United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE DENIED
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING SECURITY FROM
A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT BE DENIED
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Thomas Goolsby, along with Kevin Hunt, Paul Diaz, David
Baumgaertel, and Jesse Gehrke, state prisoners and former
state prisoners proceeding pro se, commenced this
action on January 25, 2013, against Defendants Holland,
Stainer, Lundy, Foster, Plumlee, Uribe, and Jordan
(collectively “Defendants”). (ECF No. 1.)
On May
2, 2013, the Court issued an order severing the claims and
requiring each plaintiff to file an amended complaint for
their own actions within thirty days. (ECF No. 9.) On June 5,
2013, Plaintiff Thomas Goolsby (“Plaintiff”)
appealed the court’s order to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. (ECF No. 14.) On June 5, 2013, the Court stayed
this action pending resolution of Plaintiff’s appeal.
(ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff’s appeal was resolved, and on
September 23, 2013, the stay was lifted. (ECF Nos. 24, 25,
26.) On September 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed the First Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 31.) Plaintiff is now the sole plaintiff
in this case.
On May
21, 2014, the Court screened Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint and issued an order requiring Plaintiff to file a
Second Amended Complaint that corrected the deficiencies
found. (ECF No. 33.) On June 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed the
Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 34.) On March 24, 2015,
the Court screened Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
and found that it states certain cognizable
claims.[1] (ECF No. 36.) This case now proceeds on
the Second Amended Complaint, on Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claims against Defendants Holland, Stainer, and
Lundy, for denial of adequate outdoor exercise time; and
Defendants Lundy, Foster, Plumlee, Holland, Uribe, and Jordan
for deliberate indifference to unsanitary and unsafe
conditions stemming from failing to respond reasonably to
known conditions including defective plumbing, dripping
water, mold, and flooding in Plaintiff’s cell.
Because
the Court found certain cognizable § 1983 claims in
screening the Second Amended Complaint, the Court exercised
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims that form part of the same case or controversy as
Plaintiff’s cognizable federal claims. The Court made
no determination about the viability of Plaintiff’s
state law claims that related to general negligence, premises
liability, violation of the Bane Act, and failing to comply
with rules and policies.
On
March 8, 2016, Defendants filed a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment, or in the alternative, partial summary judgment.
(ECF No. 74.) In that same motion, Defendants included a
motion for an order requiring security from a vexatious
litigant. On March 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed an opposition to
the motion.[2] (ECF No. 76.) On April 1, 2016, Defendants
filed a reply. (ECF No. 77.) Defendants’ motion is now
before the Court. Local Rule 230(l).
II.
PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff
is a prisoner in the custody of California Department of
Corrections (“CDCR”), presently incarcerated at
Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) in Crescent
City, California. The events at issue in the Complaint
allegedly occurred at California Correctional Institution
(“CCI”), when Plaintiff was incarcerated there.
Plaintiff’s factual allegations follow.
From
February 11, 2011 through March 27, 2012, Plaintiff was
housed in the segregated housing unit (“SHU”) at
CCI. During the thirteen months he was housed in SHU,
Plaintiff’s exercise time averaged around 12 minutes
per day. Additionally, Plaintiff’s exercise area
amounted to a 150 square foot metal cage, which was only 25
square feet larger than Plaintiff’s cell. The small
size of the exercise area was such that Plaintiff was unable
to run, jog, or walk laps. Plaintiff repeatedly requested
that he be provided adequate exercise time and an adequate
exercise area; however, these requests were denied. Plaintiff
suffered serious physical injuries and psychological
injuries.
Baffles
that eroded with time created a back-flowing problem within
the cells at CCI. Sewage from the toilet of one cell fills
the toilet of another cell each time the toilet is flushed.
The toilets lack covers, and each time a prisoner flushes
toilet waste, sewage particles fly into the air. Plaintiff
was forced to eat every meal in his cell in these conditions.
Plaintiff wrote Defendants and made each of them aware of the
unsanitary conditions. Plaintiff requested that if he could
not get the toilets fixed immediately, that he at least have
access to a scrub pad, gloves, and cleaner, in order to
sanitize his cell. Plaintiff’s requests went
unanswered. Plaintiff contracted a skin infection and stomach
illness which caused him pain, itching, burning, and
suffering.
