United States District Court, S.D. California
WILLIAM ANDERSON, CDCR No. AT-8924, Plaintiff,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA; RICHARD J. DONOVAN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; O'DELL; P. CORTEZ; G. STRATTON; PARAMO; C. YORK; E. AUKERMAN, Defendant.
William Anderson, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILING
TO STATE A CLAIM AND FOR SEEKING MONETARY DAMAGES AGAINST
ALAN BURNS, District Judge.
13, 2016, William Anderson ("Plaintiff"), a state
inmate currently incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison, and
proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint
("Compl.") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No.
1). Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his Complaint; instead, he
filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No.
20, 2016, this Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to
Proceed IFP but simultaneously dismissed his Complaint for
failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
and for seeking monetary damages against immune defendants.
(Doc. No. 4). Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended
complaint to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified
in the Court's Order. Id. at 7-8. On June 24,
2016, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint
("FAC"). (Doc. No. 8).
Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)
Standard of Review
Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires the
Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding
IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated
or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for,
or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or
the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial
release, or diversionary program, " "as soon as
practicable after docketing." See 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must
sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a
complaint, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b);
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson,
621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
complaints must contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ( citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). "Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief [is]... a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense." Id. The
"mere possibility of misconduct" falls short of
meeting this plausibility standard. Id .; see also
Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity, and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also
Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)
("[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim,
a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact
and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff."); Barren v. Harrington, 152
F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)
"parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil
while the court "ha[s] an obligation where the
petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to
construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner
the benefit of any doubt, " Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) ( citing
Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir.
1985)), it may not "supply essential elements of claims
that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Board of
Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268
(9th Cir. 1982). "Vague and conclusory allegations of
official participation in civil rights violations" are
simply not "sufficient to withstand a motion to
U.S.C. § 1983
1983 creates a private right of action against individuals
who, acting under color of state law, violate federal
constitutional or statutory rights." Devereaux v.
Abbey,263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983
"is not itself a source of substantive rights, but
merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred." Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). "To establish § 1983 liability, a
plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2)