United States District Court, C.D. California
STEPHEN H. JOHNSON, PAULA A. JOHNSON, Plaintiffs,
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA., Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
D. PREGERSON United States District Judge.
before the court is Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss. Having considered the
submissions of the parties, the court grants the motion and
adopts the following Order.
Stephen and Paula Johnson (“Plaintiffs”) filed an
action against Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(“Defendant”) in the San Bernardino County
Superior Court in March 2014. (Case No.
5:14-cv-00777-DDP-JEMx, the “First Action”). The
case was later removed to this court. In the First Action,
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant did not have standing to
initiate foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiffs’
property because Defendant did not acquire the right to
enforce a deed of trust that was executed as part of
Plaintiffs’ refinancing of their home in November 2006.
(First Action Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiffs alleged five causes of
action: “(1) Quiet Title; (2) Violations of Business
and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.; (3)
Quasi-Contract; (4) Negligence; and (5) Wrongful Foreclosure.
(Id.) Defendant filed a motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which this Court granted. (First
Action Dkt. No. 21.) Plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside
the judgment, which the Court denied. (First Action Dkt. No.
then filed a second state court action against Defendant.
(Case No. 5:14-cv-01372-DDP-JEMx, the “Second
Action”). The case, like its predecessor, was then
removed to this Court. In the Second Action, Plaintiffs
alleged the same underlying facts as the First Action and
brought a claim for Quiet Title. (Second Action Dkt. No. 12.)
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint on res judicata grounds and the court
granted the motion.
then filed the instant action in this Court (the “Third
Action)” against Defendant, alleging causes of action
for violation of the Truth in Lending Act
(“TILA”), quiet title, and “cancellation of
instrument.” Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) alleges the same underlying facts as the
First and Second Actions, and bring a single claim for
declaratory relief pursuant to TILA and based upon a Notice
of Rescission allegedly sent to Defendant in July 2015.
Defendant now moves to dismiss the FAC.
complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court
must “accept as true all allegations of material fact
and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d
443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Although a complaint need not
include “detailed factual allegations, ” it must
offer “more than an unadorned,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations or
allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal
conclusion “are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Id. at 679. In other words, a pleading
that merely offers “labels and conclusions, ” a
“formulaic recitation of the elements, ” or
“naked assertions” will not be sufficient to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id.
at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.”
Id. at 679. Plaintiffs must allege “plausible
grounds to infer” that their claims rise “above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief” is a
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
contends that this action, like the Second Action before it,
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata
“bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims
that were raised or could have been raised in the prior
action.” Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,
Inc. 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001); W. Radio
Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir.
1997). It applies when there is “1) [an] identity of
claims, 2) a final judgment on the merits, and 3) identity or
privity between the parties.” W. Radio Servs.
Co., 123 F.3d at 1192.
Identity of Claims The Ninth Circuit relies on four factors
to determine if there is an identity of claims. The factors
(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior
judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the
second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is
presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits
involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the
two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of
Harris v. Jacobs, 621 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1980);
Constantini v. Trans World Airlines,681 F.2d 1199,