United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT, REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING, MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY DISTRICT JUDGE, AND MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
DOCKET NOS. 201, 202, 203, 209, 212, 215, 222, 223
EDWARD
M. CHEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
In
2011, following two separate jury trials, Defendant Harjit
Bhambra was convicted of filing false statements related to
naturalization, filing false statements, unlawfully obtaining
naturalization and citizenship, preparing false tax returns,
and filing false tax returns. Docket Nos. 175, 180 at 3;
United States v. Bhambra, 505 Fed.Appx. 670 (9th
Cir. 2013). Judgment was entered on October 17, 2011. Docket
No. 175. Bhambra appealed his convictions to the Ninth
Circuit, who summarily affirmed and later denied his en
banc request. Bhambra, 505 Fed.Appx. at 670;
Docket No. 196. Bhambra then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, who denied certiorari on June 24, 2013. Docket
Nos. 177, 195, 199.
Roughly
three years later, Bhambra, proceeding pro se, filed
the present motions. Docket Nos. 202 (Mot. to Set Aside
Judgment), 209 (Req. for Evidentiary Hearing), 212 (Mot. to
Disqualify), 215 (Mot. to Appoint Counsel). Bhambra moves to
(1) set aside his convictions pursuant to Rule 60 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for fraud on the Court; (2)
disqualify Judge Illston;[1] and (3) have counsel appointed to
assist him. He also requests an evidentiary hearing.
Id. For the following reasons, Bhambra's motions
are DENIED.
II.
BACKGROUND
All of
Bhambra's motions appear to take issue with comments he
alleges took place during his sentencing hearing before Judge
Illston. See Mot. to Set Aside Judgment at 2; 203
(Mem. ISO Mot. to Set Aside Judgment) at 14; Req. for
Evidentiary Hearing at 4; Mot. to Appoint Counsel at 2.
Bhambra alleges that on October 11, 2011, Judge Illston
stated, “Don't you ever come back to this Court for
any reason, we do not want to see you back here ever . . .
.” See Docket. No. 206 (Bhambra Sworn
Affidavit) at 2-3. Bhambra alleges that after “getting
sober” the undersigned “deleted [this] hateful
statement from the official court record” and caused
the hearing transcript to reflect that the hearing occurred
on October 12, 2011. See Mot. to Set Aside Judgment
at 2, 4; Mem. ISO Mot. to Set Aside Judgment at 3-4, 7; Req.
for Evidentiary Hearing at 4-5; Mot. to Disqualify at 2. The
federal prosecutor and Bhambra's court-appointed attorney
then “conspired” to present these false court
records to the Ninth Circuit, resulting in the Ninth Circuit
“deliver[ing] a total miscarriage of justice” for
Bhambra. Mot. to Set Aside Judgment at 4.
Bhambra
apparently believes that this behavior intimidated him into
believing he was barred from ever accessing the justice
system and then “obstructing the federal proceedings
record, ” constituting fraud upon the Court that
warrants a reversal of his convictions.[2] See Mem.
ISO Mot. to Set Aside Judgment at 2; Mot. to Disqualify at 2.
He likewise moves the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing on
this matter and to appoint him counsel to advance his
allegations.
III.
DISCUSSION
Bhambra
moves the Court for relief pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which, as applicable to this set of
facts, provides: “On motion and just terms, the court
may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for . . . any other reason [than those listed]
that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Bhambra
specifically cites Federal Civil Rule 60(d)(3), which
provides: “This rule does not limit a court's power
to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.”
As an initial matter, Bhambra's Rule 60(b) motion is
untimely. “[A] Rule 60(b)(6) motion 'must be made
within a reasonable time, ' Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1), and
Rule 60(b)(6) relief 'is available only where
extraordinary circumstances prevented a litigant from seeking
earlier, more timely relief.” Johnson v. CFS II,
Inc., 628 Fed.Appx. 505, 505 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.,
984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, CV 93-4072 SVW (SHx),
2004 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 28528, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2004)
(“Under prevailing Ninth Circuit doctrine, Rule
60(b)(6) is to be utilized only where extraordinary
circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to
prevent or correct an erroneous judgment”). Here,
Bhambra waited over four years to file his Rule 60(b) motion,
despite the minute order and transcript for the hearing
(which Bhambra relies upon as “evidence” of the
alleged fraud) having been available since October and
November 2011. Having reviewed Bhambra's voluminous
filings -- including a 93-page memorandum of points and
authorities -- the Court has not found any explanation for
what “extraordinary circumstances, ” if any,
prevented him from seeking timely relief.
The
Court also finds that there is no showing that “fraud
on the court” was committed. The Ninth Circuit has
directed that the term “fraud on the court”
“should be read narrowly, in the interest of preserving
the finality of judgments.” Toscano v.
Commissioner, 441 F.2d 930, 934 (9th Cir.1971).
“Simply put, not all fraud is fraud on the court. To
constitute fraud on the court, the alleged misconduct must
“harm[ ] the integrity of the judicial process.”
In re Levander, 180 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted). In order to determine whether there has
been fraud on the court, this circuit has reasoned that the
conduct alleged should “embrace only that species of
fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or
is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the
judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its
impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for
adjudication.” Id. (citations omitted).
Here,
Bhambra does not allege fraudulent conduct that imperils the
integrity of the judgment rendered against him. Bhambra was
already convicted by a jury prior to the allegedly offending
sentencing comments being made. In other words, he attempts
to attack his conviction by relying on statements made
after the jury verdict was entered. To the extent he
contends that the “fraudulent” hearing transcript
affected the Ninth Circuit proceedings, the Ninth
Circuit's denial of Bhambra's appeal of his
conviction was based on the merits of the case, not the
sentencing proceedings. Therefore, he has not demonstrated
why the sentencing proceedings would have changed the Ninth
Circuit's decision.
This,
of course, assumes that Bhambra has alleged fraudulent
conduct that suggests that the judicial machinery was somehow
thwarted; he has not. It is a serious matter to accuse a
federal judge of fraud on the court, and the evidence
presented here is unpersuasive. The primary evidence of
“fraud” relied upon by Bhambra is that the minute
order incorrectly states that the sentencing hearing occurred
on October 12, 2011 (rather than October 11, 2011), while the
transcript of proceedings correctly states the date of
October 11, 2011 but lists it as a Wednesday instead of a
Thursday. See Docket Nos. 173, 180 (Oct. 11, 2011
Trans.). It is clear from the record that the sentencing
hearing occurred on October 11, 2011. These typos do not in
any way evidence a larger plot to defraud the court, or are
related to Bhambra's allegations that Judge Illston made
the statements he claims she made.[3] Even if Judge Illston had
made the alleged comments, it is frankly every trial
judge's wish that a criminal defendant reform his ways
and not appear before that judge in a future, similar
proceeding.
IV.
...