United States District Court, E.D. California
TROSALIND L. CALDWELL Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
ORDER
KENDALL J. NEWMAN JUDGE
Plaintiff
seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner
of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying
plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of
the Social Security Act (“Act”).[1] In her motion for
summary judgment, plaintiff principally contends that the
Commissioner erred by finding that plaintiff was not disabled
from October 2, 2009, her alleged disability onset date,
through the date of the final administrative decision. (ECF
No. 19.) The Commissioner filed an opposition to
plaintiff’s motion and a cross-motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 20.) Thereafter, plaintiff filed a reply
brief. (ECF No. 21.)
After
carefully considering the parties’ written briefing,
the court’s record, and the applicable law, the court
DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, GRANTS
the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment,
and AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
was born on August 3, 1962, has a high school education, is
able to communicate in English, and previously worked
primarily in retail-type positions. (Administrative
Transcript (“AT”) 35, 244, 316,
318.)[2] In January 2012, plaintiff applied for DIB
and SSI, alleging that her disability began on October 2,
2009, and that she was disabled primarily due to
posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), a back
injury, depression, diabetes, asthma, chronic bronchitis, and
hepatitis C. (AT 24, 106-07, 210, 212, 317.) After
plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on
reconsideration, plaintiff requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which took
place on November 20, 2013, and at which plaintiff,
represented by an attorney, and a vocational expert
(“VE”) testified. (AT 43-77.) The ALJ
subsequently issued a decision dated February 21, 2014,
determining that plaintiff had not been under a disability,
as defined in the Act, from October 2, 2009,
plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, through the
date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT 24-37.) The ALJ’s
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when
the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for
review on April 1, 2015. (AT 1-5.) Plaintiff then filed this
action in federal district court on May 8, 2015, to obtain
judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision.
(ECF No. 1.)
II.
ISSUES PRESENTED
On
appeal, plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) whether
the ALJ erroneously discounted the opinion of
plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist; and (2) whether the
ALJ improperly evaluated the credibility of plaintiff and her
daughter.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
The
court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine
whether (1) it is based on proper legal standards pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the
record as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180
F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.
Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir.
2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d
625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart,
400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is
responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts
in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.”
Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.
2001) (citation omitted). “The court will uphold the
ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to
more than one rational interpretation.” Tommasetti
v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Summary of the ALJ’s Findings
The ALJ
evaluated plaintiff’s entitlement to DIB and SSI
pursuant to the Commissioner’s standard five-step
analytical framework.[3] As an initial matter, the ALJ determined
that plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act
for purposes of DIB through June 30, 2014. (AT 26.) At the
first step, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since October 2, 2009,
plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date.
(Id.) At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had
the following severe impairments: morbid obesity, lumbosacral
strain, an affective disorder, asthma, and a history of an
anxiety-related disorder. (Id.) However, at step
three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AT 27.)
Before
proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as follows:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except that
she can occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
and crawl. She must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes,
odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation, and hazards. The
claimant retains the abilities to engage in simple,
repetitive tasks with occasional contact with supervisors,
co-workers, and the public.
(AT 30.)
At step
four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was unable to perform
any past relevant work. (AT 35.) However, at step five, the
ALJ found that, in light of plaintiff’s age, education,
work experience, and RFC, and based on the VE’s
testimony, there were jobs that existed in significant
numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform.
(AT 35-36.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not
been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from October
2, 2009, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT
36.)
B.
Plaintiff’s Substantive Challenges to the
Commissioner’s Determinations Whether the ALJ
erroneously discounted the opinion of plaintiff’s
treating psychiatrist[4]
The
weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether
they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining
professionals. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195,
1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d
821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally speaking, a treating
physician’s opinion carries more weight than an
examining physician’s opinion, and an examining
physician’s opinion carries more weight than a
non-examining physician’s opinion. Holohan,
246 F.3d at 1202.
To
evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion,
in addition to considering its source, the court considers
whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; and (2)
clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an
uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical
professional only for “clear and convincing”
reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. In contrast, a
contradicted opinion ...