United States District Court, E.D. California
DEMOIN C. STROMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, et al., Defendants.
Demoin
C. Stroman, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
ORDER & FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CAROLYN K. DELANEY, Magistrate Judge.
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff
is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and seeking relief
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to
this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
Plaintiff
requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis and has submitted
a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a). However, the court will not assess a filing fee at
this time. Instead, the undersigned will recommend summary
dismissal of the complaint.
II.
Screening Standard
The
court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous
or malicious, " that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1), (2).
A claim
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,
1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The
critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however
inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis.
See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.
1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
In
order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a
complaint must contain more than "naked assertions,
" "labels and conclusions" or "a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, "[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements do not suffice." Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim
upon which the court can grant relief has facial
plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When
considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations
as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200
(2007), and construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
III.
Discussion
This
action proceeds on the amended complaint filed July 11,
2016.[1] Plaintiff names Dr. Matolon, a mental
health supervisor at California Correctional Health Care
Services, as the sole defendant. (ECF No. 6 at 2.) Plaintiff
alleges that Matolon mishandled his confidential personal and
medical information in violation of state law and federal due
process. Plaintiff alleges that a laptop containing his
confidential information was left unattended in a personal
vehicle and stolen. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims he was
deprived of property "in the form of electronically
stored confidential, medical, mental health and custodial
records without due process of law, leaving them vulnerable
to disclosure[.]" (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff states he has
not pursued administrative remedies for this issue because
none are available. (Id. at 3-5.) Plaintiff seeks monetary
damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 6.)
First,
plaintiff is required to establish standing for each claim he
asserts. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332, 352 (2006). If a plaintiff has no standing, the court
has no subject matter jurisdiction. Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. Adams, 629 F.2d 587, 593 n. 11 (9th Cir.
1980) ("[B]efore reaching a decision on the merits, we
[are required to] address the standing issue to determine if
we have jurisdiction."). There are three requirements
that must be met for a plaintiff to have standing: (1) the
plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is both
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent; (2) there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; and (3) it must be likely that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992);
Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271
F.3d 835, 847 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Here, plaintiff has
not shown he has standing to sue because the complaint
demonstrates only that the theft of the state's laptop
has the potential to injure plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges no
actual misuse of his personal information stemming from the
theft.
Second,
the violation of state tort law, state regulations, rules and
policies of the CDCR, or other state law is not sufficient to
state a claim for relief under § 1983. To state a claim under
§ 1983, there must be a deprivation of federal constitutional
or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976). Although the court may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims, plaintiff must first have
a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367.
Third,
plaintiff does not allege that defendant Matolon is liable
for any constitutional violation. An individual defendant is
not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish
the defendant's personal involvement in the
constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between the
defendant's wrongful conduct and the alleged
constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. Black, 885
F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588
F.2d 740, 743-44 ...