United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS RE:
DKT. NO. 8
HOWARD
R. LLOYD United States Magistrate Judge.
This
civil rights suit arises from plaintiff Ryan Campbell’s
arrest on Valentine’s Day 2015. He sues Monterey County
(County) and several of its peace officers, claiming that
County Sheriff’s deputies used excessive force during
the arrest. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), defendants now
move to dismiss two of Campbell’s claims. Plaintiff
opposes the motion. The matter is deemed suitable for
determination without oral argument, and the July 26, 2016
hearing is vacated.[1] Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Upon consideration of
the moving and responding papers, [2] this court denies the
motion.[3]
The
following background facts are drawn from the
complaint’s allegations, which are deemed true for the
present purpose of resolving the instant motion:
On
February 14, 2015, Campbell and his girlfriend, Tiffany
Harward, were at the AT&T golf tournament in Pebble
Beach, California. They went to the Tap Room, a restaurant
located inside The Lodge at Pebble Beach. Harward later
stepped outside for some fresh air, at which time defendant
Deputies Perez and Sullivan told her that she must
immediately leave the premises. Because the deputies would
not permit her to return to the restaurant, Harward texted
plaintiff, who then joined her outside. Deputy Sullivan
allegedly told Campbell that Harward was sick and needed to
leave. Campbell and Harward left in a taxi.
Less
than thirty seconds into the cab ride, plaintiff realized he
left his wallet at the restaurant. At his request, the cab
driver turned around and returned to the premises so he could
retrieve his wallet.
Upon
their return, Campbell and Harward stepped out of the taxi
and were spotted by Deputies Sullivan and Tsuchira and by
Sergeant Burns, who made a beeline for the couple. According
to plaintiff, these defendants “immediately displayed
an aggressive demeanor” and began to shout at them,
demanding to know why they had come back. (Dkt. 1, Complaint
¶ 17). Nevertheless, defendants allegedly “closed
their ears to any explanation and shouted orders to [Campbell
and Harward] to ‘shut up.’” (Id.).
Campbell
says that, based on their behavior, he believed that
Sullivan, Tsuchira, and Burns were angry that he apparently
had defied their orders to leave. Sensing that they were
about to use physical force against him, plaintiff says that
he put his hands up, with his palms facing forward, to signal
his submission to their authority---all the while, trying to
explain that he had returned for his wallet.
At that
point, Campbell says that, even though his hands were still
up, and without any warning or provocation, Sullivan and
Tsuchira “each grabbed one of [his] arms, spun him
around, and then slammed him face down onto the
tarmac.” (Complaint ¶ 19). Deputy Perez allegedly
then “joined his partners in battering
[plaintiff].” (Id.). The complaint goes on to
allege that before handcuffing Campbell, “the Deputies
repeatedly hit him on the back of his head, knowingly forcing
his face into the rough and highly abrasive tarmac, ”
and ignored his cries of pain and pleas to stop.
(Id. ¶ 20). The deputies eventually handcuffed
plaintiff and sat him up. Campbell says that his entire face
was covered with blood; and, until emergency medical
technicians arrived, he sat on the ground crying, still
trying to explain that he only wanted to get his wallet.
Campbell’s
complaint asserts three claims for relief. The first is
asserted against the individual defendants pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his civil rights under
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments (the right to
free speech, the right not to be deprived of property without
due process, and the right to be free from excessive force).
This claim is not challenged by defendants on the present
motion.
It is
the second and third claims that defendants seek to dismiss
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Those claims are for
violation of the Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b)) as
to the individual defendants; and for vicarious
liability/respondeat superior (Cal. Gov’t Code §
815.2) as to the County. For the reasons discussed below, the
court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss these
claims.
LEGAL
STANDARD
A
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the
claims in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d
729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is appropriate where
there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of
sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal
theory. Id. (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica
Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).
In such a motion, all material allegations in the complaint
must be taken as true and construed in the light most
favorable to the claimant. Id. However,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009). Moreover, “the court is not required to
accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual
allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn
from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness
Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” This means that the
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations omitted) However,
only plausible claims for relief will survive a motion to
dismiss. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. A claim is
plausible if its factual content permits the court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
alleged misconduct. Id. A plaintiff does not have to
provide detailed facts, but the pleading must include
“more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Id. at 1949.
Documents
appended to the complaint or which properly are the subject
of judicial notice may be considered along with the complaint
when deciding a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion. See Hal
Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc.,
896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th ...