United States District Court, N.D. California, Eureka Division
CASHELLA I. BENJAMIN, Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOCS. 21,
24.
NANDOR
J. VADAS United States Magistrate Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff
Cashella I. Benjamin seeks judicial review of an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) decision denying
her application for supplemental security income under Title
XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff’s request for
review of the Administrative Law Judge's
("ALJ’s") unfavorable decision was granted by
the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council made new findings
and then issued its decision finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled. The decision is the “final decision” of
the Commissioner of Social Security, which this court may
review. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3). Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction
of a magistrate judge. (Docs. 10 & 13.) The court
therefore may decide the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the court
will deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and
will grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
LEGAL
STANDARDS
The
Commissioner’s findings “as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court
has a limited scope of review and can only set aside a denial
of benefits if it is not supported by substantial evidence or
if it is based on legal error. Flaten v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir.
1995). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere
scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Sandgathe v. Chater,
108 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 1997). “In determining
whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence, ” a district court must review
the administrative record as a whole, considering “both
the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts
from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Reddick
v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The
Commissioner’s conclusion is upheld where evidence is
susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.
Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.
2005).
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
Plaintiff
applied for supplemental security income under Title XVI of
the Social Security Act (Act), on September 7, 2011. (AR
314-22.) The agency denied Plaintiff’s application
initially and on reconsideration. (AR 112-53.) Plaintiff,
accompanied by her attorney, testified at a hearing before an
ALJ. (AR 57-93.) On November 12, 2013, the ALJ issued a
hearing decision, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled.
(AR 40-50.) On March 20, 2015, the Appeals Council notified
Plaintiff that it granted her request for review. (AR 12.) On
April 15, 2015, Plaintiff requested an additional 30 days to
submit evidence. (AR 18.) The Appeals Council issued its
final decision on April 20, 2015. (AR 12-15.) The Appeals
Council adopted the ALJ’s findings at Step 1 through
Step 3, the RFC finding and the credibility determination.
(AR 12-13.) The Appeals Council made new findings at Step 4,
and ultimately found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR
13-15.) On April 30, 2015, the Appeals Council sent
Plaintiff’s counsel a letter through facsimile machine
stating that Plaintiff could send new information within 25
days. (AR 2.) Plaintiff's counsel appears to have faxed
the Appeals Council documents on June 3, 2015. (AR 860-68.)
THE
FIVE STEP SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINING
DISABILITY
A
person filing a claim for social security disability benefits
(“the claimant”) must show that she has the
“inability to do any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment” which has lasted or is expected to last for
twelve or more months. 20 C.F.R. §§
416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.909. The ALJ must consider all
evidence in the claimant's case record to determine
disability (Id. § 416.920(a)(3)), and must use
a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether the
claimant is disabled (Id. § 416.920).
“[T]he ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly
develop the record and to assure that the claimant's
interests are considered.” Brown v. Heckler,
713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983).
Here,
both the ALJ and the Appeals Council evaluated
Plaintiff's application for benefits under the required
five-step sequential evaluation. (AR 12-14; 40-50.)
At Step
One, the claimant bears the burden of showing she has not
been engaged in “substantial gainful activity”
since the alleged date the claimant became disabled. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If the claimant has worked and the
work is found to be substantial gainful activity, the
claimant will be found not disabled. Id. The ALJ
found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since her alleged onset date. (AR. 42.) The Appeals
Council adopted that finding. (AR 12.)
At Step
Two, the claimant bears the burden of showing that she has a
medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). “An impairment is
not severe if it is merely 'a slight abnormality (or
combination of slight abnormalities) that has no more than a
minimal effect on the ability to do basic work
activities.'” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d
683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting S.S.R. No. 96-3(p) (1996)).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered the following severe
impairments: status post carpal tunnel release of the left
nondominant upper extremity; cutaneous lupus; and obesity.
(AR. 42.) The Appeals Council adopted the ALJ's finding.
(AR. 12.)
At Step
Three, the ALJ compares the claimant's impairments to the
impairments listed in appendix 1 to subpart P of part 404.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). The claimant
bears the burden of showing her impairments meet or equal an
impairment in the listing. Id. If the claimant is
successful, a disability is presumed and benefits are
awarded. Id. If the claimant is unsuccessful, the
ALJ assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) and proceeds to Step Four. Id.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e). Here, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed
impairments. (AR 45.) The Appeals Council adopted the
ALJ's finding. (AR 12). Next, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff retained the RFC “to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except she can stand and/or walk
for 4 hours in an 8-hour workday; sit without limitation; can
lift and/or carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds
occasionally; frequently climb ramps/stairs and balance;
occasionally stoop, kneel crouch, and crawl; can frequently
reach, handle and finger; can occasionally feel with the left
non-dominant upper extremity; and must avoid working around
heights and heavy machinery.” (AR 45.) The Appeals
Council adopted this finding. (AR 14.)
At Step
Four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was capable of
performing past relevant work. (AR 49.) The Appeals Council,
however, rejected this determination and found that Plaintiff
was unable to perform past relevant work. (AR 14.)
At Step
Five, after considering the Plaintiff's age, education,
work experience, and RFC, the Appeal Council determined that
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (AR 15.)
Accordingly, the Appeals Council found that Plaintiff had
“not been under a disability, ...