United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND
On May
28, 2015, plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
subsequently was granted leave to proceed without prepayment
of the full filing fee.[1] On September 1, 2015, defendant Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
(“LACSD”) filed a Motion to Dismiss
(“Motion”) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Rather than filing opposition to the Motion, on October 8,
2015, plaintiff sought leave of Court to file an amended
complaint. On October 16, 2015, the Court granted
plaintiff’s request, denied defendant’s Motion as
moot, and ordered plaintiff to file a first amended complaint
within thirty days. Following an extension of time, plaintiff
filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on
February 1, 2016. (ECF No. 23.)
In
accordance with the terms of the “Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995” (“PLRA”), the Court
screened the FAC prior to ordering service for purposes of
determining whether the action is frivolous or malicious; or
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). The FAC named 26
defendants, including the LACSD and Sheriff McDonnell. After
careful consideration of the FAC, the Court found that
plaintiff’s allegations appeared insufficient to state
any federal civil rights claim on which relief may be
granted. Plaintiff was advised that: (1) the allegations in
the FAC failed to comply with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8 because each “claim” included
numerous legal grounds as well as factual allegations
pertaining to unrelated incidents, and it would be extremely
difficult for each defendant to discern what specific facts
or legal theories applied to which potential claim or claims
against them; (2) the FAC failed to state a claim against the
LACSD or defendants in their official capacities because
plaintiff did not allege that any policy, custom, or practice
caused his civil rights violations; (3) plaintiff could not
hold Sheriff McDonnell or any other defendant liable solely
as a supervisor; and (4) the allegations were insufficient to
state a claim for a violation of plaintiff’s right of
access to the courts or for retaliation. Plaintiff was
instructed, if he wished to pursue his claims, to set forth a
short and simple statement of the actions each defendant was
alleged to have taken that caused each civil rights
violation.
Accordingly,
the FAC was dismissed with leave to amend, and plaintiff was
ordered, if he wished to pursue this action, to file a Second
Amended Complaint no later than March 7, 2016, remedying the
deficiencies in the FAC. Further, plaintiff was admonished
that, if he failed to timely file a Second Amended Complaint,
or failed to remedy the deficiencies of the pleading as
discussed in the Court’s Order, the Court would
recommend that this action be dismissed without leave to
amend and with prejudice. (See ECF No. 24.)
On
March 3, 2016, plaintiff filed a 48-page Second Amended
Complaint (“SAC”) (ECF No. 28) accompanied by 123
pages of exhibits (ECF No. 32).[2] Once again, in accordance with
the PLRA, the Court screened the SAC. After careful
consideration of the SAC, the Court found that plaintiff
continued to set forth the similar claims against the same
list of 26 defendants without having cured the deficiencies
in his FAC as set forth in the Court’s Order Dismissing
First Amended Complaint. However, because plaintiff is a
prisoner proceeding pro se, the Court provided him
an additional opportunity to cure the deficiencies of his
claims by amendment. Plaintiff once again was advised that:
(1) the allegations in the SAC again failed to comply with
Rule 8 because each “claim” continued to include
numerous legal grounds and factual allegations pertaining to
unrelated incidents, and it would be extremely difficult for
each defendant to discern what specific facts or legal
theories applied to which potential claim or claims against
them; (2) the SAC failed to state a claim against the LACSD
or defendants in their official capacities because plaintiff
did not allege that a specific policy, custom, or practice
caused his civil rights violations; (3) plaintiff could not
hold Sheriff McDonnell or any other defendant liable solely
as a supervisor; and (4) the allegations were insufficient to
state a claim for a violation of plaintiff’s right of
access to the courts or for retaliation. Plaintiff was
further advised that, in order to state a plausible claims
for retaliation, he must set forth factual allegations
suggesting a causal connection between a specific adverse
action taken by a specific defendant and plaintiff’s
protected conduct. Further, plaintiff was instructed, if he
wished to pursue his claims, to set forth a short and simple
statement of the actions each defendant was alleged to have
taken that caused each civil rights violation.
Accordingly,
the SAC was dismissed with leave to amend, and plaintiff was
ordered, if he wished to pursue this action, to file a Third
Amended Complaint no later than April 29, 2016, remedying the
deficiencies in the SAC. Further, plaintiff was admonished
that, if he failed to timely file a Third Amended Complaint,
or failed to remedy the deficiencies of the pleading as
discussed in the Court’s Order, the Court would
recommend that this action be dismissed without leave to
amend and with prejudice. (See ECF No. 34.)
