, while working for Defendant
in California from March 20, 2009 to the present.
(7) Late Pay Subclass: All nonexempt employees who worked for
Defendant in California whose employment ended between March
20, 2010 and the date of certification, who did not receive
all wages due at the time they were terminated or otherwise
stopped working for Defendant.
(8) Wage Statement Subclass: All nonexempt employees who
received non-compliant wage statements while working for
Defendant in California from March 20, 2009 to the present.
(Order,
ECF No. 112.) Plaintiff Jodi Scott-George is the Class
Representative for subclass (1), (2), (5), (6) and (7).
Plaintiff Melissa Wiggs is the Class Representative for the
subclass (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8).
In its
order, the Court considered the wage and hour policies of
both PVH and Retail Stores and found that because the
policies were identical, nonexempt employees of both
companies would be similarly situated under Rule 23.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Thus, the Court certified a
class of all nonexempt employees of both PVH and Retail
Stores. In doing so, the Court made a determination as to
whether the class action could be maintained. However, the
Court did not decide whether piercing the corporate veil
would be appropriate.[1] Federal Rule of Civil procedure Rule
23(c)(1) specifically provides that a district court’s
determination on the maintainability of a class action
“may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits.” Officers for
Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 633 (9th Cir. 1982). At the
time of class certification, the Court made a determination
that should Plaintiffs be able to prove their
allegations―that PHV and Retail Stores are
integrated―the nonexempt employees of both companies
would be similarly situated for typicality purposes. See
Id . (“[B]efore entry of a final judgment on the
merits, a district court’s order respecting class
status is not final or irrevocable, but rather, it is
inherently tentative.”).
Following
the Court’s order granting class certification,
Defendant moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 114.)
II.
Legal Standard
Summary
judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates no
genuine issue as to any material fact exists, and therefore,
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Under summary judgment practice,
the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and
identifying those portions of “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file together with affidavits, if any, ” which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a
summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance
solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Id.
at 324 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, summary
judgment should be entered against a party who does not make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.
If the
moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden
then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue as to any material fact actually does exist.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank
of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89
(1968). In attempting to establish the existence of this
factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the
denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence
of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or
admissible discovery material, in support of its contention
that the dispute exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The opposing
party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is
material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the dispute is
genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
at 251–52.
In the
endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth
at trial.” First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at
288–89. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is
to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in
order to see whether there is a genuine need for
trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587
(quoting Rule 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963
amendments).
In
resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with any applicable affidavits.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d
1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1982). The evidence of the
opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from the facts pleaded before
the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences
are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing
party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from
which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen
Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D.
Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.
1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue that
necessitates a jury trial, the opposing party “must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 586. “Where the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving
party, there is no ‘genuine issue for
trial.’” Id. at 587.
III.
Analysis
Defendant
moves for partial summary judgment and asserts: (1)
Plaintiffs cannot impose liability on Retail Stores because
they have sued PVH not its subsidiary, Retail Stores, and
have failed to justify disregarding the corporate form; (2)
Plaintiff cannot succeed on their claim concerning bag checks
because carrying a bag is optional and the time associated
with such bag checks is de minimis; and (3)
Plaintiffs seek damages under an outdated section of
California Labor Code ...