In
November 2011, Plaintiff was placed in a cell that had a
leaking roof. The leaking was constant, and Plaintiff
observed mold patches all along the five to six foot crack in
his ceiling. Plaintiff submitted numerous work orders and
complained directly to numerous Defendants, however, the leak
was never fixed. Plaintiff slipped and fell on the concrete
floor, which resulted in a back injury. Plaintiff also
suffered respiratory injuries.
Plaintiff
requests monetary damages as relief.
III.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.
Legal Standard
Any
party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)
(quotation marks omitted); Washington Mutual Inc. v.
U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each
party’s position, whether it be that a fact is disputed
or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular
parts of materials in the record, including but not limited
to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2)
showing that the materials cited do not establish the
presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). The Court may consider other materials
in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not
required to do so. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th
Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz.,
609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).
Defendant
does not bear the burden of proof at trial and in moving for
summary judgment, he need only prove an absence of evidence
to support Plaintiff’s case. In re Oracle Corp.
Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986)). If Defendant meets his or her initial burden, the
burden then shifts to Plaintiff “to designate specific
facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for
trial.” Id. (citing Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 323). This requires Plaintiff to “show more
than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.”
Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
In
judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court
may not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting
evidence, Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509
F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007), and it must draw all
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
precludes entry of judgment, Comite de Jornaleros de
Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936,
942 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1566 (2012). The
Court determines only whether there is a genuine issue for
trial and in doing so, it must liberally construe
Plaintiff’s filings because he is a pro se
prisoner. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th
Cir. 2010).
B.
Failure to Exhaust an Available Administrative
Remedy
Initially,
Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s Appeals were not
filed timely making them procedurally deficient, and
therefore, Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust an
administrative remedy.[3] However, confronted with clear law,
Defendants withdrew the argument. Defendants’ Reply, p.
2. (ECF No. 77.) The Court briefly summarizes the issue for
the record below, and for the potential relevance to other
issues pending in this motion.
Defendants
allege that Plaintiff first became aware of the inadequate
exercise time, toilet backflow, and mold and leaking roof
issues when he first arrived to SHU on February 11, 2011.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff: (1) did not submit his
inadequate exercise time Appeal until December 17, 2011; (2)
did not submit his toilet backflow Appeal until September 4,
2011; and (3) did not submit his mold and leaking roof Appeal
until January 24, 2012. (RJN Exhs. N, P, R.) Because these
grievances were filed more than thirty days after the time
these continuing issues were first noticed, Defendants
initially claimed Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed
for non-exhaustion.
It is
undisputed that Plaintiff’s appeals were heard on the
merits. (RJN Exhs. N, P, R.) Plaintiff properly cites to
Reyes v. Smith, which recently held that the failure
to name defendants or comply with any procedural requirements
does not bar a claim if an Appeal is heard on the merits by
prison officials. 810 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2016). Courts
tend to agree that if the public entity accepted the Appeal,
and weighed in on the merits, the administrative remedy is
properly exhausted. Given that Plaintiff’s appeals were
accepted by CCI’s Appeals Coordinator, and heard on the
merits, the Court finds that Plaintiff properly exhausted the
appropriate administrative remedies in regards to his
appeals.
Defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to their argument pertaining
to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative
appeals has now been withdrawn.
C.
Failure to Comply with the California Government Claims
Act
Defendants
next argue that Plaintiff’s inadequate exercise time
and leaking roof Government Claims were submitted too long
after the first time these continuing issues arose, and
failed to name individual prison officials responsible for
these prison conditions. For these reasons, Defendants argue
that Plaintiff’s claims of negligence and violation of
the Bane Act should be dismissed on summary judgment.
In
opposition, Plaintiff maintains that his Government Claims
pertaining to inadequate exercise time and a leaking roof,
like his appeals, were accepted and heard on the merits. (RJN
Exhs. O, S.) Additionally, the Government Claims Board never
refused to accept either claim for failure to name
defendants. (RJN Exhs. O, S.) As to Defendants’
argument that Plaintiff waited too long to file his lawsuit
after learning of his leaking roof Government Claim denial,
Plaintiff maintains that summary judgment should be denied
because the limitations period was tolled while he was
exhausting administrative remedies.[4]
1.
Legal Standard
The
requirement to submit a Government Claim is a separate
requirement from the requirement to exhaust an available
administrative remedy, both of which must be satisfied before
suit can be filed. LaCava v. Merced Irrigation
Dist., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36050 *39 (E.D. Cal. March
16, 2012). The Government Claim requirement applies to
Plaintiff’s claims of negligence under California law
and violation of the Bane Act, California Civil Code section
52.1, with respect to the alleged denial of exercise time and
roof leaks. The California Government Claims Act requires
that before a claim for money or damages is brought against a
state entity, the claim must have first been presented to,
and acted upon or rejected by, the Victims Compensation and
Government Claims Board (“VCGCB”). Cal. Gov. Code
§ 945.4. A plaintiff must plead compliance with this act
in his complaint or be subject to dismissal for failure to
state a claim. Mangold v. California Pub. Utils.
Com’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). Under
Government Code section 911.2(a), a Government Claim must be
submitted within six months of the accrual of the cause of
action.
Based
on the doctrine of equitable tolling, the running of the
six-month limitations period under the California Government
Claims Act can be suspended in certain instances. Addison
v. State, 21 Cal.3d 313, 316 (1978). As the court in
Addison held, “occasionally and in special
situations, the foregoing statutory procedure does not
preclude application of the equitable tolling doctrine, the
purpose of which is to soften the harsh impact of technical
rules which might otherwise prevent a good faith litigant
from having a day in court.” Id. “In the
case of a [prisoner] who has acted in good faith to pursue
his claims, the balance tips sharply in favor of equitable
tolling the statute of limitations to ensure fundamental
practicality and fairness.” Jones v. Blanas,
393 F.3d 918, 929 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations
omitted). Application of the doctrine of equitable tolling
“requires a balancing of the injustice to the plaintiff
occasioned by the bar of his claim against the effect upon
the important public interest or policy expressed by the
limitations statute.” Id. at 928 (internal
punctuation omitted).
2.
Discussion
In
regards to Plaintiff’s inadequate exercise time Claim,
Defendants allege that Plaintiff knew of the issue and
alleged injury beginning on February 11, 2011, the first time
these continuing problems took place, but that a Claim was
not submitted until August 20, 2012. (RJN Ex. O.)
Additionally, the Claim also failed to list the names of the
staff members involved.
Though
there is dispute as to whether the claims were procedurally
deficient, it is undisputed that Plaintiff did file
Government Claims pertaining to inadequate exercise time and
a leaking roof. (RJN Exhs. O, S.) The claim intake letters,
provided by Defendants, each state that “The VCGCB will
act on your claim at the . . . hearing. You do not need to
appear at this hearing. The VCGCB’s rejection of your
claim will allow you to initiate litigation should you wish
to pursue this matter further.” (RJN Exhs. O, S.) These
letters sufficiently show that Plaintiff’s Government
Claims, at the very least, were allowed to proceed to a
hearing before the Government Claims Board. Therefore,
irrespective of any procedural deficiencies, the Government
Claims Board accepted Plaintiff’s claims and did not
reject them for being late.
The
issue of when a claim accrues in the case of a continuing
violation is not a clear one. Where a temporary and brief
leak in a roof (or any of the other alleged problems) may not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation, a continued
and unfixed leaky roof over a long period of time may. The
Court is not persuaded that the claim for such continuing
violations began to accrue on the first day the issue was
noticed. In the end, the Court looks to the fact that the
Government Claims Board accepted Plaintiff’s complaint
without finding it deficiently late. The Court does not find
any case precedent establishing applicable law related to
deficient Government Claims that are nonetheless accepted and
heard on the merits. Nonetheless, the Court finds that the
same principle regarding deficient administrative appeals
heard on the merits, discussed above, is guiding here for the
same reason. The principle, provided by the court in
Reyes, contends that the failure to name defendants
or comply with any procedural requirements does not bar a
claim if an Appeal is heard on the merits by prison
officials. 810 F.3d at 659. The Court finds that, if the
public entity accepted the Claim and weighed in on the
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