On May
9, 2016, plaintiff filed a 28-page Third Amended Complaint
(“TAC”), containing only two claims with 41 pages
of exhibits. (See ECF No. 36.) In his TAC, plaintiff
names the LACSD, LACSD Sheriff Jim McDonnell, LACSD Sergeants
Lavey and Chase, and “Doe” defendants “5
through 26.” The individual defendants are named in
their official as well as individual capacities. (ECF No. 36
at 3-4.) Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights
have been violated as a “pre-trial detainee” at
the Los Angeles County Jail. (Id. at 5.) He seeks
damages. (Id. at 27-28.)
On June
27, 2016, plaintiff filed a “Request for the [Court] to
Intervene Due to Cruel and Unusual Punishment”
(“Request”). (ECF No. 38). Plaintiff does not
specify what intervention he is seeking apart from asking the
Court send to a new address at the Los Angeles County Jail
any “reply, order, or notification” issued by the
Court since plaintiff’s TAC was filed. (Id. at
5, 7.) In addition, plaintiff sets forth factual allegations
concerning a petition for writ of habeas corpus that he filed
with the Superior Court “challenging the conditions of
confinement at Los Angeles County Jail” and
investigations that are pending with the American Civil
Liberties Union and the Department of Justice. (Id.
at 2-3, 6.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was placed (by
unnamed officials) in High Observation Housing as a
“suicidal inmate” on June 2, 2016, in a
“retaliatory motivated move.” (Id. at
4.) Because plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding pro
se in this matter, the Court has considered the factual
allegations in plaintiff’s Request as if set forth in
his TAC. In addition, along with this Order, the Court will
include a copy of the one Court order that was issued since
plaintiff filed his TAC.
The
Court’s screening of the TAC under the foregoing
statutes is governed by the following standards. A complaint
may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a
claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory;
or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory.
See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901
F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Rosati v.
Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (in
determining whether a complaint should be dismissed under the
PLRA, courts apply the standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)). In
determining whether the pleading states a claim on which
relief may be granted, its allegations of material fact must
be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to
plaintiff. See Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242,
1245 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the “tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In
addition, since plaintiff is appearing pro se, the
Court must construe the allegations of the pleading liberally
and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. See
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d
621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has held,
however, that, “a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]
to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .
on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted, alteration in original); see also
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (To avoid dismissal for failure
to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’ . . . A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” (internal citation omitted)); Starr v.
Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“the
factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair
to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense
of discovery and continued litigation”), cert.
denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012).
After
careful consideration of the TAC under the foregoing
standards, the Court finds that plaintiff’s allegations
remain insufficient to state any federal civil rights claim
on which relief may be granted and fail to give each
defendant fair notice of what plaintiff’s claims are or
the factual and legal grounds upon which they rest. Plaintiff
has been provided with four opportunities to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, and he has been apprised of the
deficiencies in his claims in the Court’s two detailed
Orders dismissing each of the FAC and the SAC with leave to
amend. Plaintiff’s TAC, however, fails to cure the
deficiencies in his SAC as set forth in the Court’s
Order. However, because plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding
pro se, the Court will provide him with one final
opportunity to cure the deficiencies of his federal civil
rights claims by amendment. Accordingly, the TAC is dismissed
with leave to amend. See Rosati, 791 F.3d at 1039
(“A district court should not dismiss a pro se
complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely
clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be
cured by amendment.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Certain of the critical legal principles that guide
the Court’s review have been highlighted in the
discussion below.
If
plaintiff still desires to pursue this action, he is ORDERED
to file a Fourth Amended Complaint no later than August 31,
2016, remedying the deficiencies discussed below. Further,
plaintiff is admonished that, if he fails to timely file a
Fourth Amended Complaint, or fails to remedy the deficiencies
of this pleading as discussed herein, the Court will
recommend that this action be dismissed without leave to
amend and with prejudice.[3]
A.
The allegations of the TAC once again fail to comply with
the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8.
Plaintiff’s
TAC still fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8(a) and 8(d). Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) states:
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court’s jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may
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