United States District Court, S.D. California
AMERICAN SHOOTING CENTER, INC., a California Corporation, RECCE GROUP, INC., a California corporation, Plaintiffs,
v.
SECFOR INTERNATIONAL, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Barry
Ted Moskowitz, Chief Judge United States District Court
Defendant
Linda Kurokawa (“Defendant” or
“Kurokawa”), in her official capacity as Director
of Community Services & Business Development for
MiraCosta College, has filed a motion pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint’s claims against her for retroactive
monetary relief for copyright infringement. For the reasons
discussed below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
This
case involves claims by Plaintiffs American Shooting Center,
Inc., and Reece Group that two former employees and their
companies infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrights by using
certain materials in connection with training courses offered
at MiraCosta College.
In an
order filed on March 28, 2016 [Doc. 101], the Court dismissed
with prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims against MiraCosta
Community College District (“District”) on the
ground that the District is immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment. The Court also dismissed
Plaintiffs’ claims for retroactive monetary relief
against Kurokawa because the District’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity extends to her as to those claims.
However, the Court denied the motion to dismiss as to
Plaintiffs’ claims for prospective declaratory or
injunctive relief.
On
April 27, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”). In the SAC, Plaintiffs allege that
Kurokawa deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutionally
protected property interests by wrongfully infringing
Plaintiffs’ copyrights and failing to provide
Plaintiffs with notice or an opportunity to be heard before
or after such deprivation. (SAC ¶ 62.) According to
Plaintiffs, the Copyright Remedies Clarification Act
(“CRCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 511, strips Kurokawa
of any immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. (Id.)
Plaintiffs
seek the following relief against Kurokawa: (1) a declaration
that Kurokawa deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutionally
protected property interests in the copyrighted works at
issue; (2) imposition of a constructive trust on all gains,
profits and advantages MiraCosta College derived from
Kurokawa’s infringing activity; (3) an accounting of
all gains, profits, and advantages MiraCosta College derived
from Kurokawa’s infringement of the copyrighted works;
(4) disgorgement of all gains, profits, and advantages
derived from Kurokawa’s infringement of the copyrighted
works; and (5) attorney’s fees and costs. (SAC
¶¶ 64, 65, Prayer for Relief.)
II.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs
contend that their claim for retroactive monetary relief is
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because (1) the claim is
an equitable claim for disgorgement of ill-gotten gains; and
(2) the CRCA abrogates any Eleventh Amendment immunity
applicable to Kurokawa. The Court does not find these
arguments to be persuasive.
A.
Retroactive Monetary Relief against Immune State
Agency
In the
Court’s prior order, the Court dismissed with prejudice
Plaintiffs’ claims against the MiraCosta Defendants,
with the sole exception of Plaintiffs’ claim against
Kurokawa, in her official capacity, for prospective
injunctive relief. Yet in the SAC, Plaintiffs seek
retroactive monetary relief against Kurokawa in the form of
disgorgement of all gains and profits derived from use of the
copyrighted materials.
Plaintiffs
attempt to justify their claim for retroactive monetary
relief by characterizing the relief as an
“equitable” remedy. Plaintiffs argue that they do
not seek money damages but, rather, equitable recovery of
ill-gotten profits the District derived from Kurokawa’s
infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrights.
But
Plaintiffs cannot avoid Eleventh Amendment immunity by
dressing up their claim for relief as an equitable remedy. In
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Supreme
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the recovery of
“equitable restitution” in the form of the
retroactive release and payment of AABD (Aid to the Aged,
Blind, and Disabled) benefits wrongfully withheld by the
State of Illinois. The Supreme Court explained that the funds
to satisfy such an award would inevitably be paid from the
general revenues of the State of Illinois, not the pocket of
the petitioner Edelman, and that such relief would run afoul
of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 665. Responding to
the argument that the award was in the form of
“equitable restitution, ” the Supreme Court
stated:
We do not read Ex parte Young or subsequent holdings
of this Court to indicate that any form of relief may be
awarded against a state officer, no matter how closely it may
in practice resemble a money judgment payable out of the
state treasury, so long as the relief may be labeled
‘equitable’ ...