United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (DOC. NO.
55)
Plaintiff
Amir Shabazz is a state prisoner appearing pro se
and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is currently
proceeding on plaintiff’s first amended complaint
(“FAC”) against defendants George J. Giurbino, R.
H. Trimble, R. Fisher, Jr., W.K. Myers, and B. Farkas for
violation of plaintiff’s rights under the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). (Doc.
Nos. 12, 14.)
Before
the court is a motion for reconsideration brought on behalf
of all defendants. (Doc. No. 55.) For the reasons set forth
below, the court will deny the motion.
PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed the FAC on October 28, 2013, alleging that defendants
served him vegetarian meals instead of Halal meals and
discriminated against him on the basis of his religion. (Doc.
No. 12.) On May 23, 2014, defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the FAC. (Doc. No. 23.) Among other things,
defendants argued that the FAC failed to describe each
defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged
violations and that defendants Farkas, Fisher, Myers, and
Trimble cannot be held liable based on their participation in
the inmate grievance process. (Doc. No. 23-1 at 4-5, 7-9.) On
August 8, 2014, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings
and recommendations, recommending in part that this court
deny defendant’s motion with respect to dismissal of
defendants Farkas, Fisher, Myers, and Trimble. (Doc. No. 31
at 11.) Specifically, the magistrate judge found that each of
the named defendants was personally involved in some capacity
with respect to plaintiff’s claims under the United
States Constitution and the RLUIPA, and that plaintiff lacked
a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison
grievance procedure. (Id. at 4-6.) The magistrate
judge further concluded:
Based on the allegations in the complaint coupled with the
notice provided by the administrative appeals, the Court
finds, as stated in the prior screening order, that
Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against
Defendants Farkas, Fisher, Myers, and Trimble for subjecting
him to conditions in violation of . . . Plaintiff’s
rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act.
(Id. at 7 (emphasis added).) The court adopted these
findings and recommendations in full. (Doc. No. 33.)
On
April 6, 2015, defendants Trimble, Fisher, and Farkas moved
for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies with respect to those three
defendants. (Doc. No. 40.) The magistrate judge issued
findings and recommendations, recommending that the court
grant that motion because plaintiff had failed to
specifically name the three defendants in his inmate
grievance. (Doc. No. 50 at 8-12.) The magistrate judge also
noted that “[t]his action is proceeding strictly on
Plaintiff’s claim that ‘Defendants’
enforced the RMAP which failed to provide Plaintiff a proper
Halal meal and discriminated against [plaintiff] by failing
to do so.” (Id. at 11.)
On
February 12, 2016, the undersigned declined to adopt the
findings and recommendations and denied the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 52 at 5.)
Specifically, this court held that because plaintiff’s
inmate grievance put the prison on notice of the substance of
his complaint-i.e., that prison officials failed to provide a
diet option that met his religious requirements and further
discriminated against him based on his religious identity-
and that prison officials rendered a decision on the merits
of that grievance at every level of the administrative
process, defendants had not established they entitled to
summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit.
(Id. at 4-5) (quoting and citing and Reyes v.
Smith, 810 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2016)).
On
February 26, 2016, defendants filed the instant motion
seeking reconsideration of the court’s February 12,
2016 order. (Doc. No. 55.) On March 30, 2016, plaintiff filed
an opposition. (Doc. No. 56.) On April 7, 2016, defendants
filed a reply. (Doc. No. 57.) On July 11, 2016, defendants
filed supplemental briefing in support of their motion for
reconsideration. (Doc. No. 61.)
LEGAL
STANDARD
District
courts “possess[] the inherent procedural power to
reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for
cause seen by it to be sufficient.” City of L.A.,
Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885
(9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). A motion for reconsideration, however,
“should not be granted . . . unless the district court
is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear
error, or if there is an intervening change in the
controlling law.” 389 Orange St. Partners v.
Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing
Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263
(9th Cir. 1993)). Reconsideration of a prior order is an
extraordinary remedy “to be used sparingly in the
interests of finality and conservation of judicial
resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v.
Hodel, 882 F.2d 364 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he
orderly administration of lengthy and complex litigation such
as this requires the finality of orders be reasonably
certain.”).
DISCUSSION
In the
instant motion, defendants argue that plaintiff’s
claims against defendants Farkas, Fisher, and Trimble relate
only to their roles in the administrative grievance process.
(Doc. No. 55-1 at 1-2.) Thus, because plaintiff failed to put
the prison on notice of such claims, defendants argue that
summary judgment should have been granted in favor of
defendants Farkas, Fisher, and Trimble. (Id. at
4-5.) Defendants, however, mischaracterize plaintiff’s
claims at issue in this case. The court previously concluded
that plaintiff lacks the right to claim an entitlement to a
specific grievance procedure. However, the court also
concluded that plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim
against defendants Farkas, Fisher, and Trimble with respect
to plaintiff’s allegation that he had been denied
access to an appropriate diet and discriminated against based
on his religious identity. (Doc. No. 31 at 6-7.) Thus,
plaintiff’s claim against these defendants proceeded
based on a theory that they were directly liable for
violations of plaintiff’s rights under the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the RLUIPA.
(Id. at 7.)
On
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the parties
agreed that the only inmate appeal relevant to this action is
Inmate Appeal Log No. PVSP-C-11-00363. (See Doc.
Nos. 40 at 2, 4; 41 at 1-3.) That inmate appeal concerned
only plaintiff’s complaint regarding prison
officials’ failure to serve him Halal meals and
discrimination against him on the basis of his religion. As
noted above, and as defendants concede here, defendants moved
for summary judgment on the sole basis that
plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior
to filing suit against defendants Farkas, Fisher, and
Trimble. (See Doc. No. 55-1 at 2.) Defendants
Farkas, Fisher, and Trimble did not argue then that there was
no dispute of material fact as to their direct liability with
respect to any of ...