United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CAROLYN K. DELANEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
matter came before the court on March 16, 2016, for hearing
of defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff
Michelle Yolette Brown appeared at the hearing on her own
behalf. Attorney Maureen Bogue appeared on behalf of the
defendants.
Upon
consideration of the arguments on file and at the hearing,
and for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will
recommend that defendants’ motion for summary judgment
be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
commenced this action on April 30, 2014, by filing a
complaint and paying the required filing fee. (Dkt. No. 1.)
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 27, 2014.
(Dkt. No. 12.) Therein, plaintiff, who is African American,
alleges that the defendants discriminated, harassed, and
retaliated against her based on her race in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the California
Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). (Dkt.
No. 12 at 1, 3.[1]) Defendants filed an answer on January 26,
2015. (Dkt. No. 22.)
On
January 23, 2016, defendants filed the pending motion for
summary judgment, setting the matter for hearing before the
undersigned on February 10, 2016. (Dkt. No. 44.) After
plaintiff failed to file a timely opposition or statement of
non-opposition, on February 1, 2016, the undersigned
continued the hearing of defendants’ motion to March
16, 2016. (Dkt. No. 46.) Plaintiff filed a purported
opposition on March 2, 2016, however that filing failed to
address defendants’ statement of undisputed facts.
(Dkt. No. 47.) Defendants filed a reply on March 9, 2016.
(Dkt. No. 48.)
At the
March 16, 2016 hearing of defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, the undersigned advised plaintiff of the
deficiencies found in her purported opposition, and granted
plaintiff an additional two weeks to file an opposition to
defendants’ motion for summary judgment that included a
response to defendants’ statements of undisputed fact.
(Dkt. No. 50.) On March 31, 2016, plaintiff filed a response
to defendants’ statement of undisputed facts. (Dkt. No.
54.) Defendants filed a reply on April 11, 2016. (Dkt. No.
56.)
LEGAL
STANDARDS
Summary
judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Under
summary judgment practice, the moving party “initially
bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Securities
Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
The moving party may accomplish this by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only), admission,
interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by
showing that such materials “do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that the adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When the
non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial,
“the moving party need only prove that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.). See also
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). Indeed, summary judgment should be
entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should
be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district
court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary
judgment . . . is satisfied.” Id. at 323.
If the
moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden
then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the
existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not
rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is
required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of
affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support
of its contention that the dispute exists. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586
n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in
contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors
Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that
the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d
1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).
In the
endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.
Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to
‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order
to see whether there is a genuine need for
trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587
(citations omitted).
“In
evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a
genuine issue of fact, ” the court draws “all
reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of
the non-moving party.” Walls v. Central Costa
County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir.
2011). It is the opposing party’s obligation to produce
a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn.
See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp.
1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810
F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a
genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for
trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587
(citation omitted).
In
assessing a motion for summary judgment brought in the
context of an employment discrimination action such as this
one, it is important to recognize that “California has
adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by
the United States Supreme Court [in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)] for trying claims
of discrimination . . . .” Guz v. Bechtel National,
Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (2000).
Under the three-part McDonnell Douglas test, the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of employment discrimination. Once the plaintiff
has done so, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If
the employer articulates a legitimate reason, the plaintiff
must raise a triable issue that the employer’s
proffered reason is pretext for unlawful discrimination. The
ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff.
Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108,
1112 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
However,
when the defendant employer has moved for summary judgment
“the burden is reversed . . . because the defendant who
seeks summary judgment bears the initial burden.”
Lawler v. Mountblanc North America, LLC, 704 F.3d
1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dep’t of Fair
Emp’t & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d
728, 745 (9th Cir. 2011)). “Thus, to prevail on summary
judgment, the employer is required to show either that (1)
plaintiff could not establish one of the elements of the . .
. claim or (2) there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for [the adverse employment action].”
Id. In proffering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason, the employer’s burden “is one of
production, not persuasion, thereby involving no credibility
assessment.” Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC,
447 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142
(2000)). If the employer meets its initial burden on summary
judgment, the employee must then demonstrate either
“that the defendant’s showing was in fact
insufficient or . . . that there was a triable issue of fact
material to the defendant’s showing.”
Lawler, 704 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Lucent Techs.,
Inc., 642 F.3d at 746 (quotation omitted) (omission in
original).
DEFENDANTS’
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
Defendants’
statement of undisputed facts is supported by citations to
declarations, excerpts from plaintiff’s depositions,
and exhibits. Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts
establishes the following.
Plaintiff
was hired as a Nutrition Partner for defendant Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals’ (“Kaiser”) South
Sacramento Medical Center on December 14, 2009, and has been
continuously employed by defendant Kaiser since. In January
of 2012, plaintiff was granted a short hour position as a
Nutrition Partner so that she was guaranteed to work 15 hours
per week. In December of 2012, plaintiff was promoted to a
20-hour position and became a permanent employee with
benefits. (Defs.’ SUDF (Dkt. No. 44-6) 1,
3-6.[2])
Plaintiff
has never received a warning or any discipline since she
commenced working for Kaiser. Moreover, she has not lost any
wages as a result of any of the acts alleged in her complaint
and made more money each year from 2009 through 2013.
Throughout her entire employment with Kaiser, plaintiff has
been a member of the SEIU UHW-215 Union (“Union) and
aspects of her employment are governed by the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the Union and Kaiser.
(Defs.’ SUDF (Dkt. No. 44-6) 7-10.)
On
February 7, 2012, plaintiff’s supervisor, defendant
Rebecca Pellechi, (“Pellechi”), informed Human
Resources Consultant Cornelius Stewart
(“Stewart”) that she was concerned that plaintiff
might be under the influence of alcohol or drugs during
working hours. Stewart instructed defendant Pellechi to ask
another manager to observe plaintiff in order to confirm or
dispel her concern. Defendant Pellechi asked Environmental
Services Manager Jeremiah Garcia (“Garcia”) to
observe plaintiff for signs that she might be under the
influence of drugs and/or alcohol. After conducting his
observation, Garcia informed defendant Pellechi that he
suspected plaintiff might be under the influence of alcohol
or drugs and that he did not believe it was safe for
plaintiff to continue working. (Defs.’ SUDF (Dkt. No.
44-6) 16-19.)
Defendant
Pellechi instructed plaintiff to accompany her and Garcia to
Human Resources where they met with Stewart. A union
representative, Kenneth Green, was also present during this
meeting. During the meeting, defendant Pellechi asked
plaintiff to submit to drug and alcohol testing, plaintiff
agreed, and voluntarily signed an authorization for Kaiser to
have the tests performed. Defendant Pellechi advised
plaintiff that she would be placed on paid administrative
leave pending the outcome of the tests. Plaintiff was paid
for the remainder of her shift on February 7, 2012, and for
the days she was off work (February 8-10, 2012). Plaintiff
returned to work on February 11, 2012. ...