United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER OF SERVICE
THELTON E. HENDERSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff,
an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed this pro se
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The original
complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and Plaintiff has
filed an amended complaint.
I
Federal
courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in
which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or
dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if
the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, ” or
“seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b).
Pleadings filed by pro se litigants, however, must be
liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
342 (9th Cir. 2010); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,
and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
II
Plaintiff
states that he has received inadequate medical care.
Deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th
Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX
Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th
Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate
indifference" involves an examination of two elements:
the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the
nature of the defendant's response to that need.
Id. at 1059.
A
"serious" medical need exists if the failure to
treat a prisoner's condition could result in further
significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain." Id. The existence of an
injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find
important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of
a medical condition that significantly affects an
individual's daily activities; or the existence of
chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that
a prisoner has a "serious" need for medical
treatment. Id. at 1059-60.
A
prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she
knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious
harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, ” but he
“must also draw the inference.” Id. If a
prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was
not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment,
no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of
Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A
difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison
medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to
a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662
F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).
Supervisor
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity where the
allegations against them are simply “bald” or
“conclusory” because such allegations do not
“plausibly” establish the supervisors’
personal involvement in their subordinates’
constitutional wrong, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-84
(noting no vicarious liability under Section 1983 or
Bivens actions), and unfairly subject the supervisor
defendants to the expense of discovery and continued
litigation, Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1004
(9th Cir. 2012) (general allegations about supervisors’
oversight responsibilities and knowledge of independent
reports documenting the challenged conduct failed to state a
claim for supervisor liability). So it is insufficient for a
plaintiff only to allege that supervisors knew about the
constitutional violation and that they generally created
policies and procedures that led to the violation, without
alleging “a specific policy” or “a specific
event” instigated by them that led to the
constitutional violations. Hydrick v. Hunter, 669
F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012). Under no circumstances is
there respondeat superior liability under section 1983, which
means there is no liability under section 1983 solely because
one is purportedly responsible for the actions or omissions
of another. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045
(9th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff
states that he has been denied medical care for his chronic
psoriasis and eczema. He states that Nurse Risenhoover denied
treatment by refusing creams and ointments that has been
working well for Plaintiff. As a result he suffers from
bleeding, scabbing, and pain. He also alleges that Dr. Bal
denied his requests to see a skin specialist or receive
adequate care. Liberally construed these allegations are
sufficient to proceed against Risenhoover and Bal.
Plaintiff
also alleges that Chief Executive Officer McClean failed to
properly train and supervise staff. Plaintiff has failed to
link McClean to any of his specific treatment and seeks to
hold her liable as a supervisor. However, there is no
respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Because
Plaintiff was already provided an opportunity to amend to
address ...