United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
& DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND
KENLY
KIYA KATO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs
Aurang Zaib Khan and Halima Zahib (“Plaintiffs”)
have filed a pro se Complaint
(“Complaint”) pursuant to Title 42 of the United
States Code, section 1983. Plaintiffs allege Defendants
Pacific Gas and Electric Company and Does 1 through 10
violated Title 42 of the United States Code, Sections 1983
(“Section 1983”) and 1985(3) (“Section
1985(3)”). Defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company
(“Defendant”) filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint (“Motion”), which the Court grants for
the reasons below.
II.
BACKGROUND
On May
23, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a civil rights complaint
(“Complaint”) alleging Defendant violated
Plaintiffs’ civil rights under Sections 1983 and
1985(3). See ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1,
Compl. According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs live and own
real property in Hinkley, California. Id. at 7.
Plaintiffs allege Defendant failed to remove hexavalent
chromium from Hinkley’s aquifers “to which more
than 25 connections are made by similarly situated
Plaintiffs, thus such Aquifer is construed as [a]
‘Public System Aquifer.’” Id. at
8. Plaintiffs further allege Defendant has caused poisoning
of Hinkley’s Aquifer “with ARSENIC and URANIUM,
way over the Federal and State EPA’s limits.”
Id. at 13. Plaintiffs claim to have suffered
“irreparable harm health injuries . . . as a direct
result of Defendant[’]s operations.” Id.
at 7.
In
addition, Plaintiffs allege Defendant “has performed
CONCERTED, I[N]TERTWINED, AND JOIN[T] ACTIVITY’S ACTION
with state actors” to poison water in Hinkley.
Id. at 8. Plaintiffs further allege Defendant and
state actors “conspired for the purpose of depriving
Plaintiffs of equal protection of the law and for the purpose
of preventing and hindering the constituted authorities from
giving and securing to Plaintiffs equal protection of the law
and deprivation of life, liberty and property without due
process of law.” Id. at 11. Plaintiffs also
allege Defendant was “a willful participant in joint
activity with the State or its agents” and violated
Plaintiffs’ “constitutional rights under color of
law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless,
wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiffs’ human,
safety, and property rights.” Id. at 5, 9.
Plaintiffs seek monetary damages and costs. Id. at
17-18.
On June
14, 2016, Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint. Dkt. 9-1, Mot. Defendant argues: (1) the SDWA
preempts Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 and 1985(3) claims;
(2) Plaintiffs fail to allege “membership in a
protected class or invidious discrimination” in their
Section 1985(3) claim; (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege
“they suffered injury as a result of
[Defendant]’s concerted action with government
actors” in their Section 1983 claim; (4) Plaintiffs
claims are untimely; and (5) Plaintiffs fail to state a SDWA
claim.[1] Id. at 2-8. On June 27, 2016,
Plaintiffs filed an Opposition. Dkt. 14, Opp.; Dkt. 15, Mem.
Points & Authorities; Dkt. 16, Decl.[2] On July 7, 2016,
Defendant filed a Reply. Dkt. 17, Reply. This matter is thus
submitted for decision.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
A
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
“where there is no cognizable legal theory or an
absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable
legal theory.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990,
996 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). In considering whether a complaint states a claim,
a court must accept as true all of the material factual
allegations in it. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889,
892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the Court need not accept as
true “allegations that are merely conclusory,
unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig.,
536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Although
a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004
(9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
complaint “must contain sufficient allegations of
underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the
opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr
v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
“A
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,
and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Woods v. Carey,
525 F.3d 886, 889-90 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court has “an obligation
where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in
civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and
to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.”
Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If, however,
a court finds that a pro se complaint has failed to
state a claim, dismissal may be with or without leave to
amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th
Cir. 2000).
IV.
DISCUSSION
THE
SDWA PREEMPTS PLAINTIFFS’ CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS UNDER
...