United States District Court, C.D. California
RONALD W. BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
& DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
HONORABLE KENLY KIYA KATO United States Magistrate Judge.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs
Ronald W. Brown and Sandra L. Brown
(“Plaintiffs”) have filed a pro se First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to Title 42 of
the United States Code, section 1983. Plaintiffs allege
Defendants Pacific Gas and Electric Company and Does 1
through 10 violated Title 42 of the United States Code,
Sections 1983 (“Section 1983”) and 1985(3)
(“Section 1985(3)”). Defendant Pacific Gas and
Electric Company (“Defendant”) filed a Motion to
Dismiss the FAC (“Motion”), which the Court
grants for the reasons below.
II.
BACKGROUND
On
April 11, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a civil rights complaint
(“Complaint”) alleging Defendant violated (1) the
Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”); and (2)
Plaintiffs’ civil rights under Sections 1983, 1985(3),
and 1986. See ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1,
Compl.
On June
10, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the FAC alleging Defendant
violated Plaintiffs’ civil rights under Sections 1983
and 1985(3). Dkt. 29, FAC. According to the FAC, Plaintiffs
own real property in Hinkley, California. Id. at 6.
Plaintiffs allege Defendant failed to remove hexavalent
chromium from Hinkley’s aquifers and the aquifers have
“connection via private individual water well . . .
made by similarly situated Plaintiff(s).” Id.
at 7. Plaintiffs further allege Defendant poisoned
Hinkley’s aquifers “with URANIUM, in
concentration way over 1000%, thus way over the EPA’s
legal limits.” Id. at 14. Additionally,
Plaintiffs allege Defendant caused the water beneath
Plaintiffs’ real property, “the only source of
ground drinking” water to be “poisoned with
ARSENIC, and URANIUM, way over the Federal and State
EPA’s legal limits.” Id. at 12.
Plaintiffs claim to have suffered “irreparable harm
health injuries as a direct result of being poisoned with
toxic chemicals by Defendant’s operations.”
Id. at 6.
In
addition, Plaintiffs allege Defendant “has performed
CONCERTED, I[N]TERTWINED, AND JOIN[T] ACTIVITY’S ACTION
with state actors” to poison water in Hinkley.
Id. at 7. Plaintiffs further allege Defendant and
state actors “conspired for the purpose of depriving
Plaintiff(s) of equal protection of the law and for the
purpose of preventing and hindering the constituted
authorities from giving and securing to Plaintiff(s) equal
protection of the law and deprivation of life, liberty and
property without due process of law.” Id. at
10. Plaintiffs also allege Defendant was “a willful
participant in joint activity with the State or its
agents” and violated Plaintiffs’
“constitutional rights under color of law, in bad
faith, and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and
willful disregard of Plaintiff(s) human, safety, and property
rights.” Id. at 4, 8. Plaintiffs seek monetary
damages and costs. Id. at 16-17.
On June
28, 2016, Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss the FAC. Dkt.
30-1, Mot. Defendant argues: (1) the SDWA preempts
Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 and 1985(3) claims; (2)
Plaintiffs “allege neither membership in a protected
class nor invidious discrimination” in their Section
1985(3) claim; (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege “they
suffered injury as a result of [Defendant]’s concerted
action with government actors” in their Section 1983
claim; and (4) Plaintiffs claims are untimely.[1] Id. at
2-8. On July 12, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition. Dkt.
35, Opp.; Dkt. 36, Decl.; Dkt. 37, Mem. Points &
Authorities.[2] On July 21, 2016, Defendant filed a Reply.
Dkt. 39, Reply. This matter is thus submitted for decision.
/// /// /// ///
III.
LEGAL
STANDARD
A
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
“where there is no cognizable legal theory or an
absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable
legal theory.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990,
996 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). In considering whether a complaint states a claim,
a court must accept as true all of the material factual
allegations in it. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889,
892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the Court need not accept as
true “allegations that are merely conclusory,
unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig.,
536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Although
a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004
(9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
complaint “must contain sufficient allegations of
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