United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THIS ACTION BE
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF
COULD BE GRANTED AND THAT THIS ACTION COUNT AS A STRIKE
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G). OBJECTIONS DUE IN
is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred
to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Currently before the
Court is Plaintiff's February 19, 2016, second amended
complaint, filed in response to the January 21, 2016, order
dismissing the first amended complaint with leave to amend.
(ECF No. 20.)
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that “fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .
. .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citing Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover,
Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally
participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights.
Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.2002).
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)(citations omitted). To
survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d
962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and
“facts that are „merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying
the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
an inmate in the custody of the California Department of
Corrections (CDCR) and Rehabilitation at the Central
California Women's Facility (CCWF), brings this action
against correctional officials employed by the CDCR at CCWF
and the California Institute for Women (CIW). Plaintiff names
the following individual defendants: D. Johnson, CCWF Warden;
K. Hughes, CIW Warden; CIW Appeals Coordinator Crawford; J.
Sobel, CDCR Counsel in Sacramento; Board of Parole Hearing
(BPH) Deputy Commissioner T. Ohara; CCWF Sergeant Perez; CCWF
Litigation Coordinator Smith; CCWF Appeals Coordinator B.
Fortner. Plaintiff's claims stem from the denial of her
requests to be transferred back to CIW and the denial of
second amended complaint sets forth rambling legal arguments,
interspersed with vague and conclusory factual allegations.
Plaintiff appears to allege that false information was placed
in her central file, rendering her unsuitable for parole.
Plaintiff also alleges that there was some agreement to
transfer her back to CIW, and appears to seek enforcement of
that agreement. Plaintiff also alleges that she was placed in
disciplinary housing without a hearing, resulting in the loss
of her personal property. Plaintiff also alleges that
officials were interfering with her right to file
administrative grievances regarding adverse actions.
essentially re-states the allegations of the first amended
complaint. Plaintiff divides her causes of actions into
separate categories. Plaintiff's first statement of claim
refers to an unspecified settlement agreement in another
case, alleging that sealed information
“eviscerates” a 2012 settlement agreement. (ECF
No. 21, p. 7.) Plaintiff's second claim is that the BPH
relief on false information in denying her a parole
eligibility date. Plaintiff's third claim is that she was
placed into disciplinary housing without a hearing, and while
she was in disciplinary housing, another inmate stole her
personal property. Plaintiff's fourth and fifth claims
appear to be a re-statement of her claim regarding the 2012
settlement agreement. The claims refer to some unspecified
agreement to transfer Plaintiff back to CIW.
Civil Rights Act under which this action proceeds provides
for liability for state actors that cause “the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. The statute
plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link
between the actions of the defendants, and the deprivation
alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See
Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978);
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth
Circuit has held that “[a] person „subjects'
another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within
the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,
participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to
perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes
the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Court initially notes that Plaintiff names Defendants
employed by the CDCR at CCWF and CIW. CIW is located in
Corona, in the Central District of California. The federal
venue statute requires that a civil action, other than one
based on diversity jurisdiction, be brought only in
“(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides,
if all defendants reside in the same state, (2) a judicial
district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial
part of the property that is the subjection of the action is
situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant
may be found, if there is no district in which the action may
otherwise be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The
decision to transfer venue of a civil action under §
1404(a) lies soundly within the discretion of the trial
court. Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495,
498 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court ...