Soares v. Paramo

          ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [ECF NO. 76].

          Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz, Chief Judge United States District Court.

         Manuel M. Soares (“Plaintiff”), is a prisoner currently incarcerated at the California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”) in Stockton, California, and is proceeding pro se and in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

         Defendants are all correctional and mental health care officials employed at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) where Plaintiff was incarcerated in November 2012. See ECF No. 1 at 1-2, 4-5.

         I. Procedural History

         On May 25, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Join/Amend in order to add additional parties and claims, and denied his Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice as premature (ECF No. 61). Instead of amending, however, Plaintiff filed a Motion to withdraw his previously filed Motion to Join/Amend (ECF No. 67). The Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw on June 16, 2016 as moot, but also construed it as Plaintiff’s Notice of Intent to stand on his previous pleadings. (ECF No. 68).

         Plaintiff has since filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court’s May 25, 2016 Order-at least to the extent it denied his Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 76). Essentially, Plaintiff asks the Court to again rule on the Motion for Summary Judgment it has already denied as moot, arguing that it is no longer premature because the period for fact discovery in his case has since closed.^[1]

         II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration

         A. Standard of Review

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for reconsideration. However, a motion requesting reconsideration of a matter previously decided may be construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989); In re Arrowhead Estates Development Co., 42 F.3d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1994). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed “no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Because Plaintiff’s current Motion was filed after the 28 days permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), the Court will consider his request to arise under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60. Under Rule 60, a motion for “relief from a final judgment, order or proceeding” may be filed within a “reasonable time, ” but usually must be filed “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1).

         Rule 60(b) provides for reconsideration where one or more of the following is shown: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered before the court's decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b); School Dist. 1J v. ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

         “Although the application of Rule 60(b) is committed to the discretion of the district courts . . ., as a general matter, Rule 60(b) is remedial in nature and must be liberally applied.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 695-96 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). Nevertheless, Rule 60(b) provides for extraordinary relief and may be invoked only upon a showing of “exceptional circumstances.” Engleson v. Burlington N.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1994).

         B. Plaintiff’s Motion

         Plaintiff does not seek reconsideration based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. He does not present any newly discovered evidence, point to fraud, argue that the Court’s May 25, 2016 Order is void, that any judgment has been satisfied, or point to any “other reason” that might justify reconsideration. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6).

         As noted above, this Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice as premature because it was premature given his request for leave to amend, and the fact that the period for discovery had yet to close. See ECF No. 61 at 10. In fact, the period for discovery in this case has still yet to close-Plaintiff’s recently filed Motion to Quash a subpoena is still pending (ECF No. 70), ...