United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER
ALLISON CLAIRE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
brings a complaint in pro se against his former employer,
Technicolor USA, Inc. (“Technicolor”) and
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (“MetLife”) for
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty arising from
the denial of long term disability benefits. This matter was
referred to the undersigned by Eastern District of California
Local Rule 302(c)(21). Several motions came before the
undersigned for hearing on July 27, 2016. Plaintiff appeared
at the hearing in pro se, and defendants were represented by
attorney Robert E. Hess. The following were argued and
submitted for decision: (1) Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss and to Strike, ECF No. 10; (2) Plaintiff’s
Motion to Remand, ECF No. 12; (3) Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend his Complaint, ECF No. 15; and (4) Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Adjudication, ECF No. 30.
I.
BACKGROUND
Technicolor’s
predecessor company, Thomson Inc., created a Disability Plan
for its employees on or about January 1, 2008. The Plan was
funded through insurance with MetLife. ECF Nos. 10-2, 10-3 at
4. Technicolor is the Plan administrator and MetLife is the
Claim administrator. ECF 10-3 at 4.
Plaintiff
alleges that he suffered from a serious heart disease that
required him to undergo two consecutive bypass and stent
surgeries in September and October 2009, when he was an
employee covered by the Plan. ECF No. 1-1 at 20-26. Plaintiff
was subsequently found by his psychologist to suffer from a
secondary mental disorder of severe depression, anxiety and
hopelessness with suicidal thoughts while attempting to
rehabilitate from the surgeries and their side effects. ECF
1-3 at 12:3-11. He was afforded disability benefits by
defendants on March 27, 2010, and was paid $5, 336.72 per
month, id. at 11:20-27, for approximately two years.
In March of 2012, plaintiff attempted to enroll in the
Plan’s “Return to Work” program, and was
told that he was being terminated because benefits related to
mental illness were limited to a two-year period. ECF No. 1-2
at 10-12.
Plaintiff’s
complaint was filed in Nevada County Superior Court on March
7, 2016. ECF 1-1 at 3. Defendants removed the action to
federal court on April 15, 2016. ECF No. 1. Insofar as the
court has concluded for the reasons which follow that the
Disability Plan at issue is indeed governed by ERISA,
jurisdiction is established under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
II.
ERISA PRINCIPLES AND REMOVAL JURISDICTION
The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was enacted
to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit
plans and, in order to assure success in that effort, it
includes “expansive preemption provisions ... which are
intended to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation
would be ‘exclusively a federal concern.’”
Aetna Health. Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208
(2004) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Deadeaux, 482
U.S 41 (1987)). “Therefore, any state law cause of
action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA
civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear
congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and
is therefore preempted.” Aetna, 542 U.S. at
209.
The
criteria for establishing that a disability plan is ERISA
regulated are: (1) a plan, fund or program; (2) established
or maintained; (3) by an employer; (4) for the purpose of
providing benefits; (5) to its employees. 29 U.S.C. §
1002(2)(A); Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Ins.
Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1988). Criterion (1)
“implies the existence of intended benefits, intended
beneficiaries, a source of funding, and a procedure to apply
for and collect benefits.” Donovan v.
Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir. 1982). The
Plan at issue here meets all these criteria. The Plan was
instituted by Thompson Inc. for the benefit of its employees
and was designed to provide them with benefits when they
suffered a disability that precluded them from working.
Plaintiff argues that this is not an ERISA controlled plan
since it is funded solely by insurance. But, as the Ninth
Circuit has determined, “[a]n employer . . . can
establish an ERISA plan rather easily. Even if an employer
does no more than arrange for a ‘group-type insurance
program, ’ it can establish an ERISA plan, unless it is
a mere advisor who makes no contributions on behalf of its
employees.” Credit Managers Ass’n of So. Cal.
v. Kennesaw Life and Accident Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617,
625 (9th Cir. 1986).
The
Plan here meets all of the ERISA criteria. Because
plaintiff’s complaint seeks relief from an ERISA
regulated Plan, the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over this dispute and removal was proper.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S.
58 (1987); Marin General Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire
Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s framing of his claims in state law terms
(breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty) does not
defeat removal, because those claims are preempted by ERISA.
Id. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Motion to Remand
will be denied.
III.
THE MOTION TO DISMISS
A.
Standards Under Rule 12(b)(6)
A
motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the
sufficiency of a complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc.,
349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). A complaint may be
dismissed as a matter of law for two reasons: (1) lack of a
cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a
cognizable theory. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d
729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
In
reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court will only
ascertain whether the nonmoving party has sufficiently
alleged claims that would entitle him or her to relief.
Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 2003).
In doing so, the Court assumes the truth of all factual
allegations and construes factual allegations in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Gompper v.
VISX. Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). However,
the court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation. “When there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). However, the
conclusions contained in the pleading “are not entitled
to the assumption of truth.” Id.
“Dismissal
can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the
absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In order
to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a
complaint must contain more than a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it
must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It
is insufficient for the pleading to contain a statement of
facts that “merely creates a suspicion” that the
pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action. 5 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§
1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal¸ 556
U.S. at 678.
In
reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court
“must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint, ” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), construe those
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena,
592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), and resolve all doubts in
the plaintiffs’ favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). The court need not accept as
true, legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual
allegations.” Western Mining Council v. Watt,
643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).
Moreover,
pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972). “Pro se complaints are construed
‘liberally’ and may only be dismissed ‘if
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d
903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)). However, the
conclusions contained in the pleading “are not entitled
to the assumption of truth.” Id.
B.
The ...