United States v. Thurman

          ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY MOTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY (DOC. 87)

          LAWRENCE J. O’NEILL, UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE.

         I. INTRODUCTION

         Jennifer Thurman (“Petitioner”), a prisoner in federal custody, brings a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion (“Habeas Motion”) to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence.

         II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

         On February 28, 2008, Petitioner was indicted on five counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)-(2) (production of material involving the sexual exploitation of minors). Doc. 1. Pursuant to a plea agreement made with the government, Doc. 32, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the first four counts of the indictment. Doc. 36. On March 11, 2011, Petitioner was sentenced by Judge Oliver W. Wanger to four consecutive 360-month periods. Doc. 67. Petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. Doc. 62. On October 19, 2012, The Ninth Circuit entered an order affirming her sentence. Doc. 82. Its judgment took effect November 15, 2012. Doc. 84. There is no indication in the docket that Petitioner filed a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

         On June 10, 2016, Petitioner signed the instant motion for habeas relief. Doc. 87.^{[1] [2]}

         III. LEGAL BACGROUND

         On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). The instant petition was filed on June 10, 2016, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA.

         The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). As amended, § 2255, subdivision (f) reads:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the ...