United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
REMAND
Troy
L. Nunley United States District Judge
This
matter is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff Maccord
Nguyen’s (“Plaintiff) Motion for Remand to State
Court. (ECF No. 9.) Defendant Adams & Associates, Inc.
(“Defendant or “Adams”) opposes Plaintiffs
motion. (Opp’n, ECF No. 12.) The Court has carefully
considered the arguments raised by the parties’
briefing. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for
Remand to State Court (ECF No. 9) is DENIED.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
This is
an employment claim brought by Plaintiff against his former
employer, Defendant for claims under California’s Fair
Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Plaintiff
filed this action with the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of Sacramento on November 18, 2015.
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges the following causes of action:
(1) age discrimination; (2) disability discrimination; (3)
racial and national origin discrimination; (4) failure to
hire against public policy; (5) retaliation; (6) failure to
prevent discrimination; (7) failure to accommodate; (8)
failure to engage in the interactive process; and (9)
intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Compl., ECF
No. 1-1.) On February 12, 2016, Defendant removed this action
to the United States District Court, Eastern District of
California, alleging diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. sections 1332 and 1441(b). (Not. of Removal, ECF No.
1.) Plaintiff filed the instant motion asserting that
Defendant has not met its burden in showing diversity,
specifically that Defendant is domiciled in Nevada and not
California. (ECF No. 9 at 3.)
II.
Legal Standard
A civil
action brought in state court, over which the district court
has original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant to
federal court in the judicial district and division in which
the state court action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
The district court has original jurisdiction over civil
actions between citizens of different states in which the
alleged damages exceed $75, 000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
The party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
proving diversity. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749
(9th Cir. 1986) (citing Resnik v. La Paz Guest
Ranch, 289 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1961)). Diversity is
determined as of the time the complaint is filed and removal
effected. Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass ’n of
Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002). Removal
statutes are to be strictly construed against removal.
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.
1992).
The
amount in controversy is determined by reference to the
complaint itself and includes the amount of damages in
dispute, as well as attorney’s fees, if authorized by
statute or contract. Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432
F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005). Where the complaint does not
pray for damages in a specific amount, the defendant must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75, 000. Singer v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997)
(citing Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102
F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996)). If the amount is not facially
apparent from the complaint, the Court may “require
parties to submit summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to
the amount in controversy at the time of removal.”
Id. (citing Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63
F.3d 1326, 1335-56 (5th Cir. 1995).
Removal
based on diversity requires that the citizenship of each
plaintiff be diverse from the citizenship of each defendant
(i.e. complete diversity). Caterpillar Inc. v.
Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). For purposes of
diversity, a limited liability company (LLC) is a citizen of
every state in which its “owners/members” are
citizens. Johnson v. Columbia Prop. Anchorage, LP,
437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that courts are
to treat LLCs like partnerships, which have the citizenships
of all of their members). A corporation is a citizen of any
state in which it is incorporated and any state in which it
maintains its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. §
1332(c)(1).
III.
Analysis
Here it
is undisputed that Plaintiff is a citizen of California and
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. Thus, the
Court is left to determine Defendant’s citizenship in
order to decide whether the parties are diverse. Plaintiff
contends that Defendant’s Notice of Removal is
insufficient because Defendant has not provided the required
information to determine its corporate citizenship, such as:
“(1) the number of employees it has in each state; (2)
the percentage of its sales originating in each state; and
(3) the percentages of its assets held in each state.”
(ECF No. 9 at 7.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff has applied
the wrong legal test for corporation citizenship and asserts
that it is a citizen of Nevada. (ECF No. 11 at 2-3.) This
Court agrees.
“The
federal diversity jurisdiction statute provides that ‘a
corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by
which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has
its principal place of business.’” Hertz
Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). The Supreme Court has concluded
that “the phrase ‘principal place of
business’ refers to the place where the
corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and
coordinate the corporation’s activities. Lower federal
courts have often metaphorically called that place the
corporation’s nerve center.’” Id.
at 80-81.
Defendant
is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Nevada and has been since September 25, 1990.
(See Decl. of Tiffinay Pagni in Supp’t of Def
s Opp’n, ECF No. 12-1 at ¶ 2.) Defendant holds
annual stockholder and Board of Directors meetings, usually
in the first quarter of the year, as well as
Defendant’s twice-annual meetings for its Job Corps
Center Directors during which Directors meet with corporate
staff for training, evaluation and strategic planning. (ECF
No. 12-1 at ¶ 2.) These meetings take place at
Defendant’s corporate office in Reno. (ECF No. 12-1 at
¶ 2.) As for Defendant’s high level officers,
Defendant alleges as follows:
All but one of Adams’ top executives are based out of
the Reno office, including President Roy Adams, Secretary and
Vice President of Administration Leslie Adams, Treasurer and
Executive Director Dan Norem, Vice President of Finance
Magdalena Cleveland, Vice President of Information Technology
Dino Cabal and [General Counsel and Vice President of Human
Resources, Tiffinay Pagni]. The single exception, President
of Operations Susan Larson, currently resides in Maryland but
spends 30 percent of her time at the Reno office. Ms. Larson
has purchased a home in Reno and will soon relocate there
permanently.
(ECF No. 12-1 at ¶ 4.) Defendant further alleges that
although each of Defendant’s Job Corps Centers has its
own local administrative departments for day-to-day
operations, “policy decisions for the entire company
are made by the executives resident in the Reno corporate
office. All job descriptions, personnel policies, employee
terminations, benefits plans, retirement plans and insurance
policies are reviewed and approved in the Reno corporate
office.” (ECF No. 12-1 at ¶ 3.) The Court finds
that these ...