United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; DENYING
MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION RE: DKT. NO. 6
HAWOOD
S GILLIAM JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff,
an inmate at the Santa Clara County Jail, filed this pro
se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff has also filed a motion to proceed as a class
action. Docket No. 6. Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis in a separate order. For the
reasons stated below, the complaint is dismissed with leave
to amend and the motion for class certification is DENIED.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
Federal
courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in
which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or
dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if
the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, ” or
“seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b).
Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed,
however. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,
901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not
necessary; the statement need only “‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does
not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A
complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.
at 570.
To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,
and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B.
Legal Claims
Plaintiff
alleges that the following conditions of confinement at the
Santa Clara County Jail constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of his rights under the Eighth
Amendment: inadequate ventilation; poor air circulation; high
levels of lead and chemicals in the water; poor sanitation;
roach and gnat infestations; exposed plumbing; sewage leakage
in the pro-per phone room; mold in the showers; a
constant high pitched noise that affects Plaintiff’s
ears and Plaintiff’s sleep; and overcrowding that
exacerbates his mental health issues. Docket No. 1
(“Compl.”) at 3. Plaintiff also alleges that he
has been retaliated against for his civil lawsuits by being
forced to remain in a higher classification status than other
similarly situated inmates. Id. Plaintiff also
alleges that he fears for his safety because prison officials
“retaliate [against], beat, and murder mentally ill
inmates. Id. Plaintiff names as defendants Santa
Clara County and the Santa Clara County Department of
Corrections (“DOC”).
Liberally
construed, Plaintiff’s allegations that there is a
constant high pitched noise in the prison that affects
Plaintiff’s ears and Plaintiff’s sleep; and that
the prison is overcrowded, exacerbating his mental health
issues, state cognizable Eighth Amendment claims. See
Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996),
amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“[P]ublic conceptions of decency inherent in the
Eighth Amendment require that [inmates] be housed in an
environment that, if not quiet, is at least reasonably free
of excess noise.”) (quoting Toussaint v.
McCarthy, 597 F.Supp. 1388, 1397, 1410 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other
grounds, 801 F.2d 1080, 1110 (9th Cir. 1986)); see
Akao v. Shimoda, 832 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1987)
(allegations of increase in stress, tension, communicable
diseases, and confrontations between inmates due to
overcrowding states 8th Amendment claim). However, Plaintiff
has not stated an Article III controversy for his allegations
regarding inadequate ventilation; poor air circulation; high
levels of lead and chemicals in the water; poor sanitation;
roach and gnat infestation; exposed plumbing; sewage leakage
in the pro-per phone room; and mold in the showers. Article
III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2.
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1)
an injury in fact, meaning an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is both concrete and particularized, and
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a
sufficient causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs.
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Plaintiff has not
alleged that he has suffered injury from these particular
conditions of confinement. General grievances about
conditions of confinement do not state an Article III case or
controversy. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74 (“[A]
plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about
government-claiming only harm to his and every
citizen’s interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more
directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large-does not state an Article III case or
controversy.”). In addition, Plaintiff’s vague
allegation that there is exposed plumbing does not, without
more, state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff
does not explain how the exposed plumbing constitutes cruel
or unusual punishment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims
regarding inadequate ventilation; poor air circulation; high
levels of lead and chemicals in the water; poor sanitation;
roach and gnat infestations; sewage leakage in the pro-per
phone room; mold in the showers; and exposed plumbing are
DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff may attempt to cure
the identified deficiencies in an amended complaint by
specifying how these particular conditions of confinement
violated his constitutional rights, if he can do so in good
faith.
Liberally
construed, Plaintiff’s allegation that he was assigned
to a higher classification status than is appropriate in
retaliation for filing civil lawsuits states a cognizable
First Amendment retaliation claim. See Rhodes v.
Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First
Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An
assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against
an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected
conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s
exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action
did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional
goal.”).
Plaintiff’s
vague and conclusory allegation that he fears for his safety
because prison officials retaliate against, beat, and murder
mentally ill inmates fails to state a cognizable Eighth
Amendment claim. Although the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must
give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly
and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency,
733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege,
with at least some degree of particularity, overt acts which
Defendants engaged in that support Plaintiff’s claim.
Id.
Plaintiff’s
complaint suffers an additional deficiency. The complaint
does not state a claim against the named defendants.
Plaintiff has named as defendants Santa Clara County, or the
Santa Clara County DOC, which is a department of Santa Clara
County. To impose liability under Section 1983 against a
municipal entity such as Santa Clara County for a violation
of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the
plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which he or she
was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3)
that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the
policy is the moving force behind the constitutional
violation. Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of
Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997); see
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978). Plaintiff does not allege ...