United States District Court, E.D. California
MONTE WILSON, et al. Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al. Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
(DOC. 22)
JENNIFER L. THURSTON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiffs
assert Defendants are liable for violations of their rights
arising under the Constitution of the United States and
California law. Defendants seek dismissal of several causes
of action in the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 22)
Because the Court concludes Plaintiffs fails to provide
sufficient factual allegations to support the claims
challenged by Defendants, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
I.
Background and Factual Allegations
Plaintiff
Monte Wilson asserts that he and his children, who are the
minor plaintiffs identified as “MW, M.W and M.W.,
” “are of African American heritage.” (Doc.
21 at 5, ¶ 7) Mr. Wilson reports he “graduated
from California State University Bakersfield, does not have a
criminal record, has not been associated with any street gang
or illegal association, and is… gainfully employed as
a camera man for a local news organization.”
(Id., ¶ 8)
According
to Plaintiffs, Mr. Wilson was “hired by a local record
company to photograph individuals for a music album
cover… around the front yard of 831 ‘R’
Street in Bakersfield, California.” (Doc. 21 at 7-8,
¶¶ 19-20) In addition, Mr. Wilson “intended
to shoot a short portion of a film at the location where the
music album cover was to be photographed.”
(Id. at 7, ¶ 19)
Plaintiffs
allege that around 5:30 p.m. on July 23, 2015, Mr. Wilson
prepared his photography equipment in the presence of other
individuals, including the person who hired Mr. Wilson and
those who were to be in the photos. (Doc. 21 at 8, ¶ 20)
Plaintiffs assert Bakersfield Police Officer James Montgomery
and unidentified “Doe” officers “opened the
gate surrounding the front yard, and refused to allow [Mr.
Wilson] to leave the yard without a reasonable suspicion or
probable cause.” (Id., ¶ 21)
Plaintiffs
assert Mr. Wilson began filming the officers “when at
least one of the officers pointed a taser weapon at
individuals in the front yard.” (Doc. 21 at 7, ¶
22) Plaintiffs allege that after the officers noticed Mr.
Wilson filming, Officer Montgomery “and/or DOES 1
through 100 inclusive, pointed at [Mr. Wilson] and instructed
another officer to ‘take him.’”
(Id.) According to Plaintiffs, Mr. Wilson “was
then detained, handcuffed, restrained, and arrested without a
reasonable suspicion or probable cause … and without a
warrant.” (Id., ¶ 23) Plaintiffs contend
the officers “harassed, threatened, intimidated,
pressured, unlawfully touched, and/or assaulted those present
in the front yard, ” including Mr. Wilson.
(Id. at 9, ¶ 24)
Plaintiffs
contend the officers questioned Mr. Wilson “about his
association with the other individuals, ” to which he
“responded that he was not a part of any street gang,
had been hired to take photographs and video, and was at the
location to do so.” (Doc. 21 at 9, ¶ 25) The
officers “took possession” of the camera and
photography equipment and Mr. Wilson was “placed
… in the back of a police vehicle” and
transported to the police station. (Id. 9-10,
¶¶ 26, 31)
Plaintiffs
report that the officers charged Mr. Wilson “with PC
25850(c)(3) gang member in possession of a firearm, PC
186.22(d) gang participation, PC 182(a)(l) conspiracy, and PC
496(a) possession of stolen property without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.” (Doc. 21 at 9,
¶ 27) Plaintiffs contend Officer Montgomery and
the “Doe” officers “knew said charges
against [Mr. Wilson] were false. (Id., ¶ 28) In
addition, Plaintiffs report the Kern County District
Attorney’s office “refused to file a complaint
and/or prosecute Plaintiff Monte Wilson for any of the
alleged crimes for which Defendants arrested [him].”
(Id. at 10, ¶ 30) (emphasis omitted) Mr.
Wilson’s bail was set at $55, 000, and he
“suffered economic damage to be released.”
(Id. at 9, ¶ 29)
According
to Plaintiffs, the next day, “Defendants DOES 1 through
100, inclusive, arrived at Plaintiffs’
residence…. [and] informed [Mr. Wilson] that his
vehicle had been broken into.” (Doc. 21 at 10,
¶¶ 32-33) Plaintiffs report Mr. Wilson
“walked to his vehicle and determined that it in fact
had not been broken into, contrary to statements made by [the
officers].” (Id., ¶ 33) Plaintiffs allege
the officers then served Mr. Wilson with a search warrant.
(Id., ¶ 34)
Plaintiffs
allege Mr. Wilson was “restrained” while the
officers searched his vehicle and apartment. (Doc. 21 at 10,
¶ 34) In addition, “Plaintiffs MW, M.W, and M.W.,
were present at the residence and witnessed Defendants DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, restrain their father, the search of
the vehicle, and the search of the apartment.”
(Id.) The officers “took possession of
property . . . including but not limited to laptops, tablet
computers, and audio and video recording equipment.”
(Id. at 10-11, ¶ 35) Plaintiffs contend the
photography equipment and items taken the next day were not
returned in “a timely fashion.” (Id.,
¶¶ 31, 35)
Plaintiffs
assert the Bakersfield Police Department; the City of
Bakersfield; “and their employees, agents, supervisors,
managers and/or representatives… ratified or
acquiesced in the constitutional deprivation, or were
deliberately indifferent, reckless, negligence, and/or
careless with respect to hiring, training, supervising
disciplining and retaining” Officer Montgomery and Does
1 through 50, inclusive. (Doc. 21 at 11, ¶ 36)
Based
upon the foregoing allegations, Plaintiffs identify the
following causes of action in the First Amended Complaint:
(1) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment by
Montgomery and the City, (2) excessive force in violation of
the Fourth Amendment by the “Doe” officers and
the City, (3) unlawful seizure by Montgomery and the City,
(4) unlawful seizure by the “Doe” officers and
the City, (5) violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act, (6)
violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, (7) violation of the
Bane Civil Rights Act, (8) assault, (9) battery, (10)
intentional infliction of emotional distress, (11) unlawful
arrest in violation f California law, (12) false
imprisonment, (13) general negligence, (14) trespass to
chattels, (15) conversion, (16) civil conspiracy, and (17)
negligent infliction of emotional distress. (See
generally Doc. 21)
II.
Pleading Requirements
General
rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. A complaint must include a
statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is
entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought,
which may include relief in the alternative or different
types of relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). The Federal Rules
adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se
pleadings are held to “less stringent standards”
than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972).
A
complaint must state the elements of the plaintiff’s
claim in a plain and succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty
Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).
The purpose of a complaint is to give the defendant fair
notice of the claims against him, and the grounds upon which
the complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted,
Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it
demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
III.
Motions to Dismiss
A Rule
12(b)(6) motion “tests the legal sufficiency of a
claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732
(9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate
when “the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or
sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d
1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, under Rule 12(b)(6),
“review is limited to the complaint alone.”
Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274
(9th Cir. 1993).
“To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). The Supreme Court explained,
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a
“probability requirement, ” but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
“merely consistent with” a defendant’s
liability, it ...