United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER
Having
reviewed the allegations of the complaint and the
parties’ briefing, the court orders as
follows:[1]
The
complaint includes one claim, for wrongful death, asserted
against all of the defendants. To state a claim for wrongful
death, plaintiff must allege (1) the defendants were
negligent or did some other wrongful act, (2) this negligence
or wrongful act caused the death, and (3) she suffered a
pecuniary loss as a result. Quiroz v. Seventh Ave.
Ctr., 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1263 (2006).
A
surviving heir may bring a wrongful death claim after a
suicide. Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal.App. 2d 898');">180 Cal.App. 2d 898, 909
(1960). First, a plaintiff may succeed by alleging that the
“defendant intended, by his conduct, to cause serious
mental distress or serious physical suffering” and that
the defendant’s conduct in fact caused this distress or
suffering, which was “a substantial factor in bringing
about the suicide.” Id. (citation and
quotation marks omitted); accord, e.g., Nally v.
Grace Cmty. Church, 47 Cal.3d 278, 301 (1988). Second, a
defendant may also be liable if he or she negligently causes
a person to suffer from a mental illness, leading to
“an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide.”
Tate, 180 Cal.App. 2d at 915; accord, e.g.,
Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 997 F.Supp.2d
1071, 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2014).
Ms.
Golden’s factual allegations are too shallow to support
her case. They do not allow a reasonable inference that the
defendants’ wrongful acts were outrageous and a
substantial factor in bringing about the suicide, let alone
that the defendants meant to cause Mr. Golden serious
emotional distress or serious physical suffering. She alleges
generally that the defendants “harassed” Mr.
Golden, demoted him, deprived him of responsibilities, and
made false claims against him in retaliation for his
disclosures. Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 1-1. Neither is it
plausible on these allegations that the defendants caused Mr.
Golden to suffer from a mental illness. She alleges his
post-traumatic stress disorder predated his employment.
Id. ¶ 2. Finally, she does not specify which
defendants were responsible for which wrongful conduct, a
critical omission in light of the fact that three defendants
originally named in this case have since been voluntarily
dismissed. The court cannot draw a reasonable inference that
the remaining defendants are liable. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The
complaint is therefore dismissed with leave to amend. See
Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143,
1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Leave to amend . . . should be
freely given” absent “bad faith, undue delay,
futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.”
(citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted));
Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys.,
Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen
a viable case may be pled, a district court should freely
grant leave to amend.”).
Here, a
viable claim can likely be presented because “public
entities are generally liable for injuries caused by the
negligence of their employees acting in the scope of their
employment.” Hayes v. Cty. of San Diego, 57
Cal.4th 622, 629 (2013) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §
815.2). And an individual public employee is liable
“for injury caused by his act or omission to the same
extent as a private person.” Cal. Gov’t Code
§ 820(a). The court also cannot find at this early stage
that the individual defendants owed and breached no duty of
care. See Mem. P. & A. at 17-18.
The
defendants ask the court to limit any amendment to claims not
founded on statutes cited in Ms. Golden’s complaint.
Although the court recognizes the generalized, legal nature
of the defendants’ arguments, it declines to impose
this limitation without a more complete understanding of Ms.
Golden’s theory of the case and adequate factual
allegations. She and her counsel are nonetheless reminded of
their obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)
and are instructed to consider the citations offered in the
defendants’ current briefing. The parties are also
referred to the provisions of this court’s standing
order regarding efforts to meet and confer in advance of any
motion. See Standing Order at 4, ECF No. 3-1.
The
motion to dismiss is granted with leave to amend. An amended
complaint shall be filed, if at all, within twenty-one days
of the date this order is filed.
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Notes:
[1] In an effort to streamline resolution
of motions to dismiss in cases where the parties have
counsel, when the court is granting leave to amend it is
adopting a shortened form of order